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Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the

Iran-Contra Affair

Appendix C
Chronology of Events

Lee H. Hamilton, *Chairman*,
House Select Committee
Daniel K. Inouye, *Chairman*,
Senate Select Committee

U.S. House of Representatives
Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran

U.S. Senate Select Committee
On Secret Military Assistance to Iran
And the Nicaraguan Opposition

November 13, 1987.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.
November 17, 1987.—Ordered to be printed.

Washington : 1988

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 226-7932

March 1, 1988

The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the House
U. S. Capitol
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the provisions of House Resolutions 12 and 330 and House Concurrent Resolution 195, 100th Congress, 1st Session, I transmit herewith Appendix C to the Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, House Report No. 100-433, 100th Congress, 1st Session.

Appendix C consists of a Chronology of Events about the Iran-Contra Affair. All contents of Appendix C have been declassified for release to the public.

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6480

March 1, 1988

Honorable John C. Stennis
President pro tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have the pleasure to transmit herewith, pursuant to Senate Resolution 23, Appendix C to the final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. We will submit such other volumes of Appendices to the Report as are authorized and as they become available.

Sincerely,

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman

Warren B. Rudman
Vice Chairman

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Publications of the Senate and House Select Committees

Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 1 volume, 1987.

Appendix A: *Source Documents*, 2 volumes, 1988.
Appendix B: *Depositions*, 27 volumes, 1988.
Appendix C: *Chronology of Events*, 1 volume, 1988.

All publications of the Select Committees are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

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Preface

This *Chronology of Events* covers the period from January 27, 1981, to November 18, 1987. It begins with an excerpt from President Reagan's remarks at a White House ceremony celebrating the release of Americans who had been held hostage by Iran for more than a year. It ends with the release of the *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair.*

The *Report* of the investigation is a joint publication of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. This *Chronology,* however, was prepared by the staff at the direction of the House Select Committee as an Appendix to the joint *Report.* Minority Members of the Select Committee filed a brief critique of the Chronology. The Senate Select Committee also prepared a chronology that is largely based on the joint public hearings held by the two Select Committees.

The House Select Committee took several steps to make this document something of a roadmap to guide students through Iran-Contra and to encourage further study of this historic time. Each entry is dated in a way that readers can easily determine the timeframe. When the date could not be pinpointed precisely, that fact is indicated. Each item is labeled to indicate at a glance to which facet of Iran-Contra the entry relates. The entries include Presidential statements and Congressional actions.

This format helps to demonstrate the interaction and the meshing of Iran-Contra events; the interplay and maneuvering of private agents and Federal Government officials who were secretly selling arms to terrorist Iran to free American hostages—contrary to U.S. public policy—and secretly diverting money from the sale to buy weapons for the Contras—also contrary to public policy and perhaps in violation of the law. It weaves together what was being said and done publicly and being said and done privately by this group of Government officials and private agents.

This *Chronology* contains a brief description of each event and sources to which one can refer for further study. Most sources are a matter of public record. The references, while comprehensive, are not all-inclusive, because of limitations on time and resources.

Some sources cited in this volume were not part of the Select Committees' public record or otherwise available publicly at the time the Select Committees released their joint *Report.* These sources are included as an appendix to this *Chronology.* The *Chronology* itself and all sources cited, including depositions, have been reviewed by the White House Declassification Committee and declassified for publication.

Other documents that underlie the factual statements made in this *Chronology* can be found in the Appendix publications of the Select Committees. These publications, listed elsewhere in this volume, contain the testimony taken at public hearings, sworn depositions, and source documents such as letters, memorandums, interoffice messages, transcripts of telephone calls, and so on. Where depositions are cited as sources, the page numbers cited were taken from the

individual depositions. These numbers are in the upper right-hand corner of the pages of the Appendix B volumes.

When an event involved several persons, an effort was made to track down the accounts of that event of as many participants as possible through testimony, depositions, and documents. In a few cases, a single source is relied upon to establish the facts of an event. Such events are included in the *Chronology* because they may add small but important details to the complex mosaic that makes up the Iran-Contra Affair.

The Minority Critique of The Majority's Chronology

Introduction

While the Minority has labored hard to assist the Majority in preparing a better chronology, and while the Minority believes that the succeeding chronology is a better product (more accurate, objective, complete and balanced) because of our input, we cannot, for the reasons set forth below, endorse this chronology and we therefore admonish all who may read it, and consider relying on it, to refer first to the Report (Minority and Majority) to insure you have a complete and accurate picture of the events.

Background

Unlike the drafting process followed in the preparation of the Majority Report, the chronology was not presented to the Minority for review and input *prior* to its being sent to the White House on December 23, 1987, for declassification. Indeed, it wasn't until the third week of January 1988, that the Minority learned from the White House Counsel's Office that a draft had been completed and sent to the White House for declassification. In the four weeks that followed, the Minority staff worked with the Majority to produce a chronology both sides could endorse. That effort was greatly handicapped by the fact that *both* staffs, at that point, had lost the overwhelming majority of their numbers; many of whom *alone* had a highly specialized knowledge of critical areas of the investigation. While many of the Minority's suggested changes and adoptions were accepted, the final product, though better, still cannot be endorsed.

Problems with the Chronology

The Minority's objection to the existing chronology cannot be stated in one word ("inaccurate") or even one sentence; there are a combination of problems that encumber it.

First, the concept of writing a comprehensive chronology *after* the overwhelming majority of the staff has left the Committee is a flawed one in light of the enormity of the project. A huge staff, Majority and Minority, labored unceasingly for months to produce a Report (Majority and Minority) that is comprehensive, accurate, and relevant. That Report is the product of the distillation and synthesis of hundreds of depositions, thousands of pages of testimony, and hundreds of thousands of documents. It spans 700 printed pages and was pored over in multiple drafts that were reviewed by *both sides*. This chronology, by comparison, was essentially produced over a three-week period between November 18 and December 23, 1987, after most of the staff had left the Committee. With their departure went their accumulated expertise in the various component parts of the investigation. Therefore, for a chronology to be produced that is *not* an

index of that combined effort by a group of experts, is to expect an almost inhuman and risk-fraught venture from a handful of people. The issue, therefore, with regard to the *reliability* of the chronology is *not* whether the individual items are accurate, rather: *whether the authors knew the subject matter surrounding each of the highly complicated series of events well enough to insure that they included all of the relevant and important facts regarding each of those series of events.* The Minority submits that it is impossible to expect that, and that this chronology is full of examples, some of which it no doubt failed to catch, of descriptions of events that are dangerously incomplete and therefore are likely to leave its readers with misimpressions.

One example the Minority noted and which the Majority amended related to Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams. The Majority's draft failed in its two prior drafts to include *any* reference to the circumstances under which Abrams learned from the CIA that its field officer, Tomas Castillo, was secretly communicating with the private benefactors and how he (Abrams) brought that to the attention of Secretary Shultz immediately upon learning it. If those facts had been left from the chronology, there would have been a *grave* misimpression about Abrams' role in those events.

While the Minority in its review did point this out, as well as other similar examples, it is confident that in other areas which are equally, if not more complicated, its limited staff lacked the expertise and time to insure that *all* of the essential facts had been included in all of the various areas. Therefore, since the chronology has been written independent of the Report, it is highly questionable, considering the extremely limited resources that went into it, that it is as comprehensive and balanced as the Report.

A second problem with the chronology is that *despite* suggestions by the Minority to the contrary, the Majority has persisted in selectively recounting certain events in such a way as to leave a misimpression of what happened with the reader who does *not* also refer to the Report. An excellent example of this is the chronology's treatment of the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua. The sum total of the treatment of the events surrounding the CIA's involvement with the mining of the harbors in Nicaragua is contained in two entries dated 4/1/84 and 4/2/84. The critical facts concerning those events were *much* more detailed and clearly included a series of briefings by the CIA to Congress and, more importantly perhaps, a Congressional change of direction in reaction to adverse public opinion. While those events are described at length in the Report at pages 489 and 490, neither of those entries was amended to include even a reference to the CIA briefings of Congress and the Congress' about-face. This chronology therefore, in some instances, gives a distorted and incomplete picture of certain facts which, even though *accurate*, is misleading.

A final problem with the chronology worth noting is the host of entries (particularly references to phone calls and meetings) which are stated cryptically and without explanation. This type of shorthand reference, particularly during the November 1986 investigation period, not only encourages speculation and innuendo, but fails to clarify for the readership events which are accounted for by the testimony of numerous witnesses.

Conclusion

Because of the reasons stated above, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of this chronology (especially in comparison to that done for the Report), the Minority respectfully refrains from endorsing this product and strongly encourages all who read it (and may rely upon it) to refer not only to the sources cited, but to the Report (Majority and Minority) in order to get a more *complete* and contextual reference to the events uncovered during this Committee's investigation.

Chronology of Events

1981

01/27/81 (IRAN)
President Reagan says at a White House ceremony marking the freeing of American hostages by Iran a week earlier: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear it said that we live in an era of limit to our powers. Well, let it be understood, there are limits to our patience."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 17, at 41.

06/01/81 (GENERAL)
Circa Navy Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter joins the National Security Council (NSC) staff as military assistant to the National Security Adviser. He becomes deputy to Robert C. McFarlane in 10/83, shortly before the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and National Security Adviser on 1/5/86, after McFarlane's resignation.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 12.

12/01/81 (CONTRA)
President Reagan signs a Finding authorizing covert operations against Nicaragua. The Administration informs the Congressional intelligence committees of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities in Nicaragua.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 13; Chron Ex. 1.

12/04/81 (GENERAL)
President Reagan signs Executive Order No. 12333, which puts the CIA in charge of covert operations unless the President orders otherwise.

Public Papers of the President, 1981, at 1128-1139.

12/04/81 (CONTRA)
Congressional authorization for $19 million in military assistance to the anti-Sandinista rebels, the Contras, is signed into law.

Congressional Research Service, Contra Aid: 1981-86, 1/28/87.

1982

01/01/82 (CONTRA)
Circa Adolfo Calero leaves Nicaragua in 1982, joins the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) and later becomes the president of the FDN, an anti-Sandinista Resistance organization.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 4.

06/08/82 (GENERAL)
President Reagan announces his "democracy inititative." ("Project Democracy.") He says the U.S. should work to build the "infrastructure of democracy" to support democratic forces and initiatives in other countries.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1982, Part 1, at 746.

07/01/82 (GENERAL)
Circa Gaston J. Sigur is full-time Senior Director of Asian Affairs on the NSC staff to 10/84. He continues part time until 3/86.

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 285-86.

08/03/82 (CONTRA)
A cabinet meeting discusses ways to build support for Administration policies, especially in Central America. McFarlane in an interview says, "Project Democracy" was to have a covert side operated by the NSC.

New York Times, 2/15/87, at 20.

09/27/82 (CONTRA)
The first Boland Amendment is enacted as part of the classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Bill. Funds are limited to interdicting arms to the El Salvador rebels and were not to be used to overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

P.L. 97-269, 96 Stat.; H.Rept. 98-122, at 8.

12/21/82 (CONTRA)
As part of the Defense Appropriations Act, Congress retains the Boland Amendment and prohibits the CIA from using money, arms, training or support for persons who seek the overthrow of the Sandinistas or provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

P.L. 97-377, Stat. 1865, Sc. 793.

1983

01/01/83 (GENERAL)
Circa Ret. Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord's CIA security clearance is terminated in 1983. He directed the Iran-Contra operations with Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North of the NSC staff. North joined the staff in 1981.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 218.

01/01/83 (CONTRA)
Circa From 1983 to 06/84, the FDN is funded by the U.S. Government. Arms and ammunition, food, clothing, and medicine are provided.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 6.

01/01/83 (GENERAL)
Circa In 1983, Albert Hakim, an Iranian expatriate, approaches Secord and asks him to join Stanford Technology Trading Group, Inc. (STTGI). Hakim and Secord each had a 50% share. STTGI was to market U.S. manufacturing companies overseas, mainly to foreign governments.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 198.

02/01/83 (GENERAL)
Circa In February 1983, Fawn Hall is detailed by the Department of Defense (DOD) to the NSC and becomes secretary to Lt. Col. North; she was his secretary until 11/25/86, when he was fired.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 464.

03/03/83 (GENERAL)
The unclassified full text of an NSC policy paper on the management of public diplomacy relative to national security is released—National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) No. 77. (Subsequently, the National Endowment for Democracy was established outside government and two public diplomacy offices were created in the State Department.)

Hearings, 03/03/83, Subcommittee on International Operations House Foreign Affairs Committee.

03/21/83 (IRAN)
Circa The State Department begins "Operation Staunch" to discourage other countries from selling arms to Iran. The program was in place at the time of the U.S. arms sales to Iran.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 12, 70; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 252-253.

07/12/83 Circa (CONTRA)
President Reagan directs DOD to provide greater support to the CIA in its efforts to assist the Contras. At the same meeting he authorizes the creation of a Central America Presidential Commission, also known as the Kissinger Commission.

Chron. Ex. 2.

07/18/83 (GENERAL)
President Reagan announces the formation of a Presidential Commission on Central America, headed by Henry Kissinger, in an effort to develop bipartisan support for the Adminstration's policies in Central America. The Commission's mandate is to undertake a study of Central America to understand the strategic significance of the area for the United States. The Commission will then issue recommendations on initiatives to improve long-term security, encourage social and economic development, and defeat Soviet and Cuban efforts in the region.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 19, at 1047.

09/19/83 (CONTRA)
President Reagan issues another Finding authorizing covert activities in Nicaragua. It is presented to the intelligence committees.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-2.

10/17/83 (GENERAL)
McFarlane becomes National Security Adviser, succeeding William Clark.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 12.

10/23/83 (IRAN)
Terrorists kill 241 U.S. military personnel at Beirut International Airport.

Media reports.

11/18/83 (CONTRA)
Congress limits Contra support to $24 million.

Congressional Record, Vol. 129, #161, at S. 16848, H. 10488.

11/18/83 (CONTRA)
In the Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress limits Contras to $24 million. The Boland restriction is not included.

P.L. 98-215; Sc.108; 97 Stat.1475; Congressional Record, Vol. 129, #161, at S. 16858, H. 10543.

12/12/83 (IRAN)
President Reagan says in an interview with Bruce Drake of the New York Daily News: "For example, in this in Kuwait, if this is an Iranian group—claims that this is part of a holy war and this is being done in the interests of the government of Iran, then I think Iran has a responsibility to curb and curtail these things being done in their name, just as I would feel if somebody went out doing these things and said they were doing them in the interest of the United States, I would feel that I had a responsibility to corral them and stop them."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 19, at 1685.

12/19/83 (IRAN)
President Reagan in an interview says: "We do have the evidence that Khomeini has spoken a number of times about advocating a holy war in the Moslem world to promote his type of fundamentalism. So, it's hard not to believe that he must, in some way, instigate or at least egg on those that are doing these things."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1983, part II, at 1718; Marvin Stone and Joseph Fromm, U.S. News and World Report, 12/15/83.

12/20/83 (CONTRA)
The Reagan Administration begins to consider a special plan in which DOD would declare $12 million in military equipment to be surplus and without value. This is to be used to supplement the $24 million approved by Congress for the Contras. The operation was never completed.

Joint Report, at 34-35.

12/27/83 (GENERAL)
President Reagan at a press conference says: "For terrorists to be curbed, civilized countries must begin a new effort to work together, to share intelligence, to improve our training and security and our forces, to deny havens or legal protection for terrorist groups and, most important of all, to hold increasingly accountable those countries which sponsor terrorism and terrorist activity around the world."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 19, at 1748.

1984

01/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Ret. Gen. John K. Singlaub, who will become a conduit for arms to the Contras, meets Calero to offer his help. He offers to raise private funds for the Contras. Calero approves, and Singlaub reports this to North.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 70. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 147.

01/23/84 (IRAN)
The Reagan Administration accuses Iran of supporting international terrorism and places it on a list of countries subject to strict export controls.

Media reports.

02/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Nicaraguan harbors are mined, angering the Congress when it becomes public some two months later.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 199.

03/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa North says the name "Secord" first came up in connection to the Contras in early 1984 as Contra aid was about to run out. William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, suggests using Secord to North. Casey wants North to use someone outside the Government. It is decided by North that the NSC would have increased responsibility as the CIA was phased out of covert operations.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 74, 116 and 100-7 part II, at 1-2; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 41.

03/01/84 (GENERAL)
Circa North says he first met Secord in 1981 in connection with the Saudi Arabian AWACs deal. In 1984, North says, he knew nothing of Secord's security clearance problems.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 2. Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 48.

03/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa McFarlane comes to see North and asks for recommendations regarding Contra money raising. North then goes to Casey to seek his advice.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 3.

03/07/84 (GENERAL)
Jeremy Levin, Beirut Bureau Chief for the Cable News Network, is seized in Lebanon.

Media reports.

03/16/84 (IRAN)
CIA officer William Buckley is kidnapped in Lebanon.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 231; Media reports.

03/31/84 (CONTRA)
North goes to Central America seeking cooperation for a network of private benefactors to the Contras.

North Calendar.

03/31/84 (CONTRA)
Circa During a regular meeting with a Country 2 official, McFarlane discusses the Contras' needs. Within a few days, the official contacts McFarlane, saying his country would contribute $1 million a month – "as a humanitarian gesture."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 16-17, 84-86, 130-35, 199-202, 215.

03/31/84 (CONTRA)
Circa McFarlane asks North to have Calero establish an offshore bank account.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 17. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 2-3.

04/04/84 (CONTRA)
After an FDN representative approaches Gray & Co., a public relations firm for which Robert Owen then worked, Owen approaches North, whom he had met previously. North tells him that the Contras know their funds are running out and were told to seek public relations representation in Washington. Owen becomes North's liaison to the Contras during the subsequent Boland ban on assistance to the Contras.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 325.

04/06/84 (CONTRA)
The mining of the Nicaraguan harbor is exposed. This hurts Administration efforts to gain supplemental funds for the Contras over and above the $24 million authorized in 12/83. McFarlane and other Administration officials discuss third-country contributions for the Contras.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 13, 199. George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 247.

04/10/84 (CONTRA)
Circa The Administration tells the World Court that it lacks jurisdiction in the case brought by Nicaragua against the U.S. over the mining of the harbors. (The court in June, 1986, ruled for Nicaragua.)

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 20, at 503-04.

04/18/84 (CONTRA)
Circa George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, says that he had opposed soliciting Country 1 for Contra assistance and made this position clear to McFarlane. McFarlane had proposed the solicitation earlier.

Shultz Testimony, Hearings, 100-9, at 13, Ex. GPS-A.

05/01/84 (CONTRA)
Singlaub, heading a panel on El Salvador, has his "first substantive meeting" with North.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 70.

05/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Ellen Garwood, a leading contributor to the Contra cause, first meets North.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 113.

05/08/84 (IRAN)
The Rev. Benjamin Weir is kidnapped in West Beirut, Lebanon.

Media reports.

05/09/84 (CONTRA)
Shultz learns that Howard Teicher of the NSC staff had approached Country 1 for a contribution to the Contras. Teicher says the U.S. would serve as a conduit. Shultz is not informed that McFarlane sent Teicher back to Country 1 for a second solicitation. Shultz later confronts McFarlane. McFarlane says Teicher was acting on his own. Teicher, however, tells the Ambassador that he was acting on specific instructions.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 13-14; Ex. GPS-A.

05/15/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Calero meets North in Central America. North asks Calero for his bank account numbers.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 7-8.

05/15/84 (CONTRA)
Circa CIA covert money is about to run out for aid to the Contras. Discussion of third-country solicitation has been going on since March.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 14-16, Ex. 29, at 456; Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 6.

05/30/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Owen takes leave from Gray & Co., travels to Central America and spends 4 days with Contra leaders discussing financial needs. He then sends a memo to North.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 327; Ex. RWO-1, at 776-77.

06/25/84 (CONTRA)
A National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting addresses questions of solicitation of third-country support for the Contras. Shultz says it would be necessary to do it with the support of Congress and the U.S. should not rely on other countries to provide support for vital U.S. interests.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 14-15.

06/25/84 (CONTRA)
Congress rejects $21-million supplemental funding for the Contras.

Congressional Record, Vol. 130, #88, at S. 8150.

07/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Country 2 money starts arriving at the rate of $1 million a month through 2/85. From 2/22/85 to 4/9/85, an additional $24 million arrives, for a total of $32 million. The million a month was given after McFarlane discussed the Contras with a Country 2 official.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 9; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-149; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 16-18.

07/15/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Calero says he spent approximately $19 million for arms and ammunition from 07/84 to 1986.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 11.

07/29/84 (CONTRA)
North contacts Secord, tells him that support for the Contras in Congress was greatly diminished, gives him a short briefing on the Contras and asks if he would help the cause. North testifies that he contacted Secord and others, including Singlaub, to see if they would be willing to purchase arms and sell them to the Contras.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 48-49; North Test, Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 147, 100-7 part II, at 1-2.

08/01/84 (GENERAL)
Draft of NSDD 159 on Covert Actions: "[C]overt action undertaken by the CIA shall be authorized only by a written Presidential Finding."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-101.

08/01/84 (CONTRA)
North and Tomas Castillo, a CIA officer in Central America, meet at a conference in Central America.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 7.

08/03/84 (IRAN)
The CIA issues a fabricator notice on Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian businessman and arms dealer. A fabricator notice is a message to the CIA around the world that a person "should not be dealt with because he's dishonest and untruthful."

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 190-91; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 8-10.

08/07/84 (CONTRA)
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, asks McFarlane where money for the Contras is coming from. McFarlane had successfully caused contributions from Country 2 of $1 million a month to be made to the Contras. According to Armacost, McFarlane says he does not know.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 17.

08/09/84 (CONTRA)
Circa North facilitates a short meeting between Secord and Calero at the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB). Shortly thereafter Secord and Rafael Quintero (whom Secord had brought with him as an adviser—"I am not a Latin American expert") meet with Calero at a hotel near National Airport in Washington, D.C. and discuss arms for the Contras.

Calero gives Secord a list of arms. Arms transactions soon begin through Canadian Trans World Arms and then with Thomas Clines, a former CIA employee with ties to Secord.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 49-54; Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 8.

08/15/84 (CONTRA)
Singlaub meets with North at the OEOB to discuss Singlaub's possible role in maintaining the Contras.

Singlaub Interview, 4/9/87.

08/17/84 (CONTRA)
North, Singlaub, Owen, and Calero meet in Dallas. Contra needs are discussed.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 329-30.

08/23/84 (CONTRA)
A CIA legal opinion on soon-to-pass Contra fund cutoff affecting CIA support for the Contras says, "No" even for CIA staff salaries. The opinion states: "The spirit of Section 107 is abundantly clear—the House expects Section 107 to end U.S. assistance to the Contras."

Chron. Ex. 3.

08/31/84 (CONTRA)
Circa The first Calero weapons order goes to Secord. The down payment comes in November, and the sea shipment arrives in April.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 13.

09/02/84 (CONTRA)
In a memo to McFarlane describing the downing of the only operating FDN helicopter, North requests permission to approach a private donor to replace the copter. McFarlane writes, "I don't think this is legal."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 22; Ex. 30B, at 461-62.

09/21/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Calero buys his first weapons from Gretech World. He buys through retired U.S. Col. James McCoy, former military attache in Nicaragua and now an arms dealer. Calero met McCoy in Nicaragua around 1978. Ronald Martin, another American arms dealer, is also associated with Gretech.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 12.

09/21/84 (CONTRA)
Circa North asks Secord to solicit Contra aid from Country 2. North tells Secord he had discussed this with McFarlane, who gave it his blessing. McFarlane testifies he told North it was not their job to tell Secord what he can or cannot do.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 55-56; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 40; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 80-81.

09/30/84 (CONTRA)
The CIA's Central American Task Force (CATF) Chief first meets North. He takes office on 10/9/84.

C/CATF Dep., 5/1/87, at 35.

10/12/84 (CONTRA)
Congress enacts legislation to prohibit the CIA and DOD "or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" from supporting, directly or indirectly, military assistance to the Contras. This became known as the "full Boland Amendment." It passed the Senate on October 11.

P.L. 98-473, Sec 8066(a), 98 Stat.1935; H.J. Res. 648; Congressional Record, Vol. 130, #133 part II, at H. 12107, Vol. 130, No. 134, S. 14226.

10/12/84 (CONTRA)
With the enactment of the Boland restrictions, McFarlane says he encouraged North to have the Contras become a credible fighting force but says he also tells North to remain within the law and away from fund raising. North says he never heard McFarlane's instructions and that he was authorized to do everything "that I did." North also testifies that McFarlane knew and approved all his acts to raise money from third countries to help fund the Contras. North stresses that "it was clear" my understanding that what I was doing was legal." McFarlane testifies that the President wanted "something to be done to aid the Contras" during the period of Boland proscriptions. McFarlane says that he reported to the President what he and his NSC staff were doing to carry out the President's wishes. McFarlane says he never told the President specifically what the staff was doing.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 5-6, 20-21, 199. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 75, 163.

10/22/84 (CONTRA)
A North memo defends the CIA "Assassination Manual." A memo to McFarlane, written at the request of Poindexter, defends the objectionable material in the manual. The existence of the manual, which was prepared for the Contras in 1983, was revealed in September 1984.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-178.

11/01/84 (CONTRA)
Circa At a meeting in the OEOB shortly before an Owen trip to Central America, North gives Owen maps and photos to be used by the Contras in a planned operation to destroy Sandinista military equipment. North tells Owen he got the material from "across the river," meaning the CIA or the Pentagon. North acknowledges that Owen carried intelligence from him to the Contras. He also testifies that he apprised his superiors "of intelligence that I was having passed to the Resistance."

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 331-32. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 153, 100-7 part II, at 173.

11/07/84 (CONTRA)
In memo to McFarlane, North seeks approval to continue providing intelligence support to Calero, in particular information to assist Calero in "taking out" Soviet-provided Hind-D helicopters. The memo indicates that DOD and the CIA had already provided North with information about both the Hinds and possible MIG shipments.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 31, at 463-65.

11/07/84 (CONTRA)
Circa The CATF Chief learns that Hind helicopters have been shipped to Nicaragua. He says that, while there were discussions about how to destroy the Hinds, it was very clear that the Agency's position was that it could not do anything. The CATF Chief says that, if he did provide North with intelligence at this time relating to the Hinds, it was not for the purpose of providing it to the Resistance.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 86-87; Ex. C/CATF-1.

12/04/84 (CONTRA)
North sends a memorandum to McFarlane informing him of his meeting with a Country 4 official in which they discuss arms for the Contras and his meeting with Singlaub about solicitation of Countries 3 and 5.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 32, at 466-70; Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 294-96.

12/04/84 (CONTRA)
McFarlane testifies that he was concerned that North's memo indicated North was not acting in conformity with the Boland Amendment. He asks Poindexter to investigate.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 30-31.

12/11/84 (IRAN)
White House statement on hijacking of Kuwaiti aircraft: "Previous actions by the government of Iran have shown that it has the capability to act rapidly and effectively to end hijackings when it so wishes. On this occasion, when the lives of innocent Americans, Kuwaiti and other citizens were at stake, it did otherwise."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 20, #50, at 1897.

12/15/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Owen is employed by Calero from 12/84 through 10/85. He then goes to the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Organization (NHAO).

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 428.

12/19/84 (CONTRA)
North takes a one-day trip to Central America.

North calendar.

12/21/84 (CONTRA)
Circa Felix Rodriguez, a former CIA official, meets North and tells him about his idea for using helicopters for counterinsurgency in El Salvador.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 287-88.

12/30/84 (IRAN)
Circa Michael A. Ledeen becomes an NSC staff consultant on terrorism.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 5-6.

12/31/84 (IRAN)
Circa Secord tells Hakim that he had been approached by the White House to assist with the "Nicaraguan initiative." Hakim asks Secord if profit was involved. Secord says, "definitely yes" in the form of commission. The profit percentage was to be between 20-30%.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 200-01.

January-June, 1985

01/08/85 (IRAN)
The Rev. Lawrence Martin Jenco is kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

01/09/85 (CONTRA)
Owen sets up IDEA, the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance, which in 1985 gets $50,000 from NHAO to serve as liaison with the Contras.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 432-33.

01/18/85 (GENERAL)
President Reagan issues NSDD 159 on covert actions.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 37; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-101.

01/22/85 (CONTRA)
Donald Gregg, an aide to Vice President Bush, arranges for Rodriguez to meet the Vice President. Rodriguez and Gregg worked together at the CIA. Rodriguez gives a picture presentation of the helicopter tactic he is about to take to Central America.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 288: Gregg Dep., 5/18/87, at 7, Ex. Gregg-1.

01/26/85 (IRAN/CONTRA)
On Nicaragua receiving aid from Iran, President Reagan says: "I believe that very possibly there has been some help in training and in certain types of munitions now that have come to them from Iran. The whole pattern is also this, that we knew that Iran has backed and supported certain terrorist activities. We also know that there are representatives of most of the prominent terrorist groups, world wide, in Nicaragua giving advice and training, and help to the Sandinista government."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #5, at 91-92.

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01/29/85 (CONTRA)
Secord asks Ret. Air Force Lt. Col. Richard B. Gadd, a close associate, to arrange for the charter of aircraft to deliver munitions from Country 15 to a Central American country to support the Contras. Gadd arranged for five or six such flights in 1985 and 1986.

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 8-12.

01/30/85 (CONTRA)
Transamerica Limited ships arms to a Central American country using false end user certificates.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 52.

02/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Country 2 doubles the monthly level of contributions to the Contras: total $24 million. The doubling follows a person-to-person meeting between President Reagan and a Country 2 official. McFarlane testifies that an official of Country 2 later told him that whether in this meeting or not, Country 2 had decided to double its monthly contributions.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 22-27, 84-86, 130-35.

02/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Singlaub, acting on his own initiative, presents three alternative Contra aid packages to Country 3 officials on his visit there. He proposes sending them a signal of approval from someone in the Administration.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 74-75.

02/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Singlaub travels to Country 5 and offers the Contra aid packages.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 75.

02/05/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Singlaub reports to North in Washington on his trip to Countries 3 and 5. He tells North a signal from the Administration would be appropriate. North tells Singlaub he will brief his superiors.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 76-77; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 77, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-72.

02/06/85 (CONTRA)
In a memo to McFarlane, North asks permission for Singlaub to approach Country 3 and urge them to "proceed with their offer... No White House/NSC solicitation would be made." North says he did ask Singlaub to take the steps outlined in the memo.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 34, at 476-79. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 77.

02/06/85 (CONTRA)
A North memo to McFarlane asks permission to provide Calero with information on the Monimbo, a Nicaraguan arms-carrying ship headed for home port.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 31-32; Ex. 33, at 471-72; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 96-98.

02/13/85 (GENERAL)
Jeremy Levin gains his freedom. It remains uncertain whether he escaped or was released.

Media reports.

02/15/85 (IRAN)
Circa A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) source tells agents he has contacts in Lebanon who could arrange for release of hostages—at a price.

Agent 1 Dep., 8/28/87, at 56-57.

02/21/85 (CONTRA)
In response to the question of whether he is aiding in "removal" or "toppling" of the Sandinista government, President Reagan says, not if the Sandinistas will turn around and say "Uncle" to the U.S.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #8, at 212, 214.

02/21/85 (CONTRA)
Owen picks up more maps from North to take to Central America. There is a foul-up: the maps are mounted on poster board and cannot be easily carried. The foul-up is remedied and Owen takes the maps to Central America. He may have carried a letter to Calero on his Central America trip describing $20 million in bridge funding deposited "in the usual account." Owen returns with a weapons list.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 333-34.

03/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Calero gives North traveler's checks. North indicates he needs the money for a hostage-related operation. Calero gives him "probably" $25,000 at this point. North confirms that he asked Calero for traveler's checks, after Casey, citing operational problems, recommended setting up an operating account. The total he received, he says, was in excess of $100,000. He says he kept meticulous records, but he destroyed them in 11/86. Poindexter testifies that he knew about the checks, saw the possibility of "perception problems," and told North to "get rid of the money."

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 19-21; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 132; Poindexter Test., 100-8, at 74.

03/01/85 (CONTRA)
Singlaub meets with Contra leaders, and drafts a weapons list. In 4/85, he gives the list to North "to get his concurrence."

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 77.

03/05/85 (CONTRA)
North asks Owen to convert $6,000–$7,000 worth of traveler's checks into dollars. He gives Owen the checks in his OEOB office after pulling them out of a safe. Jonathan Miller of the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin American Affairs, who was in the office at the time, also cashed some of the checks.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 337-38; J. Miller Dep., 9/30/87, at 14-27.

03/05/85 (CONTRA)
Calero begins sending Country 2 money to Energy Resources, an offshore Hakim bank account. He sends $1.2 million on this day. By April he will have sent a total of about $7.4 million. Between 12/84 and 7/85, when the Lake Resources account replaces Energy, the total will come to about $11 million.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 9, 22; Exs. APC-1, APC-2; Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 207-08; Ex. AH-2.

03/05/85 (CONTRA)
North testifying on his memo recommending compensation for a third-country provider of false end user certificates says: "I do not recall telling any country... that if they did this that we would do that... All it took was saying we would be grateful... I didn't make promises based on a quid pro quo." (This is one of five documents altered by Fawn Hall in 11/86 at North's direction.)

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 147-48; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 35, at 492; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 496.

03/08/85 (CONTRA)
On 02/28/85, McFarlane had met with Republican members of the House Intelligence Committee. North, on 3/8/85 writes a memo for McFarlane to Max Friedersdorf describing the meeting. The memo notes that expansion of private sector and third country assistance, (such as Country 3 and Country 2), is suggested in the effort to support the Resistance. "I explained why these are just not tenable alternatives—for the freedom fighters or for us," North writes. (Solicitations of the two nations had already been made by the U.S.) With regard to the North PROF note, McFarlane testifies that he had no reason to believe any member of the Intelligence Committee had knowledge of fundraising efforts by any Government officials from third countries or private parties. And even if he did, it wasn't something "illegal" as it was described in the North PROF note, he says.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-104, OLN-105; McFarlane Dep., 7/2/87, at 84-85.

03/15/85 (CONTRA)
Rodriguez arrives in Central America and begins giving military advice in El Salvador on counterinsurgency. He soon begins actively assisting the Contras.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 288-89. Steele Dep., 5/21/87, at 2-12, 14-18.

03/16/85 (CONTRA)
North proposes a "Fallback Plan" for Contra aid. (This is another of the documents altered by Fawn Hall.)

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 36, at 510-13; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 498.

03/16/85 (IRAN)
American journalist Terry Anderson, Chief Middle East Correspondent for the Associated Press, is kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

03/20/85 (CONTRA)
In a memo to McFarlane titled "Timing and the Nicaraguan Resistance Vote," North lays out a plan to influence the Congressional vote on Contra aid scheduled for mid-April.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-217.

03/22/85 (CONTRA)
Owen makes payments to several Contra leaders. Owen also previously passed several thousand dollars to a Nicaraguan Indian leader in a parked car in Washington, D.C. He gives the Indians more money on other occasions.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 340-41.

03/26/85 (CONTRA)
Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Boland Amendment prohibits the Administration from soliciting funds from private parties or foreign governments to aid the Contras.

Hearings on Security Development Assistance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 99th Congress, 1st Session.

04/01/85 (CONTRA)
President Reagan, in an interview with Lou Cannon, David Hoffman, and Leonard Downie of The Washington Post, cites evidence of increasing private support for the Contras.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #14, at 398.

04/01/85 (CONTRA)
Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo, and United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leader Arturo Cruz, Sr., meet President Reagan. The UNO Directorate thanks the President for his support. This is the first of three or four times Calero meets with President Reagan.

Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 19.

04/01/85 (CONTRA)
North cashes traveler's checks for the first time: for $100 at the San Antonio Foreign Exchange. Through December, 1985, he would cash $2,440. "I never took a penny that didn't belong to me," North says. He says he cashed the checks to reimburse himself.

Calero Test, Hearings, 100-3, Ex. APC-1; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 133.

04/01/85 (CONTRA)
Owen describes to North plans for a Southern Front organization in Nicaragua.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-7, at 799-802.

04/01/85 (IRAN)
Circa McFarlane says Ledeen tells him he is going to Israel and that he will inquire there about Israeli information on Iran.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 42-43, 177.

04/11/85 (CONTRA)
In a memo to McFarlane, North seeks approval for Country 2 to be approached before June 1, 1985, for an additional $15 million to $20 million. McFarlane says no.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 28-29; Ex. 37, at 519-22; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 499.

04/18/85 (CONTRA)
Motley tells a House Appropriations Subcommittee that the Boland Amendment prohibits the Administration from soliciting funds from private parties or foreign governments to aid the Contras.

Hearings on DOD appropriations for fiscal year 1986. 99th Congress, 1st Session.

04/24/85 (CONTRA)
The House defeats a $14-million aid package for the Contras.

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, #49, at H. 2491.

04/25/85 (CONTRA)
Singlaub and Calero meet with an arms dealer who gives them low prices for items on the Contra-Singlaub (North) weapons list. Singlaub and Calero then meet with North and Secord to discuss prices and air defense weapons. Singlaub and North discuss the news media. Singlaub persuades North that Singlaub must "maintain a high profile."

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 78-80, 83.

05/04/85 (IRAN)
Ledeen travels to Israel to discuss the Iranian situation with Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 16-20; 6/19/87, at 40-43.

05/09/85 (CONTRA)
North goes to Central America and returns through New Orleans on May 10.

North calendar.

05/14/85 (IRAN)
Evidence produced by the DEA source that he had access to the kidnapped Buckley is rejected by the CIA. Clair George, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, calls the source a "scam" and "fake" and "hocus-pocus."

Chron. Ex. 4; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 235-36, 253-254; George Dep., 4/24/87, at 60.

05/21/85 (CONTRA)
At the annual conference of the Council of the Americas, President Reagan introduces Elliott Abrams as new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #21, at 670.

05/22/85 (IRAN)
Two DEA agents are assigned to help North rescue hostages in Lebanon. The DEA agents assure North their source can deliver two hostages for $2.2 million. They begin operating under his control.

North Notebooks, Q 1854-56; Lawn Dep., 8/20/87, at 41-42; Agent 2 Dep., 8/12/87, at 61-64; See 6/7/85 entry herein; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 303-305.

05/25/85 (CONTRA)
North receives a report from Central America that Secord is overcharging the Contras for arms. North gets a price list from Secord and compares it with those of other dealers and discusses the matter with Calero. At Casey's instruction, North tells Secord and Calero to avoid two particular arms dealers.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 124.

05/28/85 (IRAN)
American David Jacobsen is seized in Lebanon.

Media reports.

05/29/85 (IRAN)
At the request of North, Jay Coburn, an agent of Texas industrialist H. Ross Perot, turns over $200,000 to a DEA agent for use in a hostage rescue attempt.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 390-391; Exs. EM-2, EM-4.

05/30/85 (IRAN)
Circa Shultz is called by Ambassador Lewis, who is upset about the Ledeen meeting with Peres. Ledeen had been representing himself as an official of the U.S. on an "official mission" to Israel, Lewis says. Ledeen says he was acting as a private citizen.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 24-25. Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 24-25; 6/19/87, at 44-45.

05/31/85 (CONTRA)
North indicates to McFarlane that the lethal supply operation has been under way since June 1984. In a memo to McFarlane, "The Nicaraguan Resistance: Near-Term Outlook," North writes: "Plans are underway to transition from current arrangements to a consultative capacity by the CIA for all political matters and intelligence" once Congress lifts restrictions. "The only portion of current activity which will be sustained as it has since last June ['84], will be the delivery of lethal supplies." (This is one of the documents later altered.)

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 38, at 529-36. Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 500-01.

06/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Abrams says he spoke with Lewis Tambs in 1985 prior to Tambs' taking his post as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica. He denies telling Tambs to open up the Southern Front and says Tambs never told him that North had instructed him to open the Southern Front against Nicaragua.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 16-17; Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 367-71.

06/07/85 (IRAN)
A North memo to McFarlane describes a plan to use DEA agents and Perot money to rescue hostages. McFarlane informs the President, Vice President Bush and probably White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan; he tells them Attorney General Edwin T. Meese, 3rd, is supportive. North seeks authorization from the head of DEA, and "if I recall correctly" from Meese.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 44, 207-09, 281-82, Ex. 38A, at 537-43; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 303-05; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 162.

06/09/85 (IRAN)
American citizen Thomas P. Sutherland is kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

06/10/85 (IRAN)
A North memo to Meese describes the $2.2 million plan to rescue hostages. He asks that the DEA agents be assigned to the NSC. Meese approves the plan. Meese testifies he was unaware that it was a ransom plan.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 388-89, Ex. EM-2.

06/11/85 (IRAN)
A Draft NSDD by the NSC staff proposes a new opening to Iran with possible arms sales. The Secretaries of State and Defense oppose the proposal.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 42; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 130-31, 161-62, Exs. CWW-4, CWW-5.

06/15/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Owen flies to Denver and drives to meet with Singlaub. Present at the meeting are representatives of Soldier of Fortune, Robert K. Brown and Ed Deerborne. They discuss procurement of weapons for the Contras. Barbara Studley is Singlaub's facilitator in getting weapons. After leaving Singlaub, Owen flies to San Francisco, where Calero was giving a speech. Owen meets with Calero and goes over a Singlaub-provided arms list so that he (Owen) could then show Singlaub of Calero's choices. Calero calls North to tell him about the list. Owen then returns to Washington.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 343-46.

06/18/85 (IRAN)
President Reagan says: "Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make concessions to terrorists—to do so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we ask nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #25, at 806.

06/18/85 (CONTRA)
Joseph Coors, a wealthy friend of Casey, goes to Casey to offer his assistance to the Contras; Casey sends him to North. They discuss the Contras need for a Maule plane. The cost is $65,000. Coors agrees to send this sum to Lake Resources, the Swiss account number North gave him. North in his testimony confirms this, saying that he did not solicit Coors.

Coors Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 127-29, Ex. JC-1; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 89-90.

06/19/85 (GENERAL)
President Reagan at the annual convention of the U.S. Jaycees says: "But let me say we must not yield to the terrorist demands that invite more terrorism. We cannot reward their grisly deeds. We will not cave in."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #25, at 818.

06/20/85 (CONTRA)
Singlaub's ship carrying "East Bloc manufactured weapons" sails. The ship arrives at the port designated by the FDN on 7/8/85. Mario Dellamico, an arms dealer with local connections, meets the ship.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 84-85.

06/21/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North asks Sigur for the name of an official from Country 5. Sigur gives North the official's phone number.

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 293-94.

06/27/85 (CONTRA)
After a White House briefing of private donors, the first of five in 1985 and 1986, Carl "Spitz" Russell Channell, a conservative fundraiser, later gives a $50,000 check to Calero at a dinner at the Hay-Adams Hotel. The $50,000 represented all the money Channell's National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL) had collected for the Contras to date.

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 78-80.

06/30/85 (CONTRA)
North asks Sigur to contact a Country 3 representative to ask about a contribution that North and McFarlane think the country is considering. North says he has checked the legality with lawyers. Sigur relays the request. The official says he will check with his government. Sigur tells McFarlane the official said the funds would have to be "channeled through the [USG]." McFarlane says that cannot be done. Sigur tells North, who later asks him to set up a meeting with the Country 3 contact.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 78-79. Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 286-93.

06/30/85 (IRAN)
Circa DEA Agent 1 and his brother give $200,000 to their source. The source later says hostages might be freed in exchange for arms. The ransom plan then lay dormant until the spring of 1986.

Agent 1 Dep., 8/28/87, at 99-102, 106.

July-September, 1985

07/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North has a discussion with Tambs before he leaves for Costa Rica. North says "we" want you to open a Southern Front. Tambs understands the "we" to be the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG), which includes a member from the CATF. C/CATF and Elliott Abrams, members of RIG, said they gave no such directive.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 367-68, 370-71, 408-09, 419-20; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 11; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 150; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 16-17; C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 94.

07/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Tambs goes to Costa Rica. He calls in three officers and tells them of the North mandate to create a Southern Front.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 408; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 11; North Test. Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 150; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 75.

07/01/85 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Secord says he waived all profit interests in Iran-Contra at this time.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 54-55; Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 215-16.

07/01/85 (CONTRA)
Abrams becomes Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the senior official under the Secretary of State responsible for U.S. diplomacy in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 2.

07/01/85 (CONTRA)
A meeting in Miami on the Contra program is attended by North, Calero, Secord, former CIA employee Rafael Quintero, Clines and Gen. Enrique Bermudez, an FDN military commander. McFarlane says he did not know that North attended the meeting.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 40; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 162; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 57-60.

07/03/85 (IRAN)
David Kimche, former head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, meets at the White House with McFarlane and says some Iranians want to have political talks with U.S. officials. An arms-and-hostages swap is discussed.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 43-45, 171-73.

07/08/85 (IRAN)
President Reagan at the American Bar Association Convention says: "So, the American people are not—I repeat, not—going to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people. And we're especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich." In the same speech, President Reagan declares Iran to be part of a "confederation of terrorist states . . . a new version of Murder Incorporated." He adds, "Let me make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices that America will never make concessions to terrorists."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #28, at 880.

07/13/85 (IRAN)
President Reagan enters the hospital for abdominal surgery. While in the hospital, he authorizes McFarlane to open contacts with Iran, and McFarlane conveys President Reagan's response to Kimche, McFarlane testifies.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 45. Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 10-12.

07/15/85 (CONTRA)
Circa The financing of the Contras changes. There is a discontinuation of contributions to Calero, and the deposits go directly into Hakim's accounts. Contra arms are paid for out of Hakim's accounts.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 208-09.

07/16/85 (IRAN)
Shultz responds to the McFarlane-inspired 6/11 draft of an NSDD. He says Iran is still a terrorist nation, and there should be no arms sales to Iran.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 26, Ex. GPS-10.

07/18/85 (IRAN)
Casey writes McFarlane strongly endorsing the draft NSDD on Iran. The draft NSDD was inspired by a 5/20/85 CIA memo.

Chron. Ex. 5.

07/18/85 (CONTRA)
North asks the FBI to delay an interview of a self-styled Saudi "Prince" for about two weeks "due to tne critical timing of the Prince's possible large donation to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters." The FBI's Washington Field Office asks Bureau permission to delay interview of the "Prince" (Mousalreza Ebrahim Zadeh) as requested by North.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 62, at 681-85.

07/21/85 (IRAN)
At a White House meeting of the NSC on the pros and cons of opening up the Israeli-sponsored U.S.-Iran initiative, Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger argue the legal and policy implications.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 47; Weinberger Test., Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 134-135.

07/25/85 (CONTRA)
Tambs says that North, through Castillo, directed him to approach the Costa Rican Government to get permission to build a Santa Elena airstrip to help resupply the Contras fighting on the Southern Front of Nicaragua. Tambs says private funds were used to construct the airfield. Castillo denies Tambs' assertion that he instructed Tambs to approach the Costa Rican Government to get permission to build the strip.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 375-76, 378-80, 399-400, 409-10; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 29.

07/29/85 (IRAN)
Circa Israeli arms dealers Adolph Schwimmer and Yaacov Nimrodi and Ledeen and others meet with Ghorbanifar in Israel. The subject of weapons and hostages is raised for the first time, Ledeen says.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 34-35, 37-45; 6/19/87, at 55-57.

07/30/85 (IRAN)
Circa Shlomo Gazit, former chief of Israeli military intelligence, meets with Ledeen. Gazit informs Ledeen of Israeli apprehension that the story of the Iran initiative might leak and that they wanted a clear and binding answer on U.S. support. Ledeen responds that Israel had received a positive response from McFarlane, who had cleared it with President Reagan.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 9/10/87, at 27-28.

07/30/85 (CONTRA)
The Senate approves the conference report (H. Rept. 99-237) to S. 960, the Foreign Aid Authorization Act for FY86 and FY87. The conference report includes House provisions for $27 million in nonlethal "humanitarian" aid to the Contras. The bill also contains a "Boland Amendment" type spending restriction.

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, #104, at S. 10323.

07/30/85 (CONTRA)
North tells the FBI that the "Prince" and Richard Miller of International Business Communications, Inc., (IBC), a public relations firm that worked with North to rally support for the Contras, and the intermediary between the "Prince" and North, are in Europe arranging for funds to be transferred to the Contras.

North Text., Hearings, 100-7, Part III, Ex. OLN-265.

07/31/85 (CONTRA)
The House approves the conference report on S. 960.

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, #105, at H. 6892.

08/02/85 (IRAN)
Kimche meets with McFarlane in Washington to bring him up to date on the Iran initiative. TOW missiles for Iran are discussed.

Israeli Chronology; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 48.

08/05/85 (CONTRA)
The FBI opens a case in Philadelphia based on an allegation that "the Prince" swindled $240,000 from the William Penn Bank, at the same time North was trying to develop him as an asset for the Iran-Contra initiative.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-265.

08/06/85 (IRAN)
McFarlane conveys to Kimche President Reagan's approval of a TOW shipment, noting the President's concern that this not be perceived as swapping arms for hostages and on condition that weapons not be usable by terrorists or of such type or volume as to alter the balance in the Iran-Iraq war.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 48-50.

08/06/85 (IRAN)
At a meeting with President Reagan and McFarlane, Shultz expresses opposition to selling arms to Iran and said "that we are just falling into the arms-for-hostages business, and we shouldn't do it." The President, Shultz says, was noncommital.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 27.

08/07/85 (CONTRA)
Owen writes North of the Southern Front's needs. He updates the political and military situation.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-8, at 803-05.

08/08/85 (CONTRA)
A memo written by a Republican staff member of the House Intelligence Committee concludes that the Boland Amendment applies to the NSC.

Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5, Ex. BGS-26.

08/08/85 (CONTRA)
Statutory restrictions on Contra aid are signed into law: $27 million may be obligated by March 31, 1986 for humanitarian aid to the Contras by any agency, other than the CIA or DOD, designated by the President. NHAO is set up in the State Department.

P.L. 99-88, Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1985.

08/10/85 (CONTRA)
North makes a 1-day trip to Central America.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 13; North Calendar.

08/13/85 (CONTRA)
Castillo cables the CATF Chief that Tambs obtained permission to build the Southern Front airfield. The CATF Chief responds that the CIA was pleased, but that neither CIA nor DOD can become involved in building the strip.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 12, 13, Exs. TC-1, TC-2, at 87 and 88.

08/15/85 (CONTRA)
Sigur sets up a meeting between North and a representative of Country 3. Later that summer, the representative tells Sigur that his country gave $1 million in humanitarian assistance to the Contras.

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 287-93.

08/15/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Abrams learns of the Costa Rican airstrip. He denies, however, knowing that Tambs had been talking with the Costa Rican Government about the airstrip and says he learned about this from Tambs' testimony.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 6, 9, and 16, 20-22.

08/15/85 (IRAN)
Circa Kimche briefs Ledeen, who then briefs McFarlane on the pending first shipment of TOWs to Iran.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 48-51.

08/16/85 (CONTRA)
Rep. Michael D. Barnes sends a letter to McFarlane asking about reports of North's activities regarding resupplying the Contras. Poindexter collects the relevant North documents for McFarlane, who reviews six key memos with North. North offers to rewrite the documents. North testifies that the actual alteration took place a year later as he prepared to leave the NSC. To protect the NSC Contra operation, North and McFarlane decided to keep the six key memos out of the System IV files.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 16-18, 169-72; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 73-77, 108-12, 164, 214-15, Ex. 40A, at 546-47.

08/17/85 (CONTRA)
Poindexter assigns North to write the Rep. Barnes' inquiry response.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 81-89, Ex. JMP-7A.
North Test., Hearings, 100-7, Part I, at 272.

08/20/85 Circa (CONTRA)
Bretton G. Sciaroni, legal counsel of the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, meets with North for 5 minutes late one evening. Sciaroni asks North if there was any truth to news stories that North was helping the Contras operationally. North says, "No." Sciaroni does not ask any other factual questions. Sciaroni also meets with Paul Thompson, NSC legal counsel, who does not give Sciaroni the troublesome documents that are subsequently altered by Fawn Hall.

Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 409-11.

08/20/85 (IRAN)
96 TOW missiles are delivered to Iran from Israel. The missiles are taken by the commander of the Revolutionary Guard.

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 48.

08/20/85 (IRAN)
Kimche meets with Ledeen in London to discuss ways to bring out the hostages. No hostages were released, however, as a result of the 8/20/85 TOW shipment.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 49, 52-53.

08/20/85 (CONTRA)
Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, writes McFarlane inquiring about NSC support of the Contras.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 73, 108-12, 114-20, 135-36, Ex. 41, at 559.

08/23/85 (CONTRA)
North meets with Garwood in the OEOB and discusses the chances of the Contras invading Nicaragua. After the meeting, Channell asks for a contribution. Garwood gives a total of $90,000.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 113-16; North Calendar; Channell Calendar.

08/30/85 Circa (CONTRA)
Owen and Castillo go to a Costa Rican site on North's instructions to determine if an airfield could be built to facilitate both lethal and nonlethal drops.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 349. Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 13-14.

09/01/85 (IRAN)
Circa Kimche calls McFarlane and says he expects release of one hostage imminently and all hostages soon. McFarlane reports this to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 50-51.

09/03/85 (CONTRA)
In a PROF note, McFarlane sends back to North an edited version of North's draft of a letter to Rep. Hamilton and asks North to edit that. McFarlane writes, "Please do not share either this note or the separate draft with anyone... Ollie, don't send me any PROFS notes about it."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-115.

09/04/85 (IRAN)
Discussions are held in Paris among Ghorbanifar, Nimrodi, Ledeen, and Kimche. Iran is now interested in new HAWK missiles capable of hitting high-flying aircraft.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 53-59, 95.

09/04/85 (CONTRA)
Abrams tells Shultz the Contras are being supplied but does not know how and has not asked North. Shultz says Abrams is State's point man on this operation, and he should keep himself informed on how the Contras are being supplied. Abrams then wrote down, "Monitor Ollie."

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 14, 104-105, 125-126; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 23.

09/05/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane replies to Rep. Hamilton: "I can state with deep personal conviction that at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law." North confirms that he helped draft this letter. He acknowledges that statements in it were false.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 164-67; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 41A, at 560-63.

09/10/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane briefs the House Intelligence Committee on NSC support for Contras.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 166-67.

09/11/85 (CONTRA)
North, Garwood, and Calero meet at a Dallas airport. North speaks of the need to provide transportation for supplies to Contra camps. Channell later asks for a contribution. Garwood gives $32,000.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 137. Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 98-99.

09/11/85 (CONTRA)
North also meets in Dallas with millionaire Bunker Hunt. Channell had set a goal of $5 million for a contribution from Hunt. At dinner, North reviews a list of Contra needs totalling $5 million. This includes various types of military equipment. Channell and Hunt are left alone. (Hunt disputes this account.) Hunt donates $237,500 and provides another $237,500 as a loan.

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 101, 110, 123, 124-25. Hunt Dep., 4/24/87, at 21, 32-33, 48.

09/12/85 (CONTRA)
Rep. Hamilton writes follow-up questions to McFarlane.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 77, Ex. 41B, at 564-71.

09/12/85 (CONTRA)
Sciaroni writes a legal memo that states that the Boland Amendment does not apply to the NSC staff and that he has investigated press allegations about North and found them unsubstantiated.

Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 394-95, Exs. BGS-9, BGS-9A.

09/12/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane replies to Rep. Barnes. He writes that he "thoroughly examined" the facts relating to the charges, and "I want to assure you that my actions, and those of my staff, have been in compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law." North testifies that this and other letters were "clearly misleading."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 170. McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 40B, at 548-52.

09/14/85 (IRAN)
A plane leaves Israel with 408 TOWs. It goes to Tabriz and not Tehran to prevent the missiles from being seized by the Revolutionary Guard.

Israeli Chronology.

09/15/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Owen takes three trips to New York City. The first is on instruction of North, who gave Owen Secord's phone number. Secord instructs Owen to go to a Chinese restaurant and ask for "Mooey." Mooey gives Owen $9,500. Owen takes the money to Washington, D.C., and gives it to Secord. Owen takes two subsequent trips to New York City and brings envelopes back to North at the White House.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 353-55.

09/15/85 (IRAN)
Rev. Weir is released to the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Schwimmer asks Ghorbanifar why Buckley was not released. Ghorbanifar responds that Buckley was too ill to move.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 48; Israeli Chronology.

09/17/85 (CONTRA)
The FBI tells North that the "Prince" has been involved in fraud schemes.

Joint Report, at 110-112.

09/18/85 (IRAN)
The White House announces Weir's release. The announcement has been delayed in the hope that the other hostages would be freed.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 21, #38, at 111; Media reports.

09/19/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Channell and potential contributors attend a White House briefing with North. Weapons needs of the Contras are discussed.

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 128-30.

09/20/85 (CONTRA)
North sends Rodriguez a letter outlining what he wanted done to help the Contras. The letter was received 09/29/85. The letter asks Rodriguez to provide aircraft maintenance facilities at an air base in Central America. North and Rodriguez testify that Vice President Bush and his aides were not to be informed of Rodriguez's role.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 289-90, 320-21; Ex. FIR-1.

09/20/85 (IRAN)
Rev. Pat Robertson interviews President Reagan. Robertson notes that "a member of the White House staff" was dispatched on Sunday to Iran to "seek the release of the remaining" hostages. North denies he told Robertson about the Iran arms initiative.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 160-63; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 346; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 383.

09/21/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Owen is taken off the airfield project. He later joins NHAO through the intervention of North, Calero, Cruz, and Robelo.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 351.

09/21/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Abrams meets with Castillo and two of Castillo's assistants. He says the airstrip was never mentioned in the briefings. Abrams later says he mentioned the airstrip to Castillo, who was surprised by Abrams' knowledge. Castillo had not mentioned the airstrip to his assistants. Abrams never reports knowledge of the airstrip to Shultz, because it was a private venture.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 378, 395, 401; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 17; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 21, 23, 54.

09/21/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Secord tells Hakim that they had been asked to get directly involved in flying arms into Nicaragua and dropping them to the Contras.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 202.

October-December, 1985

10/01/85 (CONTRA)
Senators David Durenberger and Patrick J. Leahy write to McFarlane inquiring about NSC staff support for the Contras.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 41D, at 581-82.

10/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North again asks Sigur to approach Country 3. Sigur does, and Country 3 provides another $1 million. Owen says that he carried from North to the Country 3 official an envelope containing an account number. McFarlane testifies he did not know of these actions in advance.

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 292; Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 352; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 26.

10/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North gives Secord a KL-43, an encryption device. According to Secord, the following people had a KL-43: North; Secord; Gadd; Southern Air Transport; Col. James Steele, chief U.S. military adviser in El Salvador; the air operations chief, William Cooper; and Castillo. North obtained them after Casey and Poindexter had indicated to him that secure communications were needed.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 150-51; part II, at 16-18; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 75; Dutton Test., 100-3, at 208; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 65-66.

10/01/85 (CONTRA)
The Office of Latin American Public Diplomacy awards a secret, no-bid contract for $276,186 to IBC. It was not signed until 9/2/86. A State Department audit showed seven contracts and purchase orders totalling $441,084 between 2/14/84 and 9/30/86 with IBC, Frank Gomez (an IBC principal along with Richard Miller) or the Institute for North-South Issues, (INSI), another Gomez company. INSI also received grants totalling nearly $500,000 from the National Endowment for Democracy.

Audit Report No. 7PP-008, Office of Inspector General, Department of State (July 1987); North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part II, at 58-59.

10/03/85 (CONTRA)
North writes a memo to McFarlane proposing answers to Senators Leahy and Durenberger, denying allegations against North; North sends McFarlane a proposed reply to Rep. Hamilton.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-120.

10/03/85 (IRAN)
The Islamic Jihad, a pro-Iranian terrorist group, claims that it has murdered U.S. hostage William Buckley.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 21; Media reports.

10/07/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane writes to Sen. Durenberger and Rep. Hamilton denying allegations of NSC-North facilitating movement of supplies to the Contras.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 41E, at 583-88; North Test., Hearings 100-7 part I, at 165-66.

10/08/85 (IRAN)
Ledeen, Nimrodi, Schwimmer, and Ghorbanifar meet in Washington. The release of hostages and arms sales are discussed.

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 49-50; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 70-75.

10/10/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane meets with the Congressional intelligence committees and responds to questions on North's Contra activities. North said he helped prepare McFarlane's answers.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 166-67.

10/16/85 (CONTRA)
In a memo to McFarlane the day before Rep. Barnes visits McFarlane, Paul Thompson tells McFarlane to hold back from Rep. Barnes documents that are "Presidential Advisory paper that fall under the dominion of the President and are no longer subject to your disposition."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 70, at 752.

10/17/85 (CONTRA)
Channell, with large donors, attends a White House briefing.

Channell Dep., 9/2/87, at 36.

10/17/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North argues with Robert Duemling, head of NHAO, that he should hire Owen as a contractor with NHAO. Duemling initially resisted North's idea but compromised later and allowed Owen's group, IDEA, to be placed on a contract basis with NHAO and not liaison as North had initially requested. Abrams denied knowing Owen and learned of his name in a Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) meeting, and through a letter to Duemling from Cruz, Robelo, and Calero, who also interceded for Owen.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 355, Ex. RWO-16, at 829-30; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 37-38; Duemling Dep., 8/20/87, at 59-69.

10/17/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane meets with Rep. Barnes and says no one on the NSC staff violated the letter or spirit of the law. He has a stack of documents and tells Rep. Barnes that he alone can look at them. Barnes declines to look at them under that condition.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 75.

10/19/85 (CONTRA)
North gives Owen a $1,000 wedding present in Calero's traveler's checks. Calero says North did not tell him about the present.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 369; Calero Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 21.

10/21/85 (CONTRA)
North travels to Central America and returns through Miami the next day.

North calendar.

10/25/85 (CONTRA)
John H. Donahue of Pittsburgh gives $100,000 to the Heritage Foundation, which then transfers it to a Richard Miller-Francis Gomez entity, the Institute for North-South Issues. The money was donated for purposes other than the Contras. Miller and Gomez took a $20,000 fee from the $100,000.

Godson Dep., 9/10/87, at 85; R. Miller Dep., 8/20/87, at 276-81; Slease Dep., 6/11/87, at 20-36, 56-57.

10/27/85 (IRAN)
Nimrodi, Schwimmer, Ledeen, Ghorbanifar, and several Iranians meet in Geneva. The Iranians declare that they could effect the release of all the hostages without Khomeini's knowledge. They ask for HAWKs.

Israeli Chronology; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 79-83.

10/29/85 (CONTRA)
Rep. Barnes writes again, saying McFarlane's offer to let him see the documents is inadequate.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 40D, at 553-54.

11/01/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Construction of the Costa Rican airfield begins and continues off and on through 3/86. The airstrip was never completed.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 16. Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 251-52.

11/04/85 (CONTRA)
Circa North travels to Philadelphia to meet two potential donors. One contributes $60,000.

Godson Dep., 9/10/87, at 89-96. Hirtle Dep., 7/13/87, at 27-48.

11/07/85 (CONTRA)
Barbara Newington, a wealthy donor, has a meeting and photo opportunity with President Reagan. Channell, Miller, and North later meet with her in her room at the Hay-Adams Hotel. North says the Contras need missiles. After North leaves, Channell asks Newington for a contribution. In 1985 and 1986, Newington gave more than $2.8 million to NEPL.

Newington Dep., 5/12/87, at 33-52. Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 135-38.

11/08/85 (CONTRA)
North prepares a McFarlane response to Rep. Barnes. The letter, approved by McFarlane, turns down Rep. Barnes' request to provide documents, relying essentially on executive privilege.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 40E, at 556-58.

11/08/85 (IRAN)
McFarlane, North, and Ledeen meet with Kimche. McFarlane in his testimony accepts without recalling that another arms deal was discussed. During this meeting, Kimche recalls, the HAWK transaction was not discussed, since Kimche assumed it was already approved.

Israeli Chronolgy; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 97; Ledeen Dep., 6/22/87, at 231.

11/08/85 (GENERAL)
Casey writes a letter to President Reagan deploring leaks of classified information to the media and suggesting that fewer persons on the Congressional oversight committees have access to classified data.

Chron. Ex. 6.

11/14/85 (IRAN)
John N. McMahon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and perhaps Casey meet with McFarlane and Poindexter. McMahon states that McFarlane then told them about the Israeli plan to move arms to certain elements of the Iranian military who are prepared to overthrow the government. McFarlane testifies, "It is entirely possible" that he said that.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 97.

11/15/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Singlaub meets with officials from Countries 3 and 5 in their Washington embassies explaining his desire to raise money for the Contras. After the meeting, he tells North the two countries are hesitant to contribute for fear of angering Congress.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 72-73.

11/15/85 (IRAN)
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin meets with McFarlane at the White House. Rabin confirms with McFarlane that the Iran initiative was a joint project between the U.S. and Israel. Rabin also brings up the problem of receiving TOWs to replace those Israel sent to Iran.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 97-98, Ex. 64, at 736-37.

11/15/85 (IRAN)
Circa In the briefings leading up to the Geneva summit conference, Regan says President Reagan was told about a shipment that would originate in Country 15 and would be transshipped through Israel and all of our hostages would come out. According to Regan, at this time he and the President knew that HAWKs were being shipped and oil drilling equipment was a cover story.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 252-53, 264, 320.

11/16/85 (GENERAL)
President Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Regan and others leave for Geneva for a summit meeting with the Soviets.

Media reports.

11/16/85 (IRAN)
McFarlane says he doesn't recall telling Weinberger about the HAWK shipments before leaving for Geneva.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 98-99.

11/17/85 (IRAN)

North says he was "thrown into" the HAWK shipment "the night of November 17." North says he received a call late in the evening from Rabin, who was in New York. While he is on the line, he gets a call from McFarlane in Geneva. He tells North he had had a call from Rabin and there was a problem with a shipment. McFarlane tells North to take care of the problem. North talks with Rabin. This begins direct U.S. involvement in the transfer of HAWKs.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29-30, 51-52, 59. McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 52-54.

11/18/85 (IRAN)

Circa Shultz says he discussed the Iran initiative with McFarlane at the Geneva summit over a secure telephone. Shultz testifies it was "a straight arms-for-hostages deal." Shultz expresses objection to the plan.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 28-29.

11/18/85 (IRAN)

At the Geneva summit, Regan says McFarlane briefly tells the President "about the HAWKS and the hostages." McFarlane spoke of 80 Israeli HAWKS going to Iran and it was understood that there would be replenishment by the U.S., Regan says.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 13; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 52-54.

11/19/85 (IRAN)

Secord is sent a McFarlane letter signed by North asking again for Secord's help on the Iran initiative. North has asked for the help earlier by phone. North said, according to Secord, that the letter was in case Secord needed proof in Country 15 that he was acting on behalf of the U.S. McFarlane says he had no recollection of the letter and he had never asked for Secord's help before.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 41, 79, Ex. 1, at 415.

11/20/85 (CONTRA)

North reportedly tells Gadd that he called or cabled a U.S. embassy in Latin America in an effort to get the local Air Force to agree to sell four C-123s to Gadd. Gadd testifies that North read to him on the phone the message he had sent the embassy. Abrams says he is unaware of any such approach by North.

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 16-19; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 145-47.

11/20/85 (IRAN)
After a call from North or Poindexter, Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, military assistant to Weinberger, calls Noel Koch, also a Pentagon official, to ask about the availability of HAWKs. Koch learns within a few days that the HAWKs were to be shipped to Iran.

Koch Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 55. Powell Dep., 6/19/87, at 14-18, Ex. CP-2.

11/20/85 (IRAN)
A PROF note from North to Poindexter describes a delivery of 80 HAWK missiles to be flown on 11/22/85 from Israel to Iran via Country 15. This is to be followed by the release of five American hostages, to be followed by delivery of 40 additional HAWKs. The note says that Secord had made all travel arrangements.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-17.

11/21/85 (IRAN)
President Reagan returns from Geneva and addresses a joint session of Congress.

Congressional Record, Vol. 131, #161, at H. 10498.

11/21/85 (IRAN)
A Point Paper is prepared by Henry Gaffney, Jr., of DOD entitled: "HAWK Missiles for Iran." Gaffney testifies Weinberger was not in favor of the shipment; therefore the paper was supposed to be negative.

Gaffney Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 57-63, 111, Ex. DOD-5.

11/21/85 (IRAN)
Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, a CIA official, gets his first call on the HAWKs shipment from North, in the evening at home. North says he needs flight clearance to get an aircraft into Country 15. Clarridge directs the appropriate Branch Chief to go to his office and send "stand-by" cables to the CIA Chief and his deputy in Country 15.

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 3; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 60-63, 69-70.

11/21/85 (CONTRA)
Channell, with large donors, attends a White House briefing by North and others.

Channell Dep. 9/1/87, at 37, Ex. SC-1.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
North next contacts Clarridge for help in finding a reliable commercial carrier for cargo to Iran. CIA passes on the name of a proprietary airline.

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 18.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
The CIA Chief in Country 15 cables Clarridge that, per his instructions, he has contacted Secord to offer assistance.

Chron. Ex. 7.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge cables the CIA Chief in Country 15 that the operation is "a National Security Council initiative and has the highest level of USG interest;" that clearance is needed over Country 16 for three DC-8 overflights for 11/23 and 11/24.

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 8-9; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 60-61; Senior CIA official of Country 15 Dep., 4/13/87, at 4-6.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge informs Edward Juchniewicz, CIA deputy director of operations, of the activities in Country 15. Clarridge asks what Juchniewicz thought. Juchniewicz replies that because the proprietary airline was a commercial entity, he had no objection if Secord or North contacted it.

Juchniewicz Dep., 4/23/87, at 6.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
The Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) asks El Al Airlines for a cargo B-747; 80 HAWKs are loaded on board.

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 51.

11/22/85 (IRAN)
North calls Schwimmer and authorizes take-off from Tel Aviv to Country 15; 3 1/2 hours later, North urgently calls and says and there is no landing permit. The aircraft is recalled to Israel and unloaded. This delay forces Schwimmer to abandon plans of using two DC-8s from a European company to fly the missiles from Country 15 to Tehran. Schwimmer says he then told North that from now on the Americans would have to handle the flight logistics.

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-69A; North Notebook, 11/22/85, (incorrectly dated 11/21/85).

11/22/85 (IRAN)
North writes a PROF note to Poindexter detailing arrangements of U.S. involvement in the HAWK missile transfer. He says McFarlane contacted Country 15's Foreign Minister to solve a flight clearance problem and that Clarridge had arranged for a "proprietary" to work for Secord, who "will charter two 707s in the name of Lake Resources (our Swiss Co.)." A late update to this note states that a Lake aircraft would also be used, which North said was "too bad" because it had been scheduled at that time "to be our first direct flight to the Resistance . . . inside Nicaragua." Secord disputes the latter statement.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 89; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 53; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, Ex. OLN-45.

11/23/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge cables the CIA chief in Country 18 that there is an operation involving release of hostages that will require planes to land in Country 18 and will require a total of five flights by 707s from the proprietary airline.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 201-03; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 60.

11/23/85 (IRAN)
Secord tells the CIA Chief in Country 15 that the flights were carrying HAWK missiles to Iran as part of a deal for release of hostages. The CIA Chief sends two cables to CIA headquarters about his conversation with Secord. The second cable cannot be found.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 201-03; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 88; Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 14-15; Senior CIA official in Country 15 Dep., 4/13/87, at 19-21, 25-31.

11/23/85 (IRAN)
From 9:00 a.m. to 3:25 p.m., North is at CIA headquarters with Clarridge.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 60; Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 37.

11/23/85 (IRAN)
Juchniewicz asks McMahon if he was aware of all activity relating to getting the hostages out. McMahon says the CIA could pass messages between the NSC and ambassadors but could not be further involved without Presidential authorization (a Finding).

McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 94-95.

11/24/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge cables the CIA Chief in Country 16 that he can advise the U.S. Ambassador that the planes are carrying oil drilling equipment; he refers to it as a "cover story."

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 15, Ex. DRC-1-49.

11/24/85 (IRAN)
A proprietary Boeing 707, arranged by Secord, arrives in Israel. The aircraft is loaded with 18 HAWK missiles and takes off. The flight plan calls for the aircraft to land in Country 17 and then go to Tehran. The Country 15 flight plan is abandoned.

Israeli Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29, 52; Secord Dep., 6/10/87, sy 83-100.

11/25/85 (IRAN)
McMahon, in his office with Clair George, CIA deputy director and chief of operations, and another CIA official, is told that the proprietary airline helped with the NSC mission at the request of Secord. McMahon "goes through the overhead" because of the absence of a Finding. McMahon calls Stanley Sporkin, CIA general counsel, and says a Finding is required because of intercession with Country 15's Government.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 63; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 207-08; Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 116; McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 95-102.

11/25/85 (IRAN)
The CIA legal team meets, and preparation of a Finding dated 11/26/85 begins. Sporkin says the Finding should be retroactive.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 61-62; Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 116-22; Deitel Dep., 6/5/87, at 14-23, 27-29, 51-56.

11/25/85 (IRAN)
Poindexter briefs President Reagan and tells him that a shipment of arms to Iran had taken place.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-19.

11/25/85 (IRAN)
An Iranian official complains to Ghorbanifar that the 18 missiles sent were old missiles, a model of HAWK that Iran already had. According to Nimrodi, an Iranian colonel opened the crates and discovered that the model HAWK was not what was expected.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 52-53.

11/25/85 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar calls Ledeen. He says he has an urgent message from the Prime Minister of Iran to give to President Reagan, namely that "you are cheating us, and you must act quickly to remedy the situation." Ledeen conveys this to Poindexter, who then tells Ledeen he is being taken off the Iran project.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 87-88, 112.

11/26/85 (IRAN)
The draft Finding ratifying the CIA's actions retroactively is explicitly an arms-for-hostages Finding. The Finding is cleared with Casey, who calls Regan and McFarlane to verify that the operation had the President's approval. It is then sent by Casey to Poindexter for President Reagan to sign. Poindexter says he did not discuss the Finding with anyone from 11/25/85 through 12/5/85, when he says the President signed it.

North Test., 100-7 part I, at 33, 61; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 17-18, 123-25, Ex. JMP-18.

11/26/85 (CONTRA)
Owen tells North, "Nothing is moving" for the Contras. In a long memorandum, he writes that Calero is finding it increasingly difficult to go to Central America and tell people there that "things will get better and the planes are on the way etc. when nothing is moving." He also notes that "In the South, things look bright if we can supply the necessary items needed."

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-10, at 813-15.

11/30/85 (CONTRA)
McFarlane submits his resignation as National Security Adviser.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 55.

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11/30/85 (CONTRA)
Circa In late 1985, Richard Miller, a former President Reagan campaign aide and a partner in IBC, Inc., with Gomez, retains David C. Fischer, also a former Special Assistant to President Reagan, for 2 years for a fee of $20,000 a month. Fischer and Martin Artiano, a business associate, divide this amount. They are purportedly paid to facilitate visits of private donors to the White House and meetings with President Reagan. Fischer and Artiano dispute this version. In the spring of 1986, Miller pays Artiano an additional $5,000 a month under a supposedly separate retainer agreement. The original $20,000 retainer is also included.

Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 155-59; Gomez Dep., 9/11/87, at 61-64; Artiano Dep., at 64-72, 78-90; Fischer Dep., 8/11/87, 35-58, 97-104; Miller Dep. 8/21/87, at 358-62.

12/01/85 (IRAN)
Circa Ghorbanifar advances numerous arms-for-hostages proposals involving sophisticated missiles at a Paris meeting attended by Kimche, Ghorbanifar, Secord, Schwimmer, and Nimrodi. It is decided to meet with American representatives in London.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 90; Israeli Chronology.

12/03/85 (IRAN)
McFarlane returns to office for the first time since mid-November. He has several meetings with Poindexter, but does not recall the subject of the 11/26/85 Finding coming up.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 105-06.

12/03/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge, anticipating further shipments, cables to CIA officers in Countries 16 and 18: "We are still regrouping. Key meeting of principals will take place this weekend with earliest possible aircraft deployments sometime mid to late week of 8 December."

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 20; Ex. DRC-1-80.

12/04/85 (CONTRA)
The Intelligence Authorization Act is signed into law. The act authorizes the CIA to provide communications equipment and related training to the Contras and allows the CIA to exchange intelligence with them. It bars the CIA from providing other aid to the rebels but allows the State Department to solicit humanitarian aid.

P.L. 99-169, Intelligence Authorization Act of 1985; C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 105-106.

12/05/85 (IRAN)
Poindexter says President Reagan signed the 11/26 Finding this day without the debate and consultation that normally precedes a signing. Poindexter testifies he was dissatisfied with the quality of the Finding and wanted it rewritten.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 17-18, 123-25, Ex. JMP-18.

12/05/85 (IRAN)
Poindexter briefs Shultz on the Iran initiative. Shultz tells Poindexter it is a bad idea. Poindexter doesn't tell Shultz that the President had signed a Finding on Iran.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 7, 30.

12/05/85 (IRAN)
North says, "I believe I saw a signed copy of that Finding... [in] Admiral Poindexter's office...in early December [1985]."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 33.

12/06/85 (IRAN)
Israeli officials meet with North in New York. North has a position paper reviewing the progression of the Iran operation since 9/85; the paper is to be discussed at a 12/7 meeting at the White House. North reportedly states that he intends to divert profits from future Iranian transactions to Nicaragua. (The Contras were not mentioned.)

Israeli Chronology.

12/06/85 (IRAN)
Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, asks Gaffney to prepare a TOW Point Paper. Another paper is prepared by Glenn Rudd, Deputy Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The paper is titled "Possibility for Leaks."

Gaffney Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 67-68, 79-80, Ex. DOD-9; Gaffney-Rudd Dep., 6/22/87, at 2-7.

12/07/85 (IRAN)
An informal White House meeting is attended by Weinberger, Shultz, Regan, McMahon, Poindexter, and the President. Poindexter says he does not recall any discussion of the 11/85 HAWK shipment at that meeting. Shultz and Weinberger argue against arms sales to Iran. At the meeting it is decided McFarlane should go to London to meet with Ghorbanifar.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 33; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 23-26; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 30-32; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 138-141; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 14, 106.

12/07/85 (IRAN)
Secord, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, and two senior Israeli officials meet in preparation for an afternoon meeting with North. Replenishment of the TOWs Israel shipped to Iran is discussed. Ghorbanifar joins the meeting later.

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 91.

12/07/85 (IRAN)
Secord, North, Kimche, and the two senior Israeli officials meet in London. North discusses the Iranian initiative and the plans to continue it.

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 91.

12/08/85 (IRAN)
North and McFarlane meet with Ghorbanifar in London. Also present are Secord, Kimche, and Schwimmer. McFarlane is very unhappy with Ghorbanifar and his arms-for-hostages pitch. He, North, and Secord return together to Washington that evening. McFarlane says that Ghorbanifar is one of the most despicable characters he has ever met. Secord arrives home with impression that both North and McFarlane believe the initiative is dead.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 92, 95; McFarlane Test., 100-2, at 56-57, 103-04; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 281-82.

12/09/85 (IRAN)
A North memo to McFarlane and Poindexter reviews the options in the Iran initiative, including using Secord as a conduit for selling arms to Iran.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45A, at 599-602. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 282.

12/10/85 (IRAN)
McFarlane briefs the President on the trip to London. North says that stopping the shipments of arms at this point might lead to reprisals against the hostages. President Reagan is disappointed that Ghorbanifar is not reliable, but he is unwilling to give up on the idea of a project with the Iranians with both the broad objectives and the possibility of getting the hostages back.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 282; Secord Test., 100-1, at 96; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 57-59, 150, Exs. 45A, at 599, 49, at 630; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 26-27, 337; Regan Dep., 7/15/87, at 17-18, 3/3/87, at 60-61.

12/11/85 (IRAN)
Clarridge cables to CIA Chiefs in Country 16 and Country 18: ". . . As late as last night the negotiating was still going on. We have just received word that the deal is apparently all off. Don't know why yet or whether there is a possibility that it will revive. . . . For now it looks like we are standing down."

Clarridge Test., Hearings, 100-11, Ex. DRC-1-82.

12/12/85 (CONTRA)
North, Poindexter, (as the new National Security Adviser), and others take a 1-day trip to Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Poindexter says that he and North discussed the Santa Elena airfield on this visit.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3 at 380-81; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 226; Walker Dep., 5/21/87, at 46-47.

12/13/85 (CONTRA)
Poindexter briefs President Reagan on the airfield. Poindexter testifies "all we discussed was that the Costa Rican Government was being cooperative in terms of letting private individuals establish an airstrip in the remote corner of the country."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 227.

12/15/85 (IRAN)
Circa Ledeen meets Ghorbanifar in Geneva. Ghorbanifar complains that he does not like the person who has replaced Ledeen in the operation. Ledeen suspects the replacement is Secord. Ghorbanifar outlines a plot against Libya's Qadhaffi and proposes a relationship between himself and the CIA in which he provides intelligence on Iran.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 90-93, 95-96.

12/16/85 (CONTRA)
Circa An SAT 707 carrying ammunition arrives in Central America. The ammunition is stored by Rodriguez in a warehouse on the airbase, together with nonlethal aid that came in on NHAO's L-100s.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 291-92.

12/17/85 (IRAN)
Circa Ledeen reports on the Ghorbanifar proposal to North, who agrees this is a good idea. Ledeen then reports it to Charles Allen, CIA National Intelligence Officer and head of the Hostage Rescue Locating Force, Clarridge, and Casey. Casey says he would see whether it could be worked out with Ghorbanifar.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 93-94.

12/18/85 (CONTRA)
North travels to Central America through Miami. He returns December 20th.

North Appointment Cards.

12/19/85 (CONTRA)
The continuing appropriations bill is signed into law. It states that the terms and conditions of the Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 99-169) applied to assistance to the Contras and appropriated a classified amount for the CIA to provide communications equipment and training and to exchange intelligence with the Contras.

P.L. 99-190

12/21/85 (CONTRA)
Circa Casey and Secord meet to discuss intelligence needs of the Contra airlift operation.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 69-71.

12/27/85 (IRAN)
Circa Ghorbanifar travels to Washington at the request of Ledeen under the alias "Nicholas Kralis." He meets with Ledeen, a CIA officer, and North. He agrees to be polygraphed.

Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 97-98.

12/30/85 (CONTRA)
Circa The CATF Chief goes to Central America with North, who is to coordinate the weapons transshipment from the warehouse to the Contras. The CATF Chief says he issued a direct instruction that the CIA not be involved in this operation. "Our role was very, very proscribed." He says at this point he did not know of the previous SAT 707 flight of ammunition into Central America or the fact that there were thousands of pounds of ammunition there at the time.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 101-02.

12/31/85 (IRAN)
Circa In late December, North tells Secord that the remainder of the $1 million that went into the Lake Resources account for the 11/85 HAWK shipment ($800,000) would not be sought by Israel and could be used for any purpose. North says it was spent on the Contra project.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 53-56.

January-March 1986

01/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Poindexter says he told North to "continue on course" in his Contra resupply activities, which he said were ongoing when he took office. Poindexter says he does not recall telling the President "specifically" what North was doing.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 226.

01/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Recruiting begins for the Secord-North direct resupply operation. Pilot Ian Crawford says he was recruited by John Cupp, a Gadd employee. He says he was told the drops would consist of humanitarian supplies.

Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, at 13-18, 26-27.

01/02/86 (IRAN)
North calls Sporkin to ask him to help draft a new Finding. Sporkin calls Casey in Palm Springs to get Casey's approval. The first draft provides for notifying Congress of covert actions and does not mention hostages.

Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 128-35. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 61-62.

01/02/86 (IRAN)
Amiram Nir, Israeli counterterrorism adviser, comes to the White House to meet Poindexter. He meets also with North and McFarlane. North says that at this meeting the idea of using the arms sales "residuals" for other purposes first came up.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 101, 254; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 106-07; Poindexter Test., 100-8, at 27-29, Ex. JMP-23.

01/05/86 (IRAN)
Sporkin and North go to Casey's house after working on a draft of the new Finding. They then return to the White House for further editing. The new draft includes a reference to hostages.

Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 137-43.

01/06/86 (IRAN)
North meets with Attorney General Meese and Lowell Jensen, then Deputy Attorney General. North testifies that he took the draft Finding to the Attorney General for approval.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I at 221-22; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 196, 203.

01/06/86 (IRAN)
The Finding is discussed by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Poindexter, and Regan as a preliminary document. President Reagan signs the Finding in error.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 29-31; Ex. JMP-24A; Regan Dep., 7/15/87, at 19-20.

01/07/86 (IRAN)
An Oval Office meeting is attended by President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Meese, Regan, and Poindexter. Meese gives an oral opinion that the Iran arms transaction could be done legally, with the U.S. replenishing Israeli missiles. Weinberger and Shultz testify they again objected strongly. Poindexter, Casey, and Regan argue for going forward.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 30-31; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 7, 32-33; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 203-05, 208, 317; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 16-17, Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 142-143.

01/07/86 (IRAN)
Circa North and Koch discuss TOW prices. North tells Koch to call the Israeli Defense Ministry purchasing office in New York and arrange a meeting.

Koch Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 70-73. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 65.

01/11/86 (IRAN)
Secord attends a meeting at the White House at which financing of the Iranian arms sale is discussed. Secord is told he is to be the "commercial cutout," the private, third party through whom the arms deal would be handled.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 98-101, 132.

01/11/86 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar is polygraphed by the CIA and shows deception on all relevant questions. George declares that Ghorbanifar will never be used again as a CIA source. Ghorbanifar had also failed a polygraph previously. He complains to Ledeen about the test.

Ledeen Dep., 6/22/87, at 260-61; 3/11/87, at 99-101; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 210-11, 256-258; Ex. CG-50; C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 61-64; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 16-17.

01/12/86 (IRAN)
Koch meets Ben Yousef of the Israeli Defense Ministry at National Airport in Washington, D.C., and they set a price of $4,500 per TOW.

Koch Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 74-76.

01/12/86 (IRAN)
Casey advises the CIA Chief/Near East (C/NE), Allen, and George that the CIA will use Ghorbanifar in the Iran project, despite his flunking the polygraph. He instructs Allen to handle Ghorbanifar.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 212-13; Allen Dep., 4/24/87, at 311-13; C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 66-69.

01/13/86 (IRAN)
George calls North and reports that Ghorbanifar lied on 13 of 15 items in his polygraph examination.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 211; Ex. CG-52.

01/14/86 (IRAN)
North meets with Casey after a Weinberger speech at Ft. McNair, in Washington, D.C. Casey tries to contact Weinberger but misses him. North tells Poindexter: "Casey has called urging you convene a meeting with he and Cap ASAP so that we can move on. Casey's view is that Cap will continue to create roadblocks" (on shipments to Iran).

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-25.

01/15/86 (IRAN)
Circa North and Sporkin meet with Casey at Casey's home to discuss the Iran Finding. Sporkin adds a paragraph regarding the release of hostages.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 103, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-268A, OLN-268B.

01/15/86 (CONTRA)
In a memo to Poindexter about a meeting Poindexter is to have with Gen. John Galvin, then head of the Army's Southern Command, North writes: "You should be aware that Gen. Galvin is cognizant of the activities underway in (Central America) in support of the DRF. Gen. Galvin is enthusiastic about both endeavors." Galvin's testimony conflicts with this statement.

Galvin Dep., 6/13/87, at 102-12, 117-27; Ex. JG-7; Taft Dep., 6/25/87, at 62-63.

01/16/86 (IRAN)
At an impromptu meeting in Poindexter's office after a Cabinet meeting, Weinberger, Meese, Casey, and Sporkin discuss arms shipments to Iran. According to Poindexter, Shultz, who did not attend because of a scheduling conflict, told him, "You know my view, I don't think we ought to go ahead with it." Meese says the U.S. ought to sell arms directly to Iran, using Israelis for logistics assistance only, to avoid the reporting requirement of the Arms Export Control Act. No one recommends that Congress be informed, because of the fear that leaks would endanger the hostages. Weinberger signs off on the project the next day.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 197; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 31-35, 128-29; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 33-34; Sporkin Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 148-50; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 141-43.

01/17/86 (IRAN)
An "Action Memo" from Poindexter to President Reagan recommends signing the attached Finding. Instead of having the Israelis sell arms to Iran and the U.S. replenish Israeli stocks, he recommends CIA action under the covert Finding: "The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from the DOD under the Economy Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran." President Reagan signs the Finding.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9 at 12-14; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 31, 49, 130-32, Ex. JMP-28; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 7-8; Regan Dep., 7/15/87, at 20-21.

01/18/86 (IRAN)
Weinberger directs Gen. Powell to execute the TOW missile project under provisions of the Economy Act.

Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 143-44. Powell Dep., 6/19/87, at 78-80.

01/18/86 (IRAN)
At a meeting with the DC/NE, George, Poindexter, North, and Sporkin, Poindexter says a Finding had been signed to gain release of hostages. North is named action officer.

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 73-81. George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 213, 243.

01/20/86 (IRAN)
The CIA sets up a Swiss bank account to handle the Pentagon transfer of arms to the agency.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 251-52.

01/22/86 (IRAN)
North, Secord, Nir, and Ghorbanifar meet in London. Ghorbanifar takes North into the bathroom and suggests several incentives to make the next arms transaction work, North says. The attractive incentive for North is that residuals could flow to support the Nicaraguan Resistance, North testifies.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 106-07, 296; part II at 166-169.

01/23/86 (CONTRA)
Gadd purchases the first plane for the direct resupply effort, a C-7 Caribou. A second Caribou and a C-123 are purchased in 4/86. The fleet eventually grows to seven aircraft.

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 26-28, 39-40.

01/24/86 (CONTRA)
Form thank you letters are sent from North to NEPL supporters of the Contras. Similar letters went out a month earlier.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, OLN-227.

01/24/86 (IRAN)
Poindexter meets with McMahon, shows him the Finding, and says he wants to give intelligence to Iran as well as TOWs. McMahon objects to providing intelligence.

McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 138-40.

01/25/86 (IRAN)
A cable from McMahon to Casey, who is traveling, notes the new dimension in the TOW saga: "We are to get the TOWs from the US Army and arrange transport overseas." McMahon appeals to Poindexter not to use the Ghorbanifar channel or provide intelligence. Nevertheless, he proceeds to follow orders under the Finding authority.

McMahon Dep., 6/1/87, at 148-50.

01/26/86 (IRAN)
Allen meets with Ghorbanifar in London for three hours and obtains photographs from him of alleged terrorists. Ghorbanifar refers to an "[increase] for Oliver North's boys" in Central America.

Allen Dep., 4/24/87, at 360; 6/29/87, at 505-08.

01/30/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan, Abrams, and North brief visitors at the White House. Later, Channell asks for – and receives – $65,000 from Garwood.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 137-38; Channell Dep., 9/2/87, at 62-65; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 61.

01/31/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams meets Channell and Richard Miller for the first time. They discuss Channell's pro-Contra advertising campaign.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 60-61.

02/01/86 (IRAN)
Circa An interagency study concludes that "the major U.S. concern was collapse of Iraq on the 'Southern Front'." Poindexter had advised President Reagan on 1/17 that Iran was in danger of collapse. Shultz and Weinberger dispute Poindexter.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-28; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 386.

02/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa A second Casey-Secord meeting is arranged by North. Secord complains about lack of help from the CIA Central American Task Force. Casey says he would look into the problem.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 71.

02/01/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Circa Poindexter approves the diversion of profits from the Iran arms sales to the Contras. Poindexter says North came to him after returning from the 1/22/86 meeting in London and proposed using Iran arms sale profits for the Contras. Both testify they did not think they were breaking any law by doing so. Poindexter testifies he did not inform President Reagan or anyone else in the Administration.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 35-42, 182-83. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 114.

02/01/86 (IRAN)
In a PROF note to McFarlane, Poindexter reports that the hostages would soon be released, that Shultz and Weinberger "still disagree (with the Iran initiative) on policy grounds, but are cooperating" and that Casey, Meese, Regan, and Poindexter are "fully on board this risky operation, but most importantly, President and VP are solid in taking the position that we have to try."

PROF note released by the Select Committees on 12/17/87.

02/06/86 (GENERAL)
President Reagan in a message to Congress says: "Those countries that support and direct the terrorists should know there is no refuge, there is no hiding place, there is no sanctuary that will keep them safe forever."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #6, at 177.

02/07/86 (CONTRA)
Circa A Southern Air Transport flight carrying arms from Country 15 goes to Central America. This is the first of three or four such charter flights in 1986. There were two in 1985. Each flight carried 85,000 to 95,000 pounds of munitions.

Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 8-12.

02/10/86 (CONTRA)
Owen sends North a list of items needed for the Southern Front in Nicaragua. Owen refers to the attached munitions list and says it is just the first. Owen also notes that a resupply plane was once used to run drugs, "and part of the crew had criminal records. Nice group the Boys choose."

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 356, 380; Ex. RWO-11, at 816-17.

02/10/86 (IRAN)
Today and the following day, $3.7 million is transferred to the CIA Swiss account from Lake Resources. CIA headquarters arranges through the Treasury Department to pay $3.7 million to DOD for 1000 TOWs.

Interview with CIA finance officers, 3/10/87.

02/15/86 (IRAN)
1,000 TOW missiles arrive at Kelly AFB from Redstone Arsenal. Cost of the transfer is $3.7 million. The CIA surrenders control of the arms to the Enterprise, Secord's "commercial cutout." Ghorbanifar was to pay $10 million for the 1000 TOWs.

OLN PROF note of 2/13/86, cited in Joint Report, at 217, Tower Report, at B-75. (For discussions of the Enterprise, see North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II at 8-12, 33-40, 47-53.)

02/15/86 Circa (IRAN/CONTRA)
Marine Lt. Col. Robert Earl is detailed to the NSC staff from the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism. Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Craig Coy joins him a month later.

Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 7-9. Coy Dep., 3/17/87, at 6-7.

02/19/86 (IRAN)
SAT flies 1000 TOWs from Kelly AFB to Tel Aviv. 500 TOWs are then flown to Tehran. No hostages are released.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 106.

02/19/86 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar, North, C/NE, Secord, and Nir are in Frankfurt to meet with an Iranian. He does not show up.

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 110-12.

02/22/86 (IRAN)
An SAT aircraft returns from Tehran to Tel Aviv carrying 17 of the 18 HAWK missiles delivered in 11/85.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-271; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 106-07.

02/23/86 (CONTRA)
A $50,000 contribution goes to NEPL from Garwood.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 159.

02/24/86 (IRAN)
Pentagon officials meet with Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. They express concern over the nature of the TOW request, lack of documentation, Congressional notification, and the ultimate TOW missile destination. Marsh instructs Gen. Vincent Russo to keep records and raise the issue of notification with Weinberger.

Russo Dep., 6/16/87, at 48-49, Russo Ex. 2.

02/25/86 (IRAN)
At another meeting in Frankfurt are Ghorbanifar and Iranian representatives, North, Secord, C/NE, Nir, and Hakim, who is pressed into service as interpreter. The United States representatives discuss providing to Iran military intelligence and agree to release 500 additional TOW missiles. They discuss arrangements for future high-level meetings.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 291-92; part II at 4-5; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 107; N 1318, N 1547, see Appendix; C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 112-18.

02/27/86 (CONTRA)
Owen tells North the Southern troops are still waiting for a lethal supply drop.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 356-57, Ex. RWO-12, at 818-19.

02/27/86 (IRAN)
North sends a PROF note to McFarlane informing him that he, Casey, Poindexter, the C/NE, and George have agreed to press on with the Iran channel.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45 C, D, E, F, at 609-14.

02/27/86 (IRAN)
The second shipment of 500 TOWs is delivered to Iran. No hostages are released.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 109.

02/27/86 (IRAN)
After returning from Frankfurt, the C/NE recommends to George that Hakim be replaced as interpreter. George recommends George Cave, formerly of the CIA.

George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 245. C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 112-19.

02/28/86 (IRAN)
Gen. Powell provides Poindexter with a memorandum on Congressional notification. Subsequently, Poindexter advises Weinberger that the CIA has the responsibility to notify Congress for the arms shipments; this is affirmed by the Attorney General.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-78; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 147-48.

03/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North instructs Owen to fly to Central America on a Southern Air Transport plane, unload the NHAO medical supplies, and then load the plane with munitions. Problems arise and the munitions are not shipped. The weapons drop, scheduled for the next night, is cancelled.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 357-58.

03/01/86 Circa (CONTRA)
Singlaub testifies that he discusses with Abrams before going to Central America his plan to get Eden Pastora, a Contra commander in the South, to rejoin the Contras. Singlaub says Abrams agrees with his plan. North opposes it. Abrams testifies he did not discuss Pastora with Singlaub at this time.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 91. Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 26-27.

03/03/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan meets in the White House with private sector supporters of Contras. He says that the "four of us" (referring to himself and the three Contra leaders) here are "deeply grateful to you." He says he has just met with Cruz, Calero, and Robelo.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #10, at 300.

03/06/86 (GENERAL)
The Vice President's task force report on terrorism is made public. It asserts that the U.S. Government "will make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism."

Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism; Media reports.

03/07/86 (IRAN)
At a Paris meeting, Ghorbanifar discusses HAWK parts. No hostages have been released as a result of the February TOW shipments. Present are Nir, Ghorbanifar, North, Cave, and the C/NE. Purpose of the meeting is to get the process back on track.

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 124-33; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 27-33; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 111.

03/10/86 (IRAN)
North reports in a PROF to McFarlane on the Paris meeting. North requests McFarlane's private counsel on orders received from the Marine Corps for him to be transferred out of the NSC.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45G, at 615.

03/10/86 (IRAN)
In response to a North request, McFarlane writes a PROF to North and arranges to meet in North's office to discuss North's future. McFarlane proposes that North come to work with him: "How's this for a self-serving scenario... McFarlane/North continue to work the Iran account as well as to begin to build other clandestine capabilities."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 45F at 616.

03/10/86 (CONTRA)
Channell and large donors are briefed at the White House.

Channell Dep., 9/2/87, at 79-80.

03/12/86 (CONTRA)
Garwood makes a $41,000 contribution to NEPL.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 159.

03/14/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan, at a White House briefing for private supporters of the Contras, directly asks for them to help him convince Congress to pass Contra aid legislation.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #11, at 354.

03/15/86 (IRAN)
Circa Hakim writes an agreement that, should he die, Secord would control the offshore bank accounts, and that, should Secord die, North would come into control. Hakim says North knew nothing of these arrangements.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 221-22.

03/15/86 (CONTRA)
Circa The CATF Chief learns that missions are being flown to resupply Southern Front troops. He receives requests from Castillo for course information, weather reports, and intelligence for the southern flights. The CATF Chief understands the role of Castillo to be one of passing information to someone in the Southern Front set-up. He says he became aware that there was a problem with Castillo in that he was passing information directly to the private benefactors.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 105-07; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 29.

03/16/86 (CONTRA)
North writes a memo titled "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance." North proposes to obtain funds for the Contras in the event Congress does not make the necessary appropriations. North writes McFarlane of the necessity to raise $25 million to $30 million from donors for munitions in 1986. (This is one of the altered documents.)

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 34, Ex. 36, at 510-13; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 498-99.

03/17/86 (CONTRA)
Owen writes a memo to North saying the Contra leaders don't trust him or North anymore. He writes, "This war has become a business. If the $100 million is approved (by Congress) and things go on as they have these last five years, it will be like pouring money down a sink hole." He also writes that word is spreading about "Seacord's operation [sic]." He writes, "What you had hoped to remain quiet is now being openly discussed on the street."

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 405-06, Ex. RWO-13, at 820-24.

03/20/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Abrams says that by this time the Contras are near bankruptcy. The $27 million in humanitarian aid has run out.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 39.

03/20/86 (CONTRA)
The House rejects, 210 to 222, H.J. Res. 540, the President's request for $100 million in Contra aid.

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, #35, at H 1493.

03/21/86 (CONTRA)
Circa In the spring of 1986, David Fischer is said to have arranged private meetings between President Reagan and several of Channell's large donors.

Channel Dep., 9/1/87, at 174-77; Fischer Dep., 8/11/87, at 97-120; Artianō Dep., 7/31/87, at 110-116.

03/21/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan remarks at a White House reception for private sector supporters: ". . . We can't let the final hope of freedom in Nicaragua be extinguished while Congress slowly makes up its mind to do the right thing." President Reagan calls Calero, Robelo, and Cruz on stage with him and says "We're in this together . . . I give you my solemn pledge, we'll spare no effort. . . ."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #12, at 397-398.

03/21/86 (CONTRA)
The CATF Chief, North, Abrams, Gen. William Walker, and Gen. Galvin go on a 1-day trip to Central America.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 105-07; Galvin Dep., 6/13/87, at 54-59, 84-85, 100-101.

03/22/86 (CONTRA)
In a radio address to the nation, President Reagan asks for support in providing all necessary military aid to the Contras.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #13, at 404.

03/24/86 (CONTRA)
Poindexter is briefed by Deputy Attorney General Jensen on a criminal investigation by the Miami U.S. Attorney into alleged gun-running to the Contras. Poindexter says he did not recall any such meeting.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 390-91; Jensen Dep., 7/6/87, at 51-62.

03/26/86 (CONTRA)
Garwood makes a $130,000 contribution to NEPL.

Garwood Dep., 3/18/87, at 75.

03/27/86 (CONTRA)
The Senate approves $100 million for Contra aid, 53 to 47. The House had voted down a similar measure on 3/20.

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, #40, at S 3689.

03/27/86 (CONTRA)
Tambs cables North, Abrams, and the CIA about a Singlaub-Pastora agreement that would provide ammunition, encryption systems, etc., and Pastora would cooperate with other elements of the Resistance.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 384-88, Ex. LAT-1; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5 , at 26-31, Ex. EA-X, EA-6.

03/28/86 (CONTRA)
North meets with William O'Boyle, a wealthy donor, and describes the weapons needed for the Contras. The night before North had spoken to an NEPL group in the OEOB. At a breakfast this morning, North talks about arms on a weapons list he has. He says as a Government employee he couldn't ask for money but could provide information on what was needed. Prior to the breakfast, when the two were alone, Channell tells O'Boyle that for $300,000 he could meet with the President.

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 116-23, Ex. WBO-1; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 15-16; Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 142-47; 9/2/87, at 83.

03/28/86 (CONTRA)
Owen writes North again of Southern Front military needs.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-14, at 825-26.

03/29/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams sends a strongly worded cable to Tambs, criticizing him for associating the American Embassy in Costa Rica with the agreement between Singlaub and Pastora.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 387, Ex. LAT-2, at 825; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 26-31.

03/31/86 (CONTRA)
Ambassador Tambs denies associating the U.S. with the Singlaub-Pastora agreement.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 388, Ex. LAT-3.

03/31/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North thanks O'Boyle after O'Boyle hand-delivers a $130,000 check to Channell at the Hay-Adams for a plane for the Contras. North then discusses weapons again with O'Boyle.

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 121.

April-May, 1986

04/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North gives detailed instructions on a supply drop. In an undated KL-43 encoded message to Secord, North describes the "desperate need" of a unit in the southern quadrant. He suggests a detailed plan under which an NHAO-chartered L-100 would be used to carry arms after it completed its humanitarian mission. Secord testifies that it was "not customary" for North to give instructions like this. This, however, "was a very unusual mission" that involved using an NHAO-chartered airplane after it had completed its humanitarian mission to Central America.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 67-68, Ex. 3; Gadd Dep. 5/1/87, at 38.

04/03/86 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar meets in Washington with Cave, the C/NE, North, and Nir in the OEOB. There is a detailed discussion of mechanics of a planned trip to Iran, arms deliveries, and the release of hostages.

C/NE Dep., 4/22/87, at 134-39. Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 39-42, 50-55.

04/04/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
North drafts a memo for Poindexter, intended for President Reagan, outlining plans to divert $12 million in profits from the Iran arms sale on behalf of the Contras. (North testifies he prepared five different Iran-Contra diversion memos in 1986 with each asking for Presidential approval. The first was in January/February 1986. Poindexter would have received North's memos as they were "passed up the line." Poindexter testifies he recalls seeing none.)

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 11-13, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-1; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 476-77; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 43, 51-54, 161-63, 194-99, Exs. JMP-25, JMP-28, JMP-34, JMP-39.

04/07/86 (CONTRA)
An Owen memo to North describes the investigation of a Florida U.S. Attorney in Central America of Neutrality Act violations and unauthorized use of Government funds. Owen reports that Castillo has seen a diagram listing North, Owen, and John Hull, an American living in northern Costa Rica, with a line connecting the Resistance groups, at the time Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman was in Costa Rica on the investigation. Feldman says he had such a chart. Tambs says he also saw this diagram. Castillo testifies he did not know where Owen got the information; he had never seen such a diagram, he says.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 413-16; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 55-56, 69-71; Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-15, at 827-28; Feldman Dep., 4/30/87, at 49-56; Currier Dep., 5/5/87, at 27-35.

04/07/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
A North PROF to McFarlane mentions "a paper for our boss [Reagan] that lays out arrangements" for the trip to Iran that North says he has prepared at Poindexter's request. The paper he refers to is the diversion memo attached to the Terms of Reference (guidance for McFarlane's trip to Tehran, dated 4/4/86).

Tower, at B-85; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-2, OLN-283.

04/09/86 (CONTRA)
The State Department instructs Tambs to inform Pastora that Singlaub was not authorized by the U.S. Government to negotiate an agreement to supply aid to Pastora's forces.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, 388-89, Ex. LAT-4.

04/10/86 (CONTRA)
Plans are made for an airdrop of arms to the Contras in Nicaragua with Rodriguez, Ramon Medina, a Cuban-American involved in the resupply operation, and Col. Steele. The flight is made, but the cargo was not discharged because the drop site could not be found.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 21-23. Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, at 57-62.

04/10/86 (CONTRA)

– North, Channell, and Garwood meet at the Hay-Adams after she meets with President Reagan. North and Channell, "in low tones," discuss a weapons list, which Channell gives to Garwood. Channell asks for contribution after North leaves. She provides $1,663,500 in stock and cash. By June, Garwood will have donated more than $2.5 million to Channell. North testifies he does not recall this "specific event" but "I showed a lot of munitions lists."

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 113-16, Exs. ECG-1, ECG-2, ECG-3; Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 139-42; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 90.

04/10/86 (CONTRA)

In a KL-43 to North from Secord and Quintero, Secord states that Col. Steele briefed the U.S. Ambassador on all ongoing operations. He writes that Steele is intimately involved in the operation, presumably on orders of North.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, Ex. 3, at 418. Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 42, 69-70.

04/11/86 (CONTRA)

A successful drop of arms to the Contras on the Southern Front is made from an SAT L-100. The drop consists of 17 containers of mortars, grenades, and other armaments. This is the drop that failed a night before.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 21-23; Ian Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, at 62-63; Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 34-35.

04/12/86 (CONTRA)

In a KL-43 to North, Castillo reports that the 4/11/86 drop was a success. He adds: "My objective is creation of 2,500 man force which can strike northwest and link-up with quiche form solid southern force."

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 62-63, Ex. TC-6.

04/16/86 (CONTRA)
Circa "Hundreds of people" attend a briefing on Nicaragua in the OEOB.

Channell Dep., 9/2/87, at 88-89.

04/20/86 (CONTRA)
North, Secord, Enrique Bermudez, military commander of the FDN, and a local commander meet at the airbase. Bermudez complains about the planes being used. North says the equipment was donated and there was nothing he could do; that if he had the money he'd buy better aircraft.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 297-98, 332-33; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 98, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-4; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 211.

04/20/86 (CONTRA)
North, returning to the U.S., is briefed on the 4/11/86 drop by Crawford at Gadd's behest.

Crawford Dep., 3/13/87, at 76-83; Gadd Dep., 5/1/87, at 44-45.

04/21/86 (CONTRA)
Secord tells North: "Current obligations nearly wipe us out." In a KL-43, Secord describes "big ticket" obligations, including $110,000 to David Walker, a British specialist in covert operations. Secord testifies that he contracted with Walker's firm "to provide some foreign, in this case, U.K., personnel . . . to act as air crews:" two pilots and one load master.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 308; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 68-69, Ex. 3, at 424.

04/21/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to McFarlane, North writes, "There is great despair that we may fail in this effort and the resistance support acct. is darned near broke." North adds that the operation, which has seven aircraft, has delivered over $37 million in supplies and ordnance. He says he told Secord to prepare to sell the Enterprise's ship Erria and then the planes to sustain the effort. He raises the possibility of going to Perot for money. He continues: "Any thoughts where we can put our hands on a quick $3 to $5 million? Gaston is going back to his friends (Country 3) who will have given $2 million so far . . ." Sigur testifies that he had no such conversation with North, and that he did not return to the Country 3 official after the $2 million was given.

Sigur Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 293; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 122-24, Ex. 46, at 620; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 308, 100-7 part II, at 98.

04/21/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Poindexter Deputy Donald R. Fortier, North describes in detail the Contras' "dismal" financial situation. At this time, apparently, there is almost $5 million in the Secord/Hakim accounts.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 56-57, 98, part III, Exs. OLN-17, OLN-277.

04/22/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane and Poindexter exchange PROF messages. Poindexter instructs McFarlane that unless the hostages are released upon McFarlane's arrival in Iran, there would be no arms shipments.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 62, Exs. 45A, 45B, at 621, 622.

04/24/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams says he first met Singlaub on this day. He adds that he first learned of the Singlaub-Pastora agreement when Tambs sent a back-channel cable giving the text of the agreement in March. Singlaub says that he discussed the agreement with Abrams before going to Costa Rica.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 27, 55-59; Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 91.

04/28/86 (CONTRA)
By KL-43, Secord tells North of plans to lease the ship Erria to the CIA at a profit. North testifies that the original purchase of the ship was approved by his superiors to whom he sent memoranda asking for permission.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 73, 187; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 74; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 218.

04/29/86 (CONTRA)
North meets Glenn Robinette, a retired CIA security specialist. They discuss a security system for North's home, which eventually Robinette installs and Secord pays for. North testifies he and his family had been harassed and threatened, but the Government would not provide security.

Robinette Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 5-6. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 126-29.

04/29/86 (CONTRA)
North and O'Boyle meet in the OEOB for 30 to 45 minutes. Channell is present for the initial part. North imparts to O'Boyle "secret" Nicaragua plans. O'Boyle makes no contribution at this time. North testifies that he told O'Boyle the briefing was "sensitive" but not classified.

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 123-24, 135-36, 155-57, 162-63; Channell Dep., 9/1/87, at 142-46; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 15-16.

04/30/86 (CONTRA)
Singlaub meets with North to go over weapons he will purchase and to obtain assurance his activities are legal. North reports to him that they are legal if no U.S. arms or U.S. carriers are involved.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 78.

04/30/86 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar proposes that North go to Iran for a pre-summit preparation meeting. Poindexter denies North's request for such a meeting.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 135-36; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 178.

05/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa A North letter, undated, to "My Friend" (probably Calero) tells him $20 million is to be deposited in the usual account. He says also that Congress must continue to believe there is a need for dollars for the Contras.

Owen Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. RWO-3, at 780-82.

05/01/86 (CONTRA)
Rodriguez meets with Vice President Bush, Gregg, Samuel J. Watson, another aide to the Vice President, and former Senator Nicholas Brady, who was a member of the Kissinger Commission on Central America. Gregg, Watson, Senator Brady, and Rodriguez all testify that the Contras were not discussed, even though a scheduling note for the Vice President says that "resupply of the Contras" was one purpose of the meeting. Gregg and Watson say they did not put that note on the schedule or order that it be put on. Phyllis Byrne, Gregg's secretary, says she believes she got the phrase from Watson. Earlier, Rodriguez had told North that he wanted out of the resupply operation.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 299-302; Gregg Dep., 5/18/87, at 54-59; Watson Dep., 6/16/87, at 22-35; Byrne Dep., 6/16/87, at 5-25; Brady Dep., 10/1/87, at 3-9.

05/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Singlaub travels to Countries 3 and 5, following up on his previous trip. He tells Abrams he intends to solicit funds. Abrams tells Singlaub he would provide the official U.S. signal of approval that Singlaub wanted, Singlaub testifies. Abrams later calls Singlaub while he was in Country 3 and tells him the "signal" is cancelled, Singlaub testifies. Singlaub says he did not solicit Country 5 for money. Abrams testifies he does not recall meeting with Singlaub on this matter.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 89-90. Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 55-56.

05/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Before McFarlane's Tehran trip, Casey calls North while Secord was with North. They go to Casey's OEOB office and discuss the Contra fund shortage, which North says is critical. Casey is pessimistic about Congress, mentions a country he thought would donate the $10 million Secord says is needed. After Secord demurs, Casey says he would speak to Shultz about making the approach.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 71-73; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 309.

05/02/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan speaks of taking action "unilaterally" on the Contras. In a PROF to Thompson, Poindexter writes: "Yesterday in a meeting that I had with the President, he started the conversation with 'I am really serious. If we can't move the Contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance.' . . . [T]he fact remains that the President is ready to confront the Congress on the Constitutional question of who controls foreign policy."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 51, Ex. JMP-45.

05/02/86 (CONTRA)
Ret. Air Force Col. Robert C. Dutton, a Secord business associate, takes over as manager of the Contra resupply program. Secord says he brought Dutton in "to try to get this train back on the track, if you will, to try to get some operational capability generated in this airlift company. And ultimately he did. He did a very good job." Dutton testifies that Secord and North were equal commanders of the operation. He also says that under him the operation averaged about 19 pilots and flight crew members.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 204, 207; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 64.

05/02/86 (CONTRA)

North outlines for Poindexter his "Alamo" plan for direct U.S. involvement in a Central American war against Nicaragua. In September, he presents his plan to the RIG. It is dismissed. In a PROF to Poindexter, he writes that the CONTRAS will likely, within 6 to 8 weeks, try to capture a coastal population center, "run up the blue and white Nicaraguan flag, salute it – and scream like hell for help." If that occurred, "the rest of the world will wait to see what we do – recognize the new territory – and UNO as the govt – or evacuate them as in a Bay of Pigs... I believe that the American body politic would respond very favorably to the image of the DRF engaged in a final desperate struggle."

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 34, 126.

05/03/86 (IRAN)

While at the Tokyo Summit, Shultz receives a cable from Armacost, who tells him that Ambassador Charles Price in Great Britain reported that one of his officers was told by a British businessman that the White House had supposedly approved an arms sale to Iran. Poindexter is said to be the point man and Ghorbanifar and Adnan Khashoggi, an international financier and arms dealer from Saudi Arabia, are involved. Shultz speaks with Regan and Poindexter and objects strongly to the plan. Poindexter tells Shultz, and later Price, there is a "shred of truth" to the information. Shultz says he believed Poindexter, concluding the operation was not endorsed by the U.S. Government.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 9-10, Ex., GPS-20; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 70-71, Ex. JMP-42.

05/03/86 (IRAN)

Poindexter reports to North in a PROF a call he had from Ambassador Price "with a wild story." Price had told Poindexter of a meeting of Tiny Rowlands, a British entrepreneur. He said Nir, Khashoggi, and Ghorbanifar had approached Rowlands with a business deal to sell materials to Iran that involved the White House. Poindexter asks North, "What in the hell is Nir doing? We really can't trust those sob's."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-42.

05/05/86 (IRAN)
North in a PROF to Poindexter reports he is leaving with Cave for London on 05/06/86 to meet with Ghorbanifar. North sets forth proposed hostage-arms arrangement and says, "In return, we get to raise the issues of Nicaragua, no more terrorism . . ."

Chron. Ex. 8.

05/05/86 (IRAN)
Terrorism statement after the Tokyo Economic Summit: "We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and the representatives of the European Community, assembled here in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support it. We abhor the increase in the level of such terrorism since our last meeting, and in particular its blatant and cynical use as an instrument of government policy. Terrorism has no justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible means, and it must be fought relentlessly and without compromise."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #19, at 584.

05/05/86 (IRAN)
A PROF note from Poindexter to North instructs North to bypass the London Embassy during his trip to London.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 10. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-287.

05/06/86 (IRAN)
North in a PROF complains to Poindexter that the Marine Corps is trying to get him detached from the NSC. North adds, "I do not believe this is what you or the President wants." Rodney McDaniel, NSC Executive Secretary, later sends a PROF back to Poindexter saying that he told the Marine Corps, "we would not support such a move."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-288.

05/06/86 (IRAN)
Ghorbanifar meets in London with North, Nir, and Cave on arrangements for the McFarlane trip to Iran.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 45-49, 60-67.

05/08/86 (CONTRA)
Oscar Arias Sanchez is inaugurated as President of Costa Rica.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 377.

05/10/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
North asks Robinette, "Please try to keep [the cost of the security system] along those lines [from $8,000 to $8,500]. Remember, I am a poor lieutenant colonel."

Robinette Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 7-8; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 130.

05/14/86 (CONTRA)
Dutton outlines a reorganization plan whereby Dutton and Secord would act as communication and operation officers. North would give general directions, and pilot William Cooper would actually manage the resupply operation.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3. at 222-25, Ex. RCD-14.

05/14/86 (CONTRA)
AUSA Feldman drafts a memo to Miami U.S. Attorney Leon Kellner analyzing evidence in the Contra gun-running case allegedly involving Hull. The final draft was finished on 5/22. A grand jury investigation is put off because Feldman's superiors said they believed the evidence was insufficient to prosecute.

Feldman Dep., 4/30/87, at 76-83, 104-14; Kellner Dep., 4/30/87, at 18, 33-44, 46-51, 56-58.

05/14/86 (IRAN)
A PROF from Vincent Cannistraro, an NSC staff member, says that North offered to lease the Erria to the CIA for a covert operation. The CIA declined because of the Erria's association with Clines.

Joint Report, at 368; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 181-83; Appendix A, Vol. 2, at 964; George Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 218.

05/15/86 (CONTRA)
The Costa Rican Government instructs Tambs to shut down the Santa Elena airstrip.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 383.

05/15/86 (CONTRA)
In a memo for the President signed by Poindexter and written by North as preparation for a 5/16/86 National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, the "urgency" of the need to find money for the Contras is described. Three options are suggested: (1) "A reprogramming of $15 million from DOD to CIA for humanitarian aid;" (2) "A Presidential appeal for private donations;" and (3) "A direct and very private Presidential overture to certain Heads of State. . . ."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-50; North Test, Hearings, 100-7 part I at 312-315.

05/15/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to North headlined "Be Cautious," Poindexter refers to North's offering the ship Erria to the CIA and says, "I am afraid you are letting your operational role become too public." He instructs that North talk to no one but him, "including Casey," about "any of your operational roles. In fact, you need to quietly generate a cover story that I have insisted you stop."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 59-61, Ex. JMP-46; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 317-18.

05/15/86 (CONTRA)
The CATF Chief meets with all his country chiefs. Activities of private benefactors are raised as a potential problem for a specific location.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 110-11; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 26.

05/16/86 (IRAN)
The CIA Swiss account receives a deposit of $6.5 million from a Hakim account. The CIA notifies DOD that money is available for the acquisition of HAWK spare parts and 508 TOWs.

CIA Finance Officers Interview, 4/22/87, at 150.

05/16/86 (CONTRA)

In a PROF, North says that as the Contra resupply operation gets more money – it has $6 million available and "we will have a considerable amount in a few more days" – the risk of disclosure increases. Political embarrassment can be avoided by "covering it with an authorized CIA program undertaken with the $15M" reprogramming. In the PROF, North notes that the $6 million available "reduces the need to go to third countries for help." North says he did not discuss with Poindexter the possibility of bringing this to the attention of the President or the Secretary of State at the NSPG meeting. Poindexter says that he did not tell the President so as to preserve President Reagan's deniability. In the same PROF, North writes: "Unless we do this (turn the operation over to the CIA), we will run increasing risks of trying to manage this problem from here with the attendant financial and political liabilities.... While I care not a wit about what they say about me, it could well become a political embarrassment for the President and you." North also writes that although he does not know what Don Regan knows of the private operation, "the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their support of Democracy in CentAm." A PROF by Poindexter on 5/19/86 tells North, "Don Regan knows very little of your operation and that is just as well."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 312-315; 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-192; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 65-67, Ex. JMP-51.

05/16/86 (CONTRA)

The NSPG meeting approves third-country solicitation. At the meeting are President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Abrams, Poindexter, North, and others. The dire financial condition of the Contras is discussed. Participants are not told by Poindexter or North that the Contra operation has $6 million available.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 39-42; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 309-11; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 65-67, Ex. JMP-51; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 17-18.

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05/17/86 (CONTRA)
Shultz tells Abrams to compile a list of countries that could be approached for Contra donations. Shultz rules out Countries 3, 5, and 1 (which without his knowledge had already been solicited by this time). He also rules out any countries that receive aid from the U.S. Brunei is on the list.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 41-43.

05/17/86 (IRAN)
North in a PROF to Poindexter outlines plans for the upcoming Iran trip. Prior to leaving, North urges "That we have a quiet meeting with McFarlane and Ronald Reagan." He adds, "We should probably not have any paper on this meeting" and encourages Poindexter to invite to the session "Shultz, Weinberger and Casey." (On 05-19-86 Poindexter responds to North: "I don't want a meeting with Ronald Reagan . . . etc.")

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 10-11; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-48.

05/19/86 (CONTRA)
A $350,000 contribution to NEPL is made by Garwood.

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 116, Ex. ECG-3.

05/20/86 (CONTRA)
Rodriguez meets with Vice President Bush again, this time in Miami, when the Vice President is there to celebrate Cuban independence. No discussions relating to his activities in Central America occurred, Rodriguez testifies.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 302.

05/20/86 (IRAN)
$200,000 is deposited into a "Button" account by Hakim. The account, Hakim says, is set up for North's benefit but without his knowledge. It is a family insurance policy, Hakim says.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 217; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 138-140; Hakim Dep., 5/22/87, at 124, 129-130; 5/24/87, at 182-183; Secord Dep., 6/10/87, at 24-25, 27, 32-34.

05/21/86 (CONTRA)
An SAT flight from Country 15 lands in Central America. This is the last of the SAT flights from this country to Central America. With these new munitions, the warehouse becomes overloaded.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 214.

05/21/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Betsy North goes to Philadelphia. Hakim says he had Willard Zucker, an American lawyer in Geneva, call Mrs. North "to tell her that . . . a certain person . . . admires her husband and wishes to help out with . . . education expenses of the children." Zucker meets with Mrs. North in Philadelphia, then investigates ways to get money to the North family. Hakim testifies that "no proper solution was found." Hakim, reconsidering whether North knew of the Betsy North-Zucker meeting in Philadelphia, says: "[E]ventually I would have found it impossible for him not to know." North testifies he knew nothing of this Hakim plan.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 271-72. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 136, 139-140.

05/22/86 (IRAN)
An SAT 707 delivers HAWK spare parts to Israel.

Israeli Chronology.

05/23/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane flies to Tehran via Tel Aviv to meet with Iranian officials. He is joined by Cave, North, Teicher, Nir, and two CIA communicators in Tel Aviv. Also present is Secord, who remains in Tel Aviv with a CIA communicator. On the plane to Tehran are HAWK spare parts for the Iranians. The American understanding that all the hostages would be released upon arrival in Tehran is not honored. Over 3 days in Tehran, McFarlane meets with Iranians. The Iranians demand delivery of HAWK parts before any hostages are freed. On the last day, convinced that the Iranians lacked the influence to free the hostages, the U.S party leaves. McFarlane says that, on this trip, he learns for the first time from North that funds from the Iranian transactions are being diverted to the Contras.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 290-294; Secord, 100-1, at 114-15; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 62-65, 112-13, 140-42, 184-85, 219; 100-7, part II, at 239-240; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 76-91, 9/29/87, at 14-22, 26-27; C/NED Dep., 4/22/87, at 139-44.

05/23/86 (IRAN)
Circa The hostage-ransom plan is revived with a new DEA source, at about the same time of the McFarlane mission to Iran. At the request of North, Perot sends a courier to Cyprus with $2 million. Clines is standing by offshore on the Erria. The plan collapses and the operation fails. The money is not spent.

Agent 2 Dep., 8/12/87, at 188, 204; Agent 1 Dep., 8/28/87, at 136-38, 147; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 65.

05/24/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Dutton meets with Steele, Rodriguez, William Cooper and Medina. Dutton advises that a lawsuit had been initiated against 30 to 32 persons to publicize the resupply effort and stop it. Secord and North feel that the suit was probably supported by the KGB and Cubans and that publicity would cause defeat of the $100 million Contra support package being considered by Congress. Dutton is instructed to advise people in Central America that Secord and North were no longer involved. Secord and North feel that Rodriguez was the source of the information upon which the suit was based and that if he were told Secord and North were no longer involved less pressure would be exerted. Dutton states that they, however, continued to be involved even though they were traveling a great deal. Steele does not recall discussion of the lawsuit.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 248. Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 38-39.

05/24/86 (IRAN)
The 508 replenishment TOWs reach Israel.

Israeli Financial Chronology.

05/29/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane, North, and Teicher report to President Reagan on the trip to Iran. Also present are Poindexter, Regan, and Vice President Bush. McFarlane says President Reagan did not comment or react.

Tower Board Interview, 12/1/86, at 44-45.

05/31/86 (IRAN)
Circa Casey calls Shultz, telling him the Iran initiative had fizzled. Shultz thought this meant an end to the initiative.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 35.

06/08/86 (CONTRA)
Dutton complains, via KL-43, that Rodriguez – whom Steele had made his deputy for all matters relating to the resupply operation – didn't understand the organization, that he wanted partial control of the $50,000 fuel fund, and that he wanted an emergency fund of $10,000.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 220-21, Ex. RCD-1; Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 331.

06/09/86 (CONTRA)
A C-123 carrying 10,000 pounds of lethal and nonlethal supplies gets stuck in the mud in Costa Rica when it lands at Point West (Santa Elena).

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 217, 256. Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 381-82.

06/09/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams calls North on the Brunei solicitation and asks how to get money to Contras. Shortly after the call, Abrams is in North's office, and North directs Fawn Hall to type an account number from a piece of paper he handed her. North testifies that he told Abrams the account he gave him was under U.S. control. Abrams says North did not tell him it was a Lake Resources account. No money was ever received because North gave Abrams the wrong Swiss bank account number.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 43-52; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 329-30; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 487.

06/10/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Poindexter, North writes that the Contras do not now need money, but rather, "What we most need is to get the CIA re-engaged in this effort so that it can be better managed than it now is by one slightly confused Marine Lt.Col." North writes that several million rounds of ammo are now on hand, and $3 million in weapons is on the way by ship. "Critically needed items are being flown in from Europe to the expanded warehouse facility." The only liability, he says, is that "we still have . . . one of Democracy Inc.'s airplanes . . . mired in the mud."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 46C, at 623.

06/10/86 (CONTRA)
In the same PROF, North writes: "We should look to going back . . . on the Blowpipes [missiles] if we are going to do anything at all about outside support in the next few days." North continues: "Meanwhile, I would recommend that you and RCM have a talk about how much Sec. Shultz does or does not know about (Countries 2 and 3) so that we don't make any mistakes . . . At this point I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Help."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 46C, at 623; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8 at 78-80; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 18-19.

06/11/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Poindexter, McFarlane writes that "the Democratic left" is going after North and that they will eventually get him because "too many people are talking to reporters from the donor community and within the administration." McFarlane suggests getting North transferred to Bethesda for disability review. He notes that this would be "a major loss to the staff and the Contra effort."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 46D, at 624.

06/11/86 (IRAN)
President Reagan writes Perot, thanking him for his efforts on behalf of the hostages.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-4.

06/12/86 (IRAN)
Payment from the CIA to DOD for TOWs amounting to $5.6 million is made in checks of no greater amount than $999,999.99. Checks of $1 million and above require Congressional notification.

Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 215-217; Ex. CWW-21.

06/12/86 (CONTRA)
By KL-43, Secord tells North the plane is out of the mud and the field will have limited use during heavy rain. He adds that, "it can still be used as a divert base since highest 3,000 ft. is useable even during worst conditions."

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 74, Ex. 3, at 427; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 32.

06/15/86 (CONTRA)
Circa After British crews do not work out, North authorizes the use of U.S. crews to fly missions inside Nicaragua, according to Dutton. According to Secord, he and not North authorized the use of U.S. crews.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 214; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 68-69.

06/16/86 (CONTRA)
In a KL-43 to Castillo, North explains a drop was aborted because the Contras were never sighted.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-89.

06/16/86 (CONTRA)
Shultz first learns of Country 2's contribution to the Contras in a phone conversation with McFarlane. He did not learn about Country 3's $2 million contribution and of the other solicitations until the Iran-Contra hearings, he testifies.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 4. Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 42.

06/17/86 (GENERAL)
Casey signs an agreement with the Senate Intelligence Committee providing for new procedures for notifying Congress of future covert actions.

Senate Intelligence Committee.

06/17/86 (CONTRA)
In a KL-43 to Rodriguez for retransmittal to Quintero, Dutton relays a direct order from North: "Goode [a code name for North] advises (Castillo) unable to determine exact location of the troops. Therefore, tomorrow fly in support of Northern forces. We will fly the southern mission when we get the no. 1 C-7 operating or use no. 2 later in the week."

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 216-17, Ex. RCD-2.

06/18/86 (CONTRA)
President Reagan meets Robelo, Cruz, and Calero. President Reagan pledges that the U.S. will not allow a Sandinista victory, that U.S. is more than just a "fair-weather friend."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #5, at 824.

06/21/86 (IRAN)
Circa Hakim starts efforts to open up a second channel to Iran. A North-Secord-Hakim agreement is worked out under which North would handle political concerns, Secord the operational, Hakim the financial. Hakim—via Willard Zucker—used offshore companies, mostly in Panama, with some in Liberia, to finance the operation.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 205.

06/21/86 (IRAN)
Circa Hakim creates a chart of his businesses that includes a "reserve" that added $2 million covered by the will in which North is named and the $2 million covered by the other will in which only Secord is named. One reserve was created in 03/86, the other in 06/86. The chart was found in North's office.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 279-81, Ex. AH-1; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 125.

06/21/86 (CONTRA)
A successful southern mission refuels at the Costa Rica international airport. Arranged by North, this is the first successful southern supply mission under Dutton. As a result of an accident with the C-123, the C-7s were the only planes available. They did not have the range to make drops in the south without refueling. This refueling took place twice, the second time in July.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 217-18; Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 391-92; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 28-30.

06/24/86 (CONTRA)
A House Resolution of Inquiry is introduced, "directing the President to provide to the House... certain information concerning activities of ... North ... in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance." It is introduced by Rep. Ronald D. Coleman and is referred to the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-122; Media reports.

06/25/86 (CONTRA)
The House passes, 221 to 209, a $100-million military and humanitarian Contra aid package, reversing the most recent Boland prohibition on military aid.

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, #88, at H 4174.

06/25/86 (CONTRA)
North, Rodriguez, and Dutton meet at the OEOB. North tells Rodriguez he has information indicating that Rodriguez had spoken on open phone lines to unauthorized people about the operation. Rodriguez challenges him, and North does not produce any proof. Rodriguez is told he is to be the liaison between the operation and the host country.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 221-22, 275-76; Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 302-06, 333-35.

06/25/86 (CONTRA)
Rodriguez later complains privately to North. He says that people are stealing, that some of those involved – Secord and Clines – were connected to convicted former CIA officer Edwin Wilson, and that if this became known it could be "worse than Watergate." North denies the charges, says Clines, a former CIA operative and associate of Wilson, is a patriot just helping out with transportation. North also says at this time, according to Rodriguez, that Congress "cannot touch me because the old man loves my ass."

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 302-06, 333-35. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 88-89.

06/25/86 (CONTRA)
Reps. Dante E. Fascell and Hamilton write the President on the Resolution of Inquiry. They request comment.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-123, OLN-124.

06/26/86 (CONTRA)
In accord with the NSPG directive, Shultz approves a solicitation for humanitarian aid from Brunei. He travels to Brunei but does not ask for a contribution, on the advice of Sigur. Hakim is told by Secord that a $10-million donation "is in the pipeline" and is headed for the Lake Resources account. $3 million is targeted for arming the Contras. The remaining $7 million is for humanitarian aid, Hakim testifies.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 44; Sigur Test., 100-2, at 307; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 19-20; Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 369-70.

06/27/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to North, Karna Small of the NSC writes that CBS's "West 57th Street" is working on a segment in which they will say that John Hull has been boasting to friends that he has been receiving weekly checks from the NSC. "The show obviously has an interview with this guy and I can't just give them the 'bullshit' response." She asks North to get back to her.

Chron. Ex. 9.

06/28/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Small after watching the "West 57th Street" broadcast, North denies specific allegations without denying the broad charge that he was involved in supplying the Contras. He writes, for example, "I know Robert Owen—he was, up until the time it went out of business—a consultant to the State Dept. NHAO. He was not 'paid off' $50K, as alleged by an anonymous accuser, he was paid a salary and expenses for services he provided in delivering humanitarian aid for the USG on a State Dept contract.... In short, neither the witnesses nor the slanderous piece that CBS produced have any credibility whatsoever."

Chron. Ex. 10.

06/30/86 (IRAN)
An Iranian official challenges Cave on HAWK spare parts overcharges after reviewing a DOD contractor price list.

Cave memo, quoted in Tower at B-131; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-48; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 106-09.

07/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North suggests to the CATF Chief that the CIA buy the aircraft that were being used for resupply. The CATF Chief says no; they are "hot cargo" and bad airplanes.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 61-62, 113-114.

07/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Dutton says that around this time the operation had trouble making deliveries because of: (1) poor intelligence on location of troops and on weather; (2) the C-123 accident; and (3) trouble with Rodriguez at the airbase.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 219-20. Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 68-70.

07/10/86 (IRAN)
A Hakim Iranian contact meets in Washington with Hakim and Cave to explore opening a second channel.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 111-12; 9/29/87, at 31.

07/12/86 (CONTRA)
A second long C-7 flight occurs in support of southern troops with a full stop in the Costa Rica international airport. Engine trouble forces the plane to leave there and return to base. Assistance was received from the military and Castillo in Costa Rica with North's help.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 218; Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 391-92; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 28-30.

07/12/86 (CONTRA)
Castillo is instructed to stand down on assistance. A cable from CIA headquarters refers to numerous allegations of violations of law by private benefactors, and a desire not to have the CIA tied to them. Castillo describes this as "soft instructions," not a cease and desist order.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 27-28, 30-32, 41, 44-47; C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 111-13, Ex. C/CATF-33.

07/15/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Poindexter, North says it would be "ludicrous" to let the Contras wait for U.S. aid to become effective because the CIA feels Project Democracy assets are "tainted." He writes that the total value of the assets is more than $4.5 million.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-54.

07/15/86 (CONTRA)
North in a PROF to Poindexter: "[Y]ou should not be expected to retain on your staff someone who you suspect could be talking to the media or whom you believe to be too emotionally involved in an issue to be objective in the development of policy options and recommendations." Poindexter replies later that day, "Now you are getting emotional again." He writes that he just wanted to lower North's visibility, that "I do not want you to leave and to be honest cannot afford to let you go."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7, Ex. OLN-295.

07/21/86 (IRAN)
At a meeting in Europe of Ghorbanifar, Cave, Nir, and North, there is a discussion of hostages in exchange for the HAWK spare parts still undelivered from the May trip to Iran.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 114-15.

07/21/86 (CONTRA)
Dutton completes a Project Democracy reorganization plan. The plan was intended for North to use to lay out the southern operation for Casey, according to Dutton. North and Secord approve the plan, including the options listed for asset liquidation. The document says, "We prefer option 1," which called for selling the assets to the CIA for about $4 million, with the proceeds going back into a fund for continued operations. Secord denies that this was preferred option.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 222-25, 247-50, 268-70; Ex. RCD-14; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 77-79.

07/21/86 (CONTRA)
Poindexter replies to Rep. Hamilton on the Resolution of Inquiry. In a letter saying the Administration opposes the resolution, Poindexter writes that last fall McFarlane met with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and provided information relevant to H. Res. 485, which "made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaraguan Resistance." Poindexter testifies: "I think it is an accurate letter. It doesn't tell everything. It withholds information, but it is accurate." He said, "I intended to withhold information from Chairman Hamilton, which I did. . .I wanted to withhold information on the NSC operational activities in support of the Contras from most everybody."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 94-96, 150-57, Ex. JMP-14.

07/25/86 (CONTRA)
Sigur advises the U.S. Ambassador to Brunei, Barrington King, that in Brunei Shultz had emphasized the threat of Soviet aggression in Nicaragua. Sigur asks the Ambassador to meet with either the Sultan or another Brunei official and arrange for a meeting with a high-level U.S. official.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56C.

07/25/86 (IRAN)
North reports to Poindexter in a PROF that Cave is meeting with the second channel in Frankfurt. One purpose of the meeting is to ascertain if new "interlocutors" are available.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 115-23, 9/29/87, at 119-22; Chron. Ex. 11.

07/26/86 (IRAN)
Father Jenco is released.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 288; Media reports.

07/28/86 (CONTRA)
Ambassador King meets with a Brunei official. Brunei agrees to meet with a high-level U.S. official in London in August.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56D.

07/28/86 (IRAN)
Casey writes to Poindexter after the release of Father Jenco suggesting that the U.S. should move quickly to negotiate through Ghorbanifar as the only viable channel.

Chron. Ex. 12.

07/28/86 (CONTRA)
North asks Singlaub to prepare a weapons list for Casey. Singlaub, in consultation with North, prepares a proposal for Contras to buy weapons on credit until U.S. money is available.

Singlaub Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 90-91, Ex. JKS-5.

07/29/86 (CONTRA)
Secord proposes to North a plan to pull out of the airbase. In a KL-43, Secord writes, "due to security considerations/—i.e., Max/(Rodriguez), we can no longer operate from [the airbase]. Max's demands and threats have resulted in the corporate leadership deciding to withdraw."

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, Ex. 3, at 428.

07/29/86 (IRAN)
Nir briefs Vice President Bush on the Iran initiative. Nir says a decision was needed as to whether the weapons requested should be delivered in separate shipments or whether the U.S. would press for the release of all hostages before delivering the arms.

Fuller Dep., 3/30/87, at 23-33; Tower Report, at B-145-B-147.

07/30/86 (IRAN)
The President is presented and approves a schedule of arms shipments to Iran after Father Jenco's release. No mention is made on the schedule of opening a dialogue with Iranian political factions.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-56; North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part 1, at 306-307.

08/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa The House Armed Services Committee votes down the Resolution of Inquiry. Poindexter testifies: "I understood that under the House rules that essentially killed the resolution, and Chairman Hamilton indicated that he was not going to push that." However, Hamilton still wanted a meeting with North.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 150-57.

08/02/86 (CONTRA)
A Brunei official indicates that he will meet with a U.S. emissary on 08/09/86 between 9:00 a.m.-11:00 a.m. in Hyde Park, London.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 46; Chron. Ex. 13.

08/02/86 (IRAN)
Dutton and Secord meet in Geneva, pick up cash and give it to the aircrew delivering HAWK parts to Iran.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 241.

08/04/86 (IRAN)
Additional HAWK spare parts are delivered to Iran, in accord with President Reagan's decision of 7/30/86.

Israeli Chronology; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-56.

08/04/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Quintero accuses Rodriguez of stealing one of the resupply airplanes. Rodriguez flies a C-123 from the maintenance site in Miami and returns with a cargo of spare parts and medicine. Rodriguez later receives a call from Gregg about the supposedly stolen aircraft. Rodriguez tells him his version of events.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 307-09; Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 80-83; Watson Dep., 6/16/87, at 63-64; Rodriguez Dep., 5/1/87, at 787-795; Ex. 3, at 430-431.

08/05/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams is chosen by Shultz to meet with the Brunei officials.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 46, 110-11.

08/06/86 (CONTRA)

North denies Contra involvement to the House Intelligence Committee. North says he had nothing to do with raising funds for the Contras or with helping arm them. He testifies at the Iran-Contra hearings that he met with Intelligence Committee members on the instructions of Poindexter and "I misled the Congress at that meeting.... Face to face." North continues: "I am admitting to you that I participated in preparation of documents for the Congress that were erroneous, misleading, evasive and wrong. And I did it again here when I appeared before that (intelligence) committee convened in the White House situation room." Poindexter says that he did not authorize North to make false statements. "I did think that he would withhold information and be evasive, frankly, in answering questions," Poindexter testifies.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 152; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 173.

08/06/86 (CONTRA)

After being briefed by an NSC staff member about North's testimony, Poindexter congratulates North on his meeting with the House Intelligence Committee. He sends a PROF saying "well done." Poindexter testifies that, at this point, although he knew North had withheld information, he did not know that North had made false statements. "'Well done' meant that I was pleased that the session was a success and that Chairman Hamilton seemed satisfied," he says.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 103-04, Ex. JMP-15.

08/07/86 (CONTRA)

In a KL-43 message, Dutton tells Steele of the local commander's threats to reveal the operation or charge large landing fees if they do not recognize that the planes are Contra property, not private company property.

Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 68-69, Ex. 11.

08/08/86 (CONTRA)
Rodriguez meets with Gregg, Watson, and Earl and reports to them on alleged corruption in the resupply operation. Rodriguez tells Gregg about his concerns, that Secord and Clines ("The Wilson Group") were involved, and that so was North. In Gregg's notes of that meeting is the line: "a swap of weapons for dollars was arranged to get aid for the Contras." Gregg testifies he cannot explain this reference. He calls a meeting of various agencies to discuss Rodriguez's allegations.

Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 309-10, 318-20; Rodriquez Dep., 5/1/87, at 796-802; Ex.FIR-5; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 65; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 159; Gregg Dep., 5/18/87, at 11-23; Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 100-05, 5/22/87, at 165-73; Watson Dep., 6/16/87, at 60-70.

08/09/86 (CONTRA)
The resupply team has refined delivery methods using a new system approved by North. They drop munitions, uniforms, and medicine to Contra forces. Resupply operations to southern forces have become "very successful."

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 229-30, Ex. RCD-5.

08/12/86 (CONTRA)
Circa At the behest of North and Secord, Dutton meets with Col. Steele while Steele is visiting the U.S. with Ambassador Edwin Corr. Dutton says North and Secord want him to express their displeasure to Steele about problems with Rodriguez.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 226-27; Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 42-45, 62-67.

08/12/86 (CONTRA)
Rep. Hamilton tells Rep. Coleman the Resolution of Inquiry will not be reported. In a letter to Rep. Coleman, Hamilton writes, "Based on our discussions and review of the evidence provided, it is my belief that the published press allegations cannot be proven."

Chron. Ex. 14.

08/12/86 (CONTRA)
A meeting in Gregg's office is attended by the CATF Chief, Earl, Watson, and others. Gregg discusses Rodriguez's allegations of 8/8/86. There is a long discussion about Rodriguez's fears that the aircraft at the airbase would be stolen. (Rodriguez had just put air guards on all resupply missions to prevent theft).

C/CATF T., 100-11, at 114-16; Gregg Dep., 5/18/87, at 28-31; SteeleDep., 4/21/87, at 70-78; Earl Dep., 5/22/87, at 175-76, 5/30/87, at 165-76; Watson Dep., 6/16/87, at 91-97; Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 311, 349-50, 358-59; Walker Dep., 5/21/87, 30-41; Corr Dep., 4/30/87, at 22-27, 38-39.

08/13/86 (CONTRA)
The Senate approves the $100-million package in military and nonlethal Contra aid.

Conressional Record, Vol. 132, #112, at S 11543.

08/13/86 (CONTRA)
Earl tells Dutton in a KL-43 note to conduct "emergency recall" from the airbase. "Bring the maintenance and aircrews out of there quietly, but quickly. Leave all the equipment, including airplanes.... Destroy registration plates on A/C if possible, but don't damage the A/C." This instruction was given after the dispute erupted over who controlled the operation. Rodriguez learns of the planned "recall."

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 75-76, Ex. 3, at 430-31; Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 308, 335-36; Earl Dep., 5/30/87, at 177-81.

08/13/86 (CONTRA)
Secord refuses Earl's instructions. "I presume your msg results from telecom with Ollie," he writes to Earl via KL-43. He says there is more than $1 million worth of equipment owned by Udall, and he will not abandon it. "I insist on immediate meeting between Bob and Steele or I will seek out the Ambassador and resolve the issue." Earl replies that the threat of a lawsuit against the local commander for air piracy (relating to Rodriguez making off with a plane) "has apparently really poisoned the atmosphere."

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 75-76; Ex. 3, at 430-31.

08/15/86 (CONTRA)
Circa In London, Abrams uses the name "Kenilworth" when he calls the Brunei official. They meet at a hotel and go for a walk in the park. Abrams says $10 million was needed for "bridge money" to the Contras. Subsequently, Abrams hears the answer from Brunei was "yes."

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 48-51.

08/22/86 (CONTRA)
North approves a drop plan involving Castillo. In a KL-43 to North, Dutton proposes a drop plan in which Castillo would act as liaison between the Contras and the supply operation. Dutton also suggests that the drops should take place at dusk, allowing a good visual sighting of the drop zone.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 228.

08/24/86 (CONTRA)
Dutton, Earl, and Steele meet in Washington to discuss Secord's plan to pull out of the airbase and the local commander's belief that the planes should go to the Contras.

Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 62-67, Steele Ex. 10; Earl Dep., 5/22/87, at 119, 5/30/87, at 185.

08/25/86 (IRAN)
Secord and Hakim meet with the second channel to Iran in Brussels. No U.S. Government officials are there. They discuss normalizing U.S.-Iran relations and an arms-for-hostages deal. Secord then reports to North and they agree that the second channel should come to the U.S. for a meeting.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 242-43; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 122.

September-October, 1986

09/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North meets at the OEOB with Garwood and Channell. North discusses the need for a plane to deliver aid to the Contras. After Channell and Garwood leave North's office. Channell asks for a contribution. Garwood complies.

Garwood Dep., 3/18/87, at 43-45.

09/03/86 (CONTRA)
North suggests a tax-exempt organization to replace Project Democracy. In a PROF to McFarlane, North writes that the Resistance effort is going to require support that goes beyond the CIA's ability to provide, chiefly in the area of public relations. North suggests a nonprofit "Nicaraguan Democracy Institute" that could raise money and pay for Contra public relations in the U.S.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, OLN-299.

09/05/86 (CONTRA)
North calls Abrams late at night, according to Abrams. North asks him to ask Tambs, who is in the U.S., to get President Arias to cancel a scheduled press conference that would reveal the existence of the Santa Elena airstrip. North calls back with Tambs on the line, and Abrams instructs Tambs to ask Arias to cancel the press conference. (Tambs testifies that North so instructed him.) Tambs calls North and Abrams later to tell them the conference was canceled.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 383-84, 395-96; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 24; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 86-87.

09/06/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to Poindexter, North describes the press conference incident. He claims to have called President Arias. North testifies, however, that he did not in fact call President Arias. The PROF note "was specifically cast the way it was to protect the other two parties engaged," he says.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II 89; Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, Ex. LAT-6; North Notebook, Q 2392; Joint Report, at 143.

09/08/86 (CONTRA)
The State Department advises Ambassador King to contact the Brunei official and tell him that the $10 million transfer had not been effected. King is instructed to have the Brunei officials attempt to trace the money.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56P.

09/09/86 (IRAN)
The CIA's Allen and North meet at the OEOB. North has been directed by Poindexter to develop the second channel through Secord and Hakim; Ghorbanifar is to be cut out; North is to raise $4 million to pay off Ghorbanifar.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 123; Allen Dep., 4/24/87, at 443-45; 6/29/87, at 561-69, Allen Ex. 68.

09/09/86 (IRAN)
American Frank Herbert Reed is kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

09/10/86 (CONTRA)
The "Prince" is indicted in Philadelphia on fraud charges and arrested the same day in Fresno, California.

Media reports.

09/11/86 (CONTRA)
In a KL-43 to North, Dutton writes that Rodriguez and the local commander had refused to permit two-aircraft missions – something North and Secord had approved.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 232-33, Ex. RCD-8.

09/12/86 (IRAN)
American Joseph James Cicippio is kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

09/13/86 (CONTRA)
The resupply operation flies five planes for the first time. "A red letter day," Dutton writes to North via KL-43. "The surge is now in full force." One of the five missions was a successful 10,000 pound drop in the south. Dutton testifies that the 9/86 surge could not have been accomplished without Castillo's assistance.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 233-34, Ex. RCD-9.

09/15/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Abrams asks North if the Brunei $10 million has come in. North calls back a day or two later and says it had not.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 50-51.

09/15/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF message, North updates Poindexter on the resupply mission and praises Secord. Poindexter, in his PROF on the 17th, writes: "As I told you in the other note, I talked to Casey this morning about Secord. Keep the pressure on Bill to make things right for Secord."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 84; 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-161, OLN-164.

09/17/86 (CONTRA)
Dutton testifies about deliveries of several thousand pounds of munitions. He says that about 180,000 to 185,000 pounds were finally delivered. About 167,000 pounds were still left in the warehouse.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 234.

09/19/86 (IRAN)
Secord, North, and Cave meet in Washington with the second channel. Hakim attended part of the meeting. North gives the Iranian a White House tour and they decide to hold another meeting at STTGI.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 123; Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 245; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 130-39, 143, 9/29/87, at 70-79; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 283-84, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-201.

09/20/86 (IRAN)
At the STTGI meeting, financial remuneration for Hakim and the Iranians who helped open the second channel is discussed.

Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 246-47.

09/21/86 (CONTRA)
Circa North at a RIG meeting proposes his "Alamo" plan: that the Contras capture a piece of Nicaraguan territory and defend it. The plan is rejected outright by State, DOD, and CIA representatives, and the idea dies.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 34.

09/22/86 (IRAN)
North in a PROF to Poindexter gives a detailed overview of results of the second channel talks. North is very upbeat about the new channel.

Chron. Ex. 15.

09/24/86 (CONTRA)
Drops to the Contras are being made so fast that a complete record is not being kept. The group is very successful but again the local commander shuts down the airbase.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 234, 274-75, Ex. RCD-15.

09/25/86 (CONTRA)
Both Houses of Congress pass continuing resolutions including $100 million in Contra aid, lethal and nonlethal.

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, #128, at H 8504.

09/25/86 (CONTRA)
A Costa Rican press conference finally exposes the airstrip. In a PROF to Poindexter, North writes, "Believe we have taken all appropriate damage control measures to keep any USG fingerprints off this and with Elliott and the COS, have worked up appropriate 'if asked' press guidance." He writes that "one of Dick's agents [Olmstead]" was named at the press conference, but that Olmstead is not the name of the agent. Udall Research was named too. North writes that Udall, which he calls "a proprietary of Project Democracy," will cease to exist by noon today. He says Udall's resources—$48,000—have been moved to another account in Panama.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part III, Exs. OLN-131, OLN-203, OLN-307.

09/26/86 (CONTRA)
Ambassador King advises the State Department that Brunei confirms unequivocally that the transfer has been made to a Swiss bank account.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56R.

09/30/86 (CONTRA)
At Channell's request for a contribution while the Contras wait for money from Congress "to trickle down," O'Boyle donates $30,000.

O'Boyle Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 124.

10/01/86 (IRAN)
Shultz says: "We have intensified our efforts to discourage our friends from selling arms to Iran with significant, but not complete success."

Speech to the Gulf Cooperation Council at the United Nations.

10/03/86 (CONTRA)
A $90,000 contribution from the Patrick Henry Foundation goes to NEPL. The foundation was established by Garwood to give donations to "help preserve the freedom of our country."

Garwood Dep., 3/18/87, at 56, 62.

10/05/86 (CONTRA)
A C123K cargo plane is shot down over Nicaragua carrying 10,000 pounds of arms to the Contras. Three crewmen are killed; the fourth, Eugene Hasenfus, an American, is captured. Dutton notifies North's office of a missing aircraft. Identification cards link the plane to SAT. Learning of the crash, Rodriguez calls Watson, Vice President Bush's aide, with the news. North testifies that the flight was paid for by Secord's operation. "Those were certainly his activities, and I was the U.S. Government connection," he says.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 238-39, Ex. RCD-12; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 179-81; Rodriguez Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 311-12; Steele Dep., 4/21/87, at 115-16.

10/05/86 (IRAN)
Secord meets Nir in Israel. He delivers a letter from President Reagan thanking Israel for its Iran-initiative efforts and lauding Nir's work. This was done to assuage Nir, who knew he was being cut out with the rise of the second channel.

Israeli Chronology.

10/06/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF, Earl advises Poindexter, "Yesterday one of the Democracy Inc. aircraft apparently went down on a resupply mission to FDN forces in the north."

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 159-61; Chron. Ex. 16.

10/06/86 (CONTRA)
Earl in a PROF tells North of the downed plane. North is out of the country negotiating with the second Iranian channel when the Contra resupply plane goes down.

Chron. Ex. 17.

10/07/86 (IRAN)
Casey meets with Roy Furmark regarding financial aspects of the Iran arms sales. Exposure of the Iran-Contra transactions is threatened by Canadian financiers, Casey is told.

Furmark Dep., 7/22/87, at 122-26.

10/08/86 (CONTRA)
The President tells reporters that the downed aircraft in Nicaragua is not connected with the U.S. Government.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #41, at 1348-49.

10/08/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF, Cannistraro writes that at a RIG meeting "today," which included Abrams, it was decided, among other things: (1) "Press guidance was prepared which states no U.S.G. involvement or connection (with the Hasenfus flight), but that we are generally aware of such support contracted by the Contras." (2) "UNO to be asked to assume responsibility for flight and to assist families of Americans involved. Elliott will follow up with Ollie to facilitate this." (3) "HPSCI and SSCI [the intelligence committees] have been briefed and there were no problems." (4) "Elliott said he would continue to tell the press these were brave men and brave deeds. We recommended that he not do this because it contributes to perception U.S.G. inspired and encouraged private lethal aid effort."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 179, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-133; Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 63-64.

10/08/86 (CONTRA)
Circa After a conversation with Casey – following Casey's meeting with Furmark – North begins shredding "in earnest," he says. The Contra operation was "coming unraveled," North testifies, "and ought to be cleaned up."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 19, 135, 326-328.

10/08/86 (CONTRA)
Following the crash and capture of Hasenfus, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Customs Service arrive at SAT to look at its records. The president of SAT calls Dutton, who calls North. North says he will take care of the investigation. North calls Meese the following day. FAA and Customs temporarily call off their investigation. The FBI soon thereafter begins its own investigation of SAT, and North promises to take care of that as well. North testifies that he, Casey, and Poindexter sought to postpone the investigation of SAT to secure the Iran initiative (the second channel) as well as the secrecy of the Contra resupply effort.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 239-240, 280; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 105; Revell Dep., 6/11/87, at 60-71.

10/08/86 (IRAN)
North, Secord, Cave, and Hakim meet again in Frankfurt with the Iranian second channel. After North returns to Washington and Secord departs, Hakim testifies that he negotiated an elaborate nine-point hostage release plan that includes seeking the release of 17 terrorists held in Kuwaiti jails and the removal of the Iraqui president. Secord returns and relays the plan by KL-43, Hakim says, to Washington, and the plan was approved by President Reagan through North and Poindexter. Shultz disputes this and says President Reagan was angered by the plan when he learned of it from Shultz weeks later.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 7, 332-34; part II at 6-8; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 123; Hakim Test., Hearings, 100-5, 288-96, 305-308, 323-25, Ex. AH-40; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 139-46, 9/29/87, at 128-39, 183; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, 46-49 Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 68-69.

10/10/86 (GENERAL)
President Reagan, Shultz, Poindexter, and Regan go to Iceland to meet with the Soviets.

Media reports.

10/10/86 (IRAN)
David Lewis, a Washington lawyer, travels to Switzerland and has lunch with Zucker. Others are present. Discussed was a real estate transaction involving "the wife of someone in the White House." The wife was that of "Lieutenant Col. Oliver North." The dollar figure approximates $70,000. Lewis never heard anything about the deal again.

Lewis Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 235-37.

10/10/86 (CONTRA)
McFarlane tells Poindexter to return North to the Marines. In a PROF, McFarlane writes: "I really think he has become every Democrat's best target and as hard as it would be to lose him, it will serve your and his long term interest to send him back to the Corps.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-93.

10/12/86 (CONTRA)
In a PROF to McFarlane, North says a "high-powered lawyer" is needed to represent "USG/Hasenfus' interests." He says a donation of $100,000 has been lined up. North notes that President Reagan was briefed "that this plan was being contemplated" before going to Iceland.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7, Part III, Ex. OLN-136.

10/14/86 (IRAN)
North meets with DEA Administrator John C. Lawn, thanks him for the DEA effort to ransom the hostages, but says the effort failed. The ransom effort ends.

Lawn Dep., 8/20/87, at 53.

10/15/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee there was no U.S. Government involvement in the Hasenfus flight. He tells the Iran-Contra hearings that he believed that statement to be true at the time. He testifies: "As you know, I did not make this statement once. I made the statement over a period of about three weeks... and anybody who had any knowledge which he wished to communicate to me to the effect that those statements were not true had ample opportunity to do so." He says he had checked with the CIA and the NSC before testifying on 10/15.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 65-67; Hearings, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Congress, 2d Session, at 6.

10/16/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
The CIA's Charles Allen meets Furmark, who provides details of the financial arrangements for the arms deals supplied by Canadian investors.

Allen Dep., 6/29/87, at 604, Exs. 78, 80; Furmark Dep., 7/22/87, at 128-34.

10/17/86 (CONTRA)
Garwood contributes $100,000 to NEPL to aid the Contras.

Garwood Dep., 3/18/87, at 60.

10/17/86 (CONTRA)
The House and Senate approve the conference agreement on H.J. Res. 738, the continuing resolution that provides for $100 million in Contra aid; $70 million is unrestricted.

Congressional Record, Vol. 132, #144, at H 11068, S 16638.

10/18/86 (CONTRA)
The President signs the legislation appropriating the $100 million for Contra aid.

P.L. 99-500.

10/21/86 (IRAN)
Edward Austin Tracy, an American writer, is kidnapped in Beruit.

Media reports.

10/22/86 (IRAN)
Allen and Cave meet Furmark in New York. Furmark says that Ghorbanifar had told him that most of $15 million paid for the arms shipments to Iran was earmarked for Central America.

Allen Dep., 6/29/87, at 606-07, Exs. 81, 82; Furmark Dep., 7/22/87, at 137-51; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 156-59, 9/29/87, at 122-24.

10/22/86 (IRAN)
Nir, North, and Secord meet in Geneva to iron out the next arms shipment to Iran. Nir and North agree that the 500 TOWs sent to Israel in May would go to Iran and the Israelis would keep the 500 TOWs then in the U.S. earmarked for Iran. Secord says he did not take part in the decision to switch TOWs.

Israeli Chronology; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 312-13.

10/27/86 (CONTRA)
The President signs legislation authorizing the $100 million Contra aid program.

P.L. 99-569

10/28/86 (IRAN)
500 substitute TOWs are shipped to Iran from Israel.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 124. Israeli Historical Chronology.

10/28/86 (CONTRA)
Circa CATF Chief informs his boss, the Latin American Division Chief, of Castillo's involvement with communications to the private benefactors. The Latin American Chief, in turn, informs Assistant Secretary Abrams of that problem. Abrams, in response, contacts the Executive Secretary to set up a meeting with Secretary Shultz immediately. The next morning Abrams meets with Shultz and informs him of the potential Boland problem and recommends an inquiry by State to insure that no State Department officials were similarly involved.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 123-24; Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 50-54.

10/29/86 (IRAN)
Secord sends Dutton to Geneva to pick up cash to deliver to Attorney Thomas Green in Tel Aviv. Dutton then goes to Beirut to await the release of hostages.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 241-242.

10/29/86 (IRAN)
North, Secord, Cave, the Relative (second channel), Hakim, and another Iranian meet in Mainz, West Germany, to discuss the promised release of one or two hostages and implementation of Hakim's nine-point plan. At this meeting, the Americans learn that news of McFarlane's Tehran trip has been made public.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 147-150.

10/30/86 (CONTRA)
A corrected version of P.L. 99-500 is signed into law.

Congressional Research Service, Contra Aid: 1981-86, 1/28/87.

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11/02/86 (IRAN)
Hostage Jacobsen is released.

Media reports.

11/03/86 (IRAN)
North arrives in Beirut to meet Jacobsen. North, Jacobsen, Secord, and Quintero fly back to Larnaca, Cyprus, where a press conference is held. Jacobsen and North depart. Quintero and Secord remain, awaiting the release of more hostages.

Dutton Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 241-42.

11/03/86 (IRAN)
An account of McFarlane's May trip to Tehran, as reported in the Lebanese magazine Al-Shiraa, is picked up by the U.S. news media.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7, at 26-27; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 199; Media reports.

11/05/86 (IRAN)
Iranian Prime Minister Musavi announces that the major aim of the McFarlane trip was to resume relations between the U.S. and Iran.

Media reports.

11/06/86 (IRAN)
Allen meets Furmark in Washington. Furmark gives more details of what the Canadian investors intend to do; he says the Canadians will expose the U.S. Government, and they know of Secord and North's involvement in Central America.

Allen Dep., 6/29/87, at 610-13, Allen Exs. 83, 84; Furmark Dep., 7/22/87, at 153-65.

11/06/86 (IRAN)
Reporter: "Mr. President, do we have a deal going with Iran of some sort?" The President: "No comment. But could I suggest an appeal to all of you with regard to this: that the speculation, the commenting and all, on a story that came out of the Middle East and that to us has no foundation – that all of that is making it more difficult for us in our effort to get the other hostages free." He adds: "We will never pay off terrorists because that only encourages more of it."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #45, at 1534.

11/06/86 (IRAN)
Shultz says he learned of direct arms sales to Iran from press reports.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 3-4.

11/06/86 (IRAN)
Circa North receives a phone call from a high Israeli official following the press disclosures of the Iran arms sales. Both North and the Israeli decide on a "no comment" policy, North testifies.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 100, 228-30.

11/07/86 (IRAN)
White House Spokesman Peter Roussel: "As long as Iran advocates the use of terrorism, the U.S. arms embargo will continue."

Washington Times, 11/7/86.

11/07/86 (IRAN)
Meese orders Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper to do legal research on the Iran arms sales, 11 months after the President signed the 1/17/86 Finding.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 227; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 9-11; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 199.

11/07/86 (CONTRA)
North draws up a chronology of the Iran initiative. Subsequently, he testifies, "I was provided with additional input that was radically different from the truth . . . It is my recollection it was provided by Mr. McFarlane."

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 26-31.

11/07/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane writes a PROF note to Poindexter saying he will not tolerate Regan's efforts to blame him for the arms-for-hostages impetus of the Iran initiative.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 47, at 627.

11/07/86 (IRAN)
500 TOWs are shipped from the U.S. to Israel as replacements for those sent to Iran on 10/28.

Israeli Financial Chronology; North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part I, at 226-228.

11/08/86 (IRAN)
Cave, North, Secord, and Hakim meet a second channel representative in Geneva. Because the Iran initiative has been exposed, North says the publicity makes it imperative that the hostages be released.

Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 152-54, 9/29/87, at 56; Joint Report, at 262.

11/09/86 (IRAN)
Donald Regan in an interview with John McLaughlin says: "I'll assure you we're not breaking any laws, we're not doing anything illegal or immoral. And I think that when we can tell the story, the American public will appreciate the efforts of this President to get American hostages released."

John McLaughlin "One on One."

11/09/86 (IRAN)
North and Secord meet with Nir. They tell Nir the Lake Resources account has been closed because Iranian funds had become mixed with Contra money.

Israeli Chronology.

11/10/86 (IRAN)
After a national security meeting, Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes says: "While specific decisions discussed at the meeting cannot be divulged, the President did ask that it be reemphasized that no U.S. laws have been or will be violated and that our policy of not making concessions to terrorists remains intact." At this NSC meeting, Poindexter reports that a total of 1000 TOWs and 240 HAWK spare parts had been sold to Iran. Shultz sees this as HAWKs for hostages.

Media reports; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 22-23, 64, 90-91, 108, 112-114; Exs. DTR-41, DTR-41A; Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 153-155, Ex. CWW-28; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 39-41; Keel Dep., 3/18/87, 13-25; Meese Test., Hearings at 100-9, 210-213; Exs. EM-17, EM-19.

11/12/86 (IRAN)
Congressional leaders come to the White House and are briefed for the first time on the Iran arms sales. Poindexter again omits material facts.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 243-47, 312-313; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-21.

11/13/86 (IRAN)
President Reagan in an address to the Nation says: "The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon – that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists. Those charges are utterly false. The actions I authorized were and continue to be in full compliance with federal law. And the relevant committees of Congress are being and will be fully informed.... We did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages." (Poindexter says that he and his staff helped prepare President Reagan for this speech and that they had at least two sessions prior to the November 19 press conference to brief President Reagan for potential questions.)

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 281; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 24-26, 88-89; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #46, at 1559.

11/14/86 (IRAN)
The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, headed by Cooper, gives Meese its opinion on Statutes Relevant to Recent Actions with Respect to Iran.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 234, Ex. CJC-2.

11/14/86 (IRAN)
At a National Security Briefing with President Reagan, the decision is made to send the Finding on Iran to the State Department (for the first time).

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 41-42.

11/14/86 (IRAN)
Ledeen meets with Meese at the Justice Department to discuss Iran and terrorism, Meese testifies.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 213-14.

11/17/86 (IRAN)
The maximum version of the White House chronology on the Iran initiative is finished. It says the U.S. acquiesced in Israeli shipment of TOWs in 09/85 at the highest levels but objected to the 11/85 shipment.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 125-26; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 28, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-18.

11/17/86 (IRAN)
Cooper receives a draft chronology from the White House. From this, Cooper says, he first learned that there had been an arms shipment to Iran prior to the January 17 Finding. Cooper passes this information to Meese.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 234-236.

11/18/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane sends a PROF to Poindexter. He suggests changes in the chronology to eliminate U.S. acquiesence in the 09/85 shipment and makes only a vague one-sentence reference to shipments of arms "later in the fall" from Israel.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 66-67, 78-79, 87-96, 144, 214, Ex. 55, at 640-50, Ex. 56, at 651-55, Ex. 58, at 660-75; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 108-09.

11/18/86 (CONTRA)
Casey and the CATF Chief go to Central America just before Casey is to testify before the intelligence committees. A courier, who came down to give Casey his briefing book and other papers, says to the CATF Chief, "You know, there may be a problem on the diversion," the CATF Chief testifies. That was about a week before Meese divulged the diversion.

C/CATF Test., Hearings, 100-11, at 122-23, 161, 182-83, Ex. C/CATF-41.

11/18/86 (IRAN)

At a White House meeting of legal advisers from State, Justice, the CIA, and the NSC called by Peter Wallison, White House Counsel, Paul Thompson of the NSC refuses to divulge what he knew about the arms sales to Iran on orders from Poindexter, Thompson says. Later Poindexter and Thompson agree to brief Abraham Sofaer, State Department legal adviser, and Michael Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, on the Iran issue. Sofaer testifies that no mention is made of any arms transfers before 1/86 other than the 9/85 transfer of TOWs.

Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 11-29; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 116-118.

11/19/86 (IRAN)

Secord goes to the NSC offices, reads part of McFarlane's revisions of the White House chronology, questions the changes, and leaves.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29, 229-30, part III, Ex. OLN-24; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 125-28.

11/19/86 (IRAN)

President Reagan at a news conference says: "Eighteen months ago . . . this administration began a secret initiative to the Islamic Republic of Iran. . . . I considered the risks of failure and the rewards of success, and I decided to proceed, and the responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and mine alone. . . . Everything that we sold them could be put on one cargo plane and there would be plenty of room left over. . . . We did not condone, and do not condone, the shipment of arms from other countries. . . . I don't think a mistake was made. It was a high-risk gamble . . . and I don't see that it has been a fiasco or a great failure of any kind." At the press conference, President Reagan says no third country was involved in the arms sales to Iran. A correction is quickly issued. Meese called Poindexter about the error, but it had already been corrected. Poindexter invites Meese to a 11/20 meeting to review Casey's testimony.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #47, at 1583; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 238-39; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 215-16; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 91-92.

11/20/86 (IRAN)

The last version of the chronology says there was no U.S. acquiesence in 09/85 shipment of TOWs. It says the U.S. thought the 11/85 shipment was oil-drilling parts and learned it was HAWKs for the first time in 01/86.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 29, 229-30, 100-7 part III, Ex. OLN-24.

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11/20/86 (IRAN)
13:30 PM Meese, Casey, North, Cooper, Thompson, and Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, meet with Poindexter in his office to review the facts for Casey's Congressional testimony and Poindexter's briefing of the Intelligence Committees the next day. North is said to insert language saying that no one in the U.S. Government knew of the 11/86 missile shipment. North testifies that he and Casey later fixed the testimony to go with the story that the 11/85 shipment was believed to be oil-drilling parts. Poindexter testifies that he knew Casey's testimony was inaccurate when he helped draft it but did not know what really happened in 11/85. North testifies that McFarlane, Poindexter, and Casey all knew the chronologies were false. By putting out a false version of the facts, according to North, they committed the President to a false story. No one objected to the President being so committed, North testifies.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 239-43; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 108-11; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 197-200, 217-220; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 83-106; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 30-36.

11/20/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
15:30 PM After the meeting ended, Cooper is asked to come to White House Counsel Wallison's office. He goes there with NSC Counsel Thompson. When they arrive, Wallison strenuously objects to being excluded from the just concluded meeting. During the course of that discussion, Sofaer telephones and indicates there is a potential problem with Casey's testimony. Wallison phones him back on a secure line and is advised that Secretary Shultz recalls a conversation with McFarlane in November 1985 in which McFarlane made specific reference to the shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran. Wallison advises Cooper and Thompson of Sofaer's report. Cooper asks Thompson to contact North and McFarlane to get the facts straight. Cooper reminds Thompson of North's statement at the meeting earlier that no one in the U.S. Government knew that the November 1985 shipment contained arms. Thompson agrees to contact North and Poindexter.

Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 41-45; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 22, 43; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 83-100.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
15:45 PM According to Cooper, Thompson then checked with North on the 11/85 shipment, and North said he had checked with McFarlane, who sticks to the oil-drilling story. Thompson later testifies he cannot recall talking with North.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 249; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 106-08; Thompson Dep., 4/28/87, at 61-62, 66-67.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
15:45 PM Sofaer calls Deputy Attorney General Arnold I. Burns to tell him of the problems with Casey's testimony. Burns calls Sofaer later to say that Meese "knew the facts that explained everything, all these matters and that laid to rest all the problems" Sofaer saw. Meese testifies he cannot recall details of his conversation with Burns.

Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, 38-41, 45; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 220-21.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
18:00 PM Sofaer calls Cooper at the Justice Department and tells him that McFarlane told Shultz in 11/85 in Geneva that the shipment was HAWK missiles. Sofaer says there are contemporaneous notes that contradict Casey's proposed testimony. Sofaer threatens to have the State Department (testifying with Casey) dispute any false statements at the hearings and says he will resign unless the testimony is corrected.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 247-49; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 222; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 46-51; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 106-09.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
20:00 PM Shultz meets with President Reagan about the 11/19 press conference. Regan accompanies him. Shultz testifies that he told President Reagan that there were wrong and misleading statements that he wanted to go through and tell him what he thought was wrong and why. By this time, Meese is trying to "act as a coordinator of this testimony in order to get it straight," Shultz says. Shultz says he had made his views known to Meese.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 44-45; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 27; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 338; Regan Dep., 7/15/87, at 40-42.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
22:30 PM Late at night, Cooper calls Meese at West Point and tells him
Circa of the Shultz notes and the conflict with McFarlane version of events. Meese cancels a trip to Harvard and hurries back to Washington. He tells Cooper to get Casey's testimony changed.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 250-51; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 200, 220-21; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 111-13.

11/20/86 (IRAN)
23:00 PM Cooper then calls Poindexter to tell him the testimony must be
Circa changed. Poindexter says he had already called Casey at home that night telling him to admit to Congress the existence of a November HAWK shipment. Casey's response was inconclusive, according to Poindexter.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 113; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 251.

November 21, 1986

11/21/86 (IRAN)
07:20 AM Casey speaks to Poindexter.

Poindexter log.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
07:30 AM Poindexter and Casey begin briefings before the House and
09:00 AM Senate Intelligence Committees on Iran.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 87-88, 135-37, 145-47, 312; Exs. JMP-69, JMP-70, JMP-79, JMP-80; Media reports.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
08:00 AM Cooper meets with Casey and Dave Doherty of the CIA about Casey's testimony. Casey accepts revisions without comment. George Jameson, CIA Associate General Counsel, whispers to Cooper that there is evidence that the pilot knew there was military equipment on the 11/85 shipment.

Cooper Dep., 6/23/87, at 11, 6/22/87, at 181-82; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 252-53; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 222.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
09:15 AM Meese, Burns, Reynolds, Cooper, and Assistant to the Attorney General and Chief of Staff John M. Richardson, Jr., meet. Meese testifies that he decided to go to the President and recommend that he be commissioned to gather the facts about the 11/85 HAWK shipment.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 225-26, Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 254.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
9:22 AM Meese calls Poindexter on a secure phone and advises that he will ask the President to authorize fact finding. He asks that Regan and Poindexter join him at a meeting with the President.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 224; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 277.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
11:00 AM McFarlane meets with Ledeen at Ledeen's house. North arrives at 12:30 p.m. and meets with Ledeen for 5 minutes. McFarlane drives North downtown during which time North expresses concern that the President be protected and tells him that he will be shredding documents, that there will be a "shredding party."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 69, 71, 72, 107-08, 213-14; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 146; Part II at 240-41. Ledeen Dep., 6/19/87, at 19; 3/11/87, at 111.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
11:17 AM Meese receives a call from Poindexter.

Meese home and work phone log.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
11:25 AM Secord calls Poindexter.

Poindexter phone log.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
11:30 AM President Reagan meets with Meese, Regan, and Poindexter to discuss the need for a fact-finding inquiry. Meese is assigned the task and is told to report to the National Security Planning Group on 11/24 at 14:00 p.m. Meese does not ask President Reagan or Regan about the 11/85 HAWK shipment.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 277; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 27-28; Meese Test., 100-9, at 20, 224-25, Ex. EM-43; Meese schedule.

11/21/86
12:15 PM (IRAN)
Meese and Poindexter meet. Earl, North's deputy, says North also meets with Meese and asks whether he has 24 or 48 hours. North says he does not recall this. North and Meese testify they do not recall meeting on 11/21. Earl says North tells him he (North) has been designated the scapegoat.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 335-36; North Test., Hearings 100-7 part I, at 144-45; part II at 41-44, 106-108; Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 63-66.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
12:29 AM Poindexter calls North.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 116.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
12:45 PM Meese, Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, Cooper and Richardson have lunch. Meese assembles a team of lawyers and makes a list of those to interview.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 225-26; Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 283-84, 293, 321-22.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
13:30 PM North meets with Poindexter. North testifies that he asks Poindexter if he had told President Reagan of the diversion, and Poindexter says he had not.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 10; North calendar; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 117.

11/21/86
13:45 PM (IRAN)
Meese talks with FBI Director William H. Webster. Based on what Meese tells him, Webster agrees that the situation is not criminal in nature and therefore it is not appropriate to involve the FBI.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 201; Meese schedule.

11/21/86
14:25 PM (IRAN)
Meese, Reynolds, Richardson, and Cooper meet with John Bolton, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs. Bolton briefs them on Casey's testimony. Reynolds' notes of the meeting indicate the sale of TOWs to Iran is discussed.

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Exs. EM-38, EM-43.

11/21/86
14:25 PM (IRAN)
North meets with Poindexter. North has his special notebooks. Poindexter says he had the impression that North was going to destroy the notebooks. North says they discussed covering up the diversion. After this meeting, or at the one at 13:30, North returns to his office, and directs Fawn Hall to alter documents.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 114-16; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 22; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 489-90, 493-501.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
14:28 PM Meese calls McFarlane.

Meese home and work phone logs; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 134-42; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 227.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
14:58 PM Meese calls Poindexter on a secure phone. He advises Poindexter that he will send over a "couple of his people" to review documents. Thereafter, Poindexter speaks to Thompson and North. North indicates that he will destroy his notebooks and Poindexter does not try to stop him. Subsequently, Poindexter says he destroyed the 11/26/85 Finding on the 11/85 HAWK shipment to Iran that Poindexter says President Reagan signed on 12/5/85.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 226-27; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 256; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 19-23, 118-19, 132, 143-44, 148-49.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
15:15 PM Ledeen visits North in North's office. North asks Ledeen what his story will be about the 11/85 HAWK shipment. Earlier, North tells Ledeen that a source at the Department of Justice had advised him to get a lawyer.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 488; Ledeen Dep., 3/11/87, at 112.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
15:30 PM Meese and Cooper interview McFarlane and discuss the 11/85 shipment and a Finding. According to McFarlane, Meese apparently volunteers that an oral Finding is sufficient; according to Cooper there is no discussion of an oral Finding. There is no mention of either the diversion or the shredding party. McFarlane says he believed the 11/85 shipment was oil-drilling parts. Meese tells him of Shultz's notes. As McFarlane is leaving, he speaks to Meese alone, says that the President was fully behind the Iranian initiative. According to Cooper, he expresses a desire to protect the President.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 226-31; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 255; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 71-72, 93-95, 215-17, 236-37, Ex. 67, at 743; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 103. McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-7, part II, at 236-238.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
17:30 PM North and Hall destroy documents.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 15; Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 502-05.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
17:30 PM North meets with lawyer Thomas Green.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 489, 505.

11/21/86
17:45 PM (IRAN)
Circa McFarlane phones North from outside the Department of Justice and tells him about his interview with the Attorney General. North tells McFarlane he has been urged to get an attorney and warned that his phone may be bugged.

McFarlane Dep., 7/2/87, at 11, 53; North Test., Hearings, 100-7, part I, at 106; part II, at 216; North Notebook.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
18:00 PM McFarlane calls Sofaer and Shultz seeking copies of the State Department notes relating to the 11/85 HAWK shipment.

Sofaer Dep., 6/28/87, at 62-64.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
18:09 PM Meese receives a call from Webster.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
18:25 PM Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet. Bolton joins the meeting.

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
18:55 PM Meese calls Weinberger.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
19:05 PM Meese calls Casey.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
19:10 PM Shultz calls Meese; an interview is arranged for the next morning.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 231; Meese Dep., 7/8/87, at 94.

11/21/86 (IRAN)
21:01 PM McFarlane sends a PROF to Poindexter about his meeting with Meese and says: "The only blind spot... concerned a shipment in November '85 which still doesn't ring a bell with me."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 93; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, Ex. JMP-71.

November 22, 1986

11/22/86 (IRAN)
08:00 AM Meese and Cooper interview Shultz, with Charles Hill, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State, present.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 45; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 231-33, 340, 414-15; Meese schedule; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 257; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 146-50.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
09:50 AM Meese meets with Cooper.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 233; Meese schedule.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
09:50 AM North speaks to Poindexter.

Poindexter log.

11/22/86
09:55 AM (IRAN)
Casey calls Meese.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
10:00 AM Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet to review how the fact-finding would proceed.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 233; Meese schedule.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
10:15 AM Meese speaks to Poindexter.

Meese home and work logs.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
10:40 AM Meese calls Thompson (for Cooper).

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
10:45 AM Meese calls Poindexter.

Meese home and work phone logs; Poindexter phone logs.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
11:10 AM Meese and Cooper interview Sporkin. Meese learns of the 11/85 Finding, he testifies.

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 233.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
11:38 AM Poindexter speaks to Casey.

Poindexter log.

11/22/86 (IRAN)
12:05 PM Reynolds and Richardson examine NSC files. Thompson and Earl are present. These Justice Department officials review the documents "presented to them" and have copies made of those considered important. They discover the April memo that explicitly refers to the diversion of funds to the Contras. As they are leaving for lunch, North arrives and indicates he was aware they would be in the NSC offices; North then volunteers to answer their questions. According to North, he shreds documents while Reynolds and Richardson are in the office and continues while they are at lunch. The latter two deny North shredded in their presence. Earl testifies that North's shredder was broken and he had to leave his office to shred.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 254-55; part II, at 174; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 257, 259; Reynolds Dep., 8/27/87, at 58-89, 97, 101-02; Earl Dep., 5/2/87, at 79-81; Richardson Dep., 7/22/87, at 273-287; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 296-300.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
13:25 PM Casey and Poindexter have lunch. North joins them at 14:50 p.m. (until 15:40 p.m.). Alton Keel, Deputy National Security Adviser, may have been there briefly, according to Poindexter. Poindexter says there is no discussion of any diversion or of the destruction of the 1985 Finding on 11/21 by Poindexter. At 14:52 p.m., during the lunch, Regan calls Casey.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 285, 348-52, 395-396; Poindexter calendar; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 50-51.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
13:45 PM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, and Richardson have lunch at the Old Ebbitt Grill. Reynolds advises Meese of the draft diversion memo. Meese testifies that he is surprised and concerned about the document.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 41, Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 257-58; Reynolds Dep., 8/27/87, at 89-96; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 156-62; Richardson Dep., 7/22/87, at 290-298.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Cooper interviews Sporkin, who says he was told in 11/85 that the 11/85 shipment was arms.

Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 166-67.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
15:40 PM North calls Meese. Meese schedules an interview with North on 11/23 at 2:00 p.m. to give North time to go to church in the morning.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 235-36, 239-40; Meese home and work phone logs.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
15:46 PM Casey calls Meese to schedule a meeting later in the day.

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 236.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:40 PM Poindexter talks with North.

Poindexter log.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:45 PM Meese meets with Casey at the latter's home. They discuss Furmark and the Canadian investors. Meese says he is sure that Casey did not mention anything about Central America and does not believe there was any discussion of the Contras.

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 236-39, 310-11, 321; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 260.

11/22/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
18:00 PM Cooper goes to the CIA with an assistant and interviews several officials.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 260; Meese schedule.

November 23, 1986

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:00 AM Cooper goes to the CIA with an assistant and interviews Allen, Jameson, Doherty, and Clarridge.

Meese schedule; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 260.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:15 AM North calls McFarlane and asks to meet.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 72.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:30 AM North speaks to Secord about the interview with Meese due later in the day.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 280.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:10 AM Meese speaks to Casey. Cooper then meets with Casey.

Meese notes; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 260.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:45 AM Reynolds and Richardson go to the NSC.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:30 PM North and McFarlane meet in the latter's office with no one else present. According to McFarlane, North states that: (1) there is a problem with the diversion; (2) the diversion was a matter of record in a memo; (3) it was approved by Poindexter. Green and Secord arrive minutes later; McFarlane leaves them to talk in his office. North says he does not recall saying anything about the diversion memo to McFarlane.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 72. North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 106, 216.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:32 PM Meese calls Regan.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:45 PM Meese, Cooper, Reynolds, and Richardson meet.

Meese schedule.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
14:55 PM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, and Richardson interview North. (Meese leaves the interview at 16:05 p.m.) North states: (1) he believes the arms deal was authorized by the President; (2) the idea of the diversion surfaced in discussions with Nir in 1/86; (3) $3 million to $4 million was diverted after the February shipment of TOWs and more after the the May shipment of HAWK parts; (4) Israel controlled the money; (5) North gave the Swiss account numbers (accounts opened by Calero) to the Israelis; and (6) only he (North), McFarlane, and Poindexter were aware of the diversion. North is said to have been surprised when Meese showed him the draft memo that Reynolds and Richardson had found.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 240-47, 328-332; Ex. EM-43; Meese Schedule; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 20-23; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 261; Reynolds Dep., 9/1/87, at 18-33; Cooper Dep., 6/22/87, at 191-210; Richardson Dep., 7/22/87, at 317-332.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:00 PM North calls McFarlane and tells him about the Meese interview.

North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 242.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:05 PM North calls Poindexter after the interview and then shreds more documents. He remains in the office until at least 4:50 a.m. on 11/24.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 118; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 242, 257-59.

11/23/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
19:00 PM Sofaer calls Cooper to find out the status of the investigation. He explains to Cooper that he thought there may have been a difference between the purchase price and cost price in the arms sales. Sofaer also volunteers that he suspects that SAT may have given excess profits from the Iran arms sales to finance the Contra resupply operation. Cooper did not mention the diversion memorandum or North's interview.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 265; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 69-70.

November 24, 1986

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
07:20 AM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, Richardson, and T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Counselor to the Attorney General, meet to review what has been found. Meese directs Cooper to look over the criminal laws and other applicable statutes.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 207, 417.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
08:57 AM Poindexter talks with McFarlane.

Poindexter log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:00 AM Cooper meets with Sofaer and Hill; he sees the notes on the 1985 HAWKs shipment.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 265; Sofaer Dep., 6/18/87, at 71-72.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:12 AM Poindexter calls North on a secure phone.

Poindexter phone logs.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:55 AM Meese calls William Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to explain why the Criminal Division was not involved in his inquiry over the weekend.

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 56; Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 22-25.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:00 AM Meese meets with McFarlane about the diversion. McFarlane acknowleges he knew of the diversion but does not tell Meese about the "shredding party" North had mentioned to him.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 72; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 267; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 250, 331.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:02 AM Meese calls Regan.

Meese home and work phone logs; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 331.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:25 AM Poindexter speaks to Casey.

Poindexter log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:29 AM Poindexter speaks to Weinberger.

Poindexter log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:55 AM Poindexter speaks to North on a secure telephone line.

Poindexter log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
11:00 AM According to Regan, Meese meets with him and advises him of the diversion memo and North's and McFarlane's confirmation of the diversion. Regan also testifies that Meese meets with the President, informs him of the diversion memo and the North and McFarlane confirmation. Regan and Meese testify that the President was shocked. Meese tells the President he needs more time to complete his review, and will report later that day.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 251; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 29-30.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
11:44 AM Meese calls McFarlane.

Meese work and home phone logs.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:30 PM Meese, Reynolds, Cooper, Cribb, and Richardson meet.

Meese Dep., 7/8/87, at 146.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
13:30 PM A Cooper assistant tells Richardson that he had heard rumors at the CIA that Iran money was diverted to the Contras. According to Cooper, he would likely have passed this information to Meese.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 266.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
14:00 PM President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Meese, Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, Poindexter, Casey, and Cave meet to discuss Iran. The diversion was not discussed, participants testify.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 200, 225, 251, 343; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 92-93, 198.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
14:05 PM Reynolds and Cooper meet with Green, who describes Hakim's role in the diversion. Reynolds tells Meese of the conversation with Green, but Meese does not remember if Reynolds told him that Green confirmed the diversion.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 268; Reynolds Dep., 9/1/87, at 38-51, 60-66; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 134.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
14:44 PM Secord talks to North.

North phone log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
16:15 PM Meese interviews Poindexter in the latter's office for 10 minutes. Meese is alone and takes no notes. Poindexter acknowledges knowing "generally" about the diversion and adds that North gave him "enough hints" to know the money was going to the Contras. Poindexter did not inquire further, however, and told no one, including the President, about the diversion. According to Poindexter, Meese did not ask him if he ever told the President; according to Meese, he did ask him, and Poindexter responded that he had not told the President or Regan.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 119-20, 203; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 253, 332.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
16:30 PM Meese meets with President Reagan and Regan. He relates Poindexter's statements and discusses "looking at what applicable criminal laws there might be." Meese testifies that neither Regan nor President Reagan knew anything about the diversion.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 266; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 254.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:00 PM Meese meets with Vice President Bush alone. He takes no notes.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 331, Ex. EM-43.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:30 PM Casey calls Cooper, after meeting with Furmark at the CIA. He asks what Cooper knows about "Lakeside Resources."

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 282-83, Ex. CJC-1.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
18:10 PM Casey speaks to Poindexter on a secure phone.

Poindexter log.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
18:30 PM Regan talks to Casey about the diversion.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 31-32, 42-44, 101-02.

11/24/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
18:53 PM Meese calls Poindexter.

Poindexter log.

November 25, 1986

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
06:30 AM Casey calls Meese.

Senate Intelligence Report, at 61.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
06:40 AM Meese meets with Casey at the latter's house. Richardson accompanies Meese in his car but is not at the meeting. According to Meese, Casey states that he had heard from Regan the previous evening about the diversion and that Poindexter was planning to resign.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 255, 332, Ex. EM-43; Regan Dep., 7/15/87, at 73-78.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
06:50 AM Regan calls Meese at Casey's home to talk about Poindexter's resignation.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 255-56; Senate Intelligence Report, at 61.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
07:15 AM Meese meets with Poindexter and advises him the time has come to submit his resignation.

Meese schedule; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 396; Poindexter calendar; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 120.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
07:50 AM Meese calls Weinberger. He takes no notes.

Meese home and work phone logs.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
07:50 AM Regan tells Poindexter to tender his resignation at the 9:30 a.m. briefing.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 33-34.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
08:00 AM An Iran-Contra review board is proposed by Regan.

Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 61; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 7.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
08:15 AM Cooper meets with Wallison to draft a Presidential statement for a press conference later in the day. Thererafter, Cooper and Richardson meet with Assistant to the President and Director of Communications Patrick J. Buchanan, Speakes, and Wallison to review the statement.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 268.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:00 AM Meese meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and Regan and advises them of what he has learned and that a criminal investigation probably will be undertaken.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 255, 404. Senate Intelligence Report, at 61.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:20 AM Poindexter meets with North.

Poindexter calendar.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:30 AM Meese meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Regan, and Poindexter. Poindexter resigns.

Meese schedule; Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 121; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 33-34, 109-110.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
09:35 AM Green speaks to North.

North log.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:05 AM Poindexter meets with Meese.

Poindexter calendar.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
10:15 AM President Reagan meets with the NSC to brief them on developments.

Meese schedule, Weinberger Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 156-157.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
11:00 AM President Reagan, Regan, Shultz, Meese, and Casey brief Congressional leaders.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 198, 201, 203-04, 211, 214, 294; Ex. EM-53.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:00 PM Meese holds a press conference on the diversion. He announces Poindexter's resignation, North's firing, and the Tower Board appointment.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #48, at 1604; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 63.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
12:03 PM Poindexter speaks to Casey on a secure phone line.

Poindexter log.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
13:00 PM Hall relays a call from the President to North at a hotel where he went to meet Secord. North tells Hall later that the President had called him "an American hero." The President also tells North, "I just didn't know," North says. North testifies that he thought the President meant he did not know of the diversion.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 506; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 244; Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1, at 135-36.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
14:05 PM Meese meets with Webster, Burns, Reynolds, Cooper, Richardson, and Cribb. Stephen S. Trott, the Associate Attorney General, joins the meeting at 14:20 p.m. At this meeting, Meese directs Burns to notify the White House Counsel to insure that documents belonging to North and Poindexter were secure. He directs Cooper to meet with Weld about applicable laws. Meese advises Webster that he is turning the matter over to the Criminal Division and will "probably" need FBI resources. (Those resources were requested the next day.) Cooper subsequently meets with Weld and briefs him.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 202, 307, 405, Ex. EM-43; Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 113; Senate Intelligence Report, at 62.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
15:00 PM McFarlane calls North from London after the Meese press conference and reads to North a statement he has prepared. It says that he learned of the diversion in Tehran and took it to be approved policy. North says the statement is accurate. McFarlane asks if the diversion was approved. North responds, "Yes, . . . You know I wasn't doing anything that wasn't approved." McFarlane asks how the diversion became known. North says they must have found a memo. Asked on 5/11/87 whether he previously had told the Committees that North's words were "I missed one," McFarlane replied, "Yes."

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 79-80.

11/25/86 (CONTRA)
Abrams, appearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, is questioned about third-country solicitation. He fails to disclose the Brunei solicitation. Abrams later asks Shultz about disclosing the Brunei contribution; Shultz responds "[I]f you think you should, go ahead."

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 71-79, 88-91; 147-151.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
16:00 PM Meese meets with Poindexter.

Poindexter calendar.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
16:10 PM Meese meets with Reynolds, Cooper, Cribb, and Richardson.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
16:40 PM Meese has a telephone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres. Peres disputes Meese's press conference account of the Israeli role in the 1986 arms-for-hostages initiative.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 261-262; Israeli Chronology.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:00 PM Hall discovers the originals of the documents she altered on 11/21 and realizes she had not completed the process of replacing the original versions. Hall also notices PROF notes and minutes of the May Tehran meeting and becomes concerned that these had not been destroyed.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:15 PM 17:15 PM Hall calls North in a panic because the NSC security officer has taken custody of the office, and documents no longer could be destroyed. North agrees to come back to the office. He tells Hall to clear Thomas Green through security officers.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part II, at 90.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:20 PM Hall takes the materials that concerned her to the upper level of her office. There she stuffs the altered copies into her boots. Hall asks Earl to help her pull the PROF notes from the file. Hall puts those PROF notes "in my back."

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 508-10.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
17:30 PM North and Green arrive at the office. Hall, North, and Green leave together after their briefcases are inspected by the NSC security staff and go to Green's car. Hall gives the documents she had removed to North in the car. Green asks her what she would say about shredding. She says that she will say it is done every day. He says, "Good," Hall testifies.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 510.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
18:40 PM Meese meets again with Richardson, Cribb, Burns, Trott, Reynolds, Cooper, Weld, and others for an update regarding their prior meeting. Meese asks Burns if he had secured the White House documents. Burns indicated he had not done so and left the room to make a call. Meese, according to Cooper, was upset that Burns had not accomplished this yet. As it turned out, Burns was not able to get through to Wallison until the next afternoon. Wallison told him the documents had in fact already been secured by the NSC security officer.

Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. EM-43; Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 29-32.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
19:00 PM Cooper, Reynolds, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General William R. McGinnis meet with Department of the Army General Counsel Susan J. Crawford and DOD personnel to discuss the transfer and pricing of arms to Iran under the Economy Act.

Susan Crawford Dep., 6/15/87, at 47-56, Exs. 7, 8.

11/25/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
9:05 PM McFarlane calls Meese.

Meese home and work phone log

November 26-December 31, 1986

11/26/86 (IRAN)
President Reagan in a Time magazine interview says of Lieut. Colonel North: "He has a fine record. He is a national hero. My only criticism is that I wasn't told everything." He adds: "We think we took the only action we could have in Iran. I'm not going to disavow it. I do not think it was a mistake. No, it has not worked out the way we had hoped, but I don't see anything I would have done differently. . . . I believe that as the truth comes out, people will see what we were doing was right."

Phone interview with Hugh Sidey, Washington Contributing Editor.

11/26/86 (CONTRA)
Green stops representing North.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 511.

11/26/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
The full investigative team from the Justice Department and the FBI meets. Meese designates Cooper and Weld as the leaders of the investigation. Cooper subsequently leaves the team, because of FBI misgivings, Cooper and Weld testify.

Cooper Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 269-70. Weld Dep., 7/16/87, at 36-38.

11/26/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
President Reagan appoints the Special Review Board (Tower Board).

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #48, at 1605-1606; Media reports.

11/27/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Jay Stephens from the White House Counsel's office calls Hall and asks her about the shredding incident. Hall says, "We shred every day," and she "led him to believe that there was nothing unusual about what had occurred."

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 511.

11/28/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Hall and Earl agree not to discuss the removal of documents with FBI investigators.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 512.

11/28/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Rodney McDaniel, NSC Executive Secretary, orders an end to NSC covert operations pending conclusion of the Tower Board's investigation.

Media reports.

11/29/86 (CONTRA)
Acting National Security Adviser Keel, under President Reagan's orders, ends all NSC staff involvement in operational activities.

Keel Dep., 9/3/87, at 13-14.

11/29/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Hall calls Brendan Sullivan, North's new lawyer, drives to his office, and tells him she smuggled documents from the White House. Sullivan tells her to get a lawyer.

Hall Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 511-12.

11/30/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
President Reagan at a Naval Air Station in California says: "We will do everything necessary to get at the truth and then we will make the truth known."

Media reports.

12/01/86 (CONTRA)
Shultz cables the U.S. Ambassador in Brunei instructing him to tell government officials that, if they had not sent the money by then, do not. The U.S. Ambassador cables back to say when he gave the Brunei official the message, the official became visibly shaken.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 51; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Exs. GPS-56S, GPS-56T.

12/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Without notifying the State Department, Tambs resigns as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica and announces to his staff that he believes he has accomplished the mission of opening the Southern Front.

Tambs Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 366.

12/01/86 (CONTRA)
Circa Channell asks Garwood for $10,000 for a North legal defense fund. Garwood later asks for a refund to send the money to a similar fund after she is told that Channell "takes 35% for his own organization."

Garwood Test., Hearings, 100-3, at 132-33.

12/02/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Meese applies to Federal court for an Independent Counsel to investigate the Iran-Contra Affair.

Media reports.

12/04/86 (CONTRA)
A Brunei official advises the U.S. Ambassador to Brunei that David Conner, Manager of Citibank, in Brunei had transferred $10 million to Jacob Steger, Credit Suisse Bank, Geneva, Switzerland on 8/19/86, because they had been given the wrong account number.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, Ex. GPS-56T.

12/04/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Robinette sends North two phony bills and North sends Robinette two fabricated responses to give North the appearance of having paid for the home-security system. The bill was actually paid by Secord. Robinette says he never asked North for payment. North never offered any. Robinette received a $7,000 payment from Secord in 05/86. In 08/86, when the job was completed, he received an additional $9,000 and received a Secord check for that amount. Robinette said the security system cost $13,875 and he took $2,125 as a consulting fee. Senator Mitchell asks Robinette, "The purpose of these phony bills was to cover up what you were aware was at least wrong and possibly illegal?" Robinette says: "That's correct, sir."

Robinette Test., Hearings, 100-6, at 14-18, 40, Exs. GR-8A, GR-8B, GR-9A, GR-9B; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part 1, at 126-32.

12/05/86 (CONTRA)
After reviewing his testimony of November 25, 1986 and receiving permission from Secretary Shultz to reveal the Brunei solicitation, Abrams contacts members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and requests another hearing to correct the record. During that appearance, Abrams reveals the Brunei solicitation and apologizes for misleading the Committee on November 25th.

Abrams Test., Hearings, 100-5, at 75-79, 88, 147-50.

12/06/86 (IRAN)
President Reagan in a radio address says: "While we are seeking all the facts, it's obvious that the execution of these policies was flawed and mistakes were made."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22, #50, at 1629.

12/08/86 (CONTRA)
McFarlane testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He says that neither he nor North solicited Contra funds.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 82, 125, Ex. 63, at 686, Ex. 74, at 759.

12/10/86 (CONTRA)
Castillo is interviewed at CIA headquarters about contacts with private benefactors and the airstrip in Costa Rica.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 5.

12/10/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
McFarlane testifies before the House Intelligence Committee. He says he believed the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, at 125-26, Ex. 75, at 761.

12/11/86 (IRAN)
McFarlane is interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

12/13/86 (IRAN)
Cave and Charles Dunbar of the State Department meet with the second channel in Frankfurt. Dunbar learns of the nine-point plan. He later tells Shultz of the plan. Shultz is shocked and outraged. He tells President Reagan of it. Weinberger learns of the Frankfurt meeting and writes a strong protest memo to Keel, with a copy to Shultz.

Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 4-5, 46-49; 61-63; 146-147; Ex. GPS 50, 51; Weinberger Test., 100-10, at 157-160, Ex. CWW-34; Cave Dep., 4/17/87, at 154-59, 9/29/87, at 174-83; Keel Dep., 3/18/87, at 956-970.

12/15/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Casey suffers a "minor cerebral seizure" the day before his scheduled testimony at the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Media reports.

12/16/86 (IRAN)
Poindexter says he knows nothing about a meeting on this day at which a discussion allegedly took place among Meese, Regan, and the President about getting North and Poindexter either Congressional immunity or a Presidential pardon.

Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, at 89; Regan Test., Hearings, 100-10, at 104-105; Meese Test., Hearings, 100-9, at 392-93.

12/16/86 (IRAN)
President Reagan says: "It is my desire to have the full story about Iran come out now—the alleged transfer of funds, the Swiss bank accounts, who was involved—everything."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 22 #51, at 1653-1654.

12/18/86 (IRAN)
Vice President Bush is interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

12/18/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Casey undergoes surgery at Georgetown University Hospital.

Media reports.

12/19/86 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Lawrence Walsh is appointed Independent Counsel to conduct a criminal investigation of the Iran-Contra Affair.

Media reports.

1987

01/01/87 (CONTRA)
Circa Castillo is recalled to Washington.

Castillo Test., Hearings, 100-4, at 5.

01/05/87 (CONTRA)
The fake "Prince", in reality an Iranian con man, pleads guilty to fraud charges in Philadelphia.

Media reports.

01/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
The Senate establishes the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition.

S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)

01/07/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
The House establishes the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

H. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)

01/14/87 (IRAN)
Weinberger is interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

01/20/87 (IRAN)
Meese is interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

01/24/87 (IRAN)
Americans Allan Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill are kidnapped in Lebanon.

Media reports.

01/26/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan is interviewed by the Tower Board. The Tower Board reports that "The President told the Board on January 26, 1987, that he did not know that the NSC staff was engaged in helping the Contras."

Tower Report at III-24; North Test., Hearings, 100-7 part I, at 265-66.

01/27/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan in his State of the Union address says: "I do not believe it was wrong to establish contacts with a country of strategic importance or to try to save lives." He also says: "But though we have made much progress, I have one major regret. I took a risk with regard to our action in Iran. It did not work, and for that I assume full responsibility. . . . We did not achieve what we wished, and serious mistakes were made in trying to do so. We will get to the bottom of this, and take whatever action is called for."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #7, at 60.

02/08/87 (CONTRA)
McFarlane amends his 12/86 testimony in a letter to Rep. Hamilton, saying that he told a foreign official where to send a $5 million donation to the Contras.

McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, Ex. 60, at 677.

02/09/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
McFarlane takes an overdose of valium and is confined to Bethesda Naval Hospital. He had been scheduled to testify before the Tower Board the following day.

Media reports.

02/11/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan is again interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

02/19/87 (IRAN)
McFarlane is interviewed by the Tower Board.

Tower index.

02/20/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan in a statement to the Tower Board says: "Try as I might, I cannot recall anything whatsoever about whether I approved an Israeli sale in advance or whether I approved replenishment of Israeli stocks around August, 1985. My answer therefore and the simple truth is, I don't remember – period."

Tower Report, at B-19-20.

02/21/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
McFarlane testifies for the third time before Tower Board.

Tower index.

02/25/87 (CONTRA)
The fake "Prince" is sentenced to 5 years on fraud charges in Philadelphia.

Media reports.

02/26/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan in opening a Tower Board news conference says: "But I pledge to the American people today that I will do whatever is necessary to enact the proper reforms and to meet the challenges ahead."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #8, at 193.

03/04/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
President Reagan in addressing the Nation says: "First let me say I take full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my own administration. As angry as I may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable to those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I am still the one who must answer to the American people for this behavior. And as personally distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and diverted funds, as the Navy would say, this happened on my own watch." He adds: "A few months ago, I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that is true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not. What began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated . . . into trading arms for hostages."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #9, at 220.

03/13/87 (IRAN)
The General Accounting Office issues a report to the House and Senate Select Committees that concludes that DOD acted properly regarding the Economy Act; that it undercharged CIA by $2.1 million; and that DOD bypassed normal review and approval channels. It recommends that DOD adjust the billing.

Report to House and Senate Select Committees: "DOD's Transfer of Arms to the CIA."

03/26/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan in a talk to schoolchildren at Columbia, Missouri says: "It sort of settled down to just trading arms for hostages, and that's a little like paying ransom to a kidnapper. . . . If you do it, then the kidnapper's just encouraged to go kidnap someone else."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #12, at 301.

04/29/87 (CONTRA)
Channell pleads guilty to a charge by the Independent Counsel of conspiring with others to defraud the Internal Revenue Service. Channell named Richard Miller and North as co-conspirators.

Media reports; Joint Report, at 100.

05/05/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Joint Iran-Contra public hearings begin with Secord as the first witness.

Secord Test., Hearings, 100-1.

05/05/87 (CONTRA)
On solicitation of private aid for the Contras, President Reagan says: "I don't know how that was to be used, and I have no knowledge that there was ever any solicitation by our people with these people."

Media reports.

05/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Casey dies, one day after the Iran-Contra hearings begin.

Media reports.

05/06/87 (CONTRA)
Richard Miller pleads guilty to a charge nearly identical to the Channell charge.

Media reports.

08/06/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
Joint Iran-Contra hearings end.

Media reports.

08/12/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan in an address to the Nation says: "I let my preoccupation with the hostages intrude into areas it didn't belong. . . . I was stubborn in my pursuit of a policy that went astray."

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 23, #22, at 929.

10/12/87 (IRAN)
President Reagan says, "It was not trading arms for hostages."

New Republic, 10/12/87.

11/18/87 (IRAN/CONTRA)
The House and Senate Iran-Contra Committees issue their joint report on the results of their investigation.

H. Rept. No. 100-433; Sen. Rept. No. 100-216, 100th Congress, 1st Session.

EXHIBITS

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12/1/81
NSC/ICS 03340

Chron. Ex. 1

N 44659

Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, Concerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries, Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection

I hereby find that the following operation in a foreign country (including all support necessary to such operation) is important to the national security of the United States, and direct the Director of Central Intelligence, or his designee, to report this Finding to the intelligence committees of the Congress pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and to provide such briefings as necessary.

SCOPE	PURPOSE
Central America	Support and conduct [redacted] paramilitary operations against [redacted] Nicarag[redacted]

Ronald Reagan

The White House
Washington, D. C.
December 1, 1981

4/5/82

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Chron. Ex. 2

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14705

July 12, 1983

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Central America (U)

Based on the NSC meeting of July 8, 1983, it is my judgment that:

- The security situation in Central America is deteriorating.
- This is a consequence of, among other things, inadequate resources.
- There is a persistent lack of public understanding of our interests, objectives, the threat, and our policies for dealing with Central American problems. (TS/S)

Accordingly, in order to deal with these issues I have reached the following tentative conclusions:

- We should move immediately, in accordance with the plan at Tab A, to convene a Presidential Commission to develop requisite bipartisan support for our policies and the provision of adequate resources.
- U.S. military presence, [redacted] and the capability to respond to contingencies in the region should be significantly enhanced as soon as possible in accord with the plan at Tab B.
- A revitalized public affairs/legislative action plan, as depicted at Tab C, should be implemented immediately. (TS/S)

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by S. Reger, National Security Council

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The measures above are designed to improve, as quickly as possible, our ability to deter the consolidation of a Marxist/Leninist state in Central America which could serve as a base for Soviet power projection and/or destablization of other states in the region.

Attachments
Tab A - Presidential Commission
Tab B - Central America U.S. Military Presence, [redacted] and Contingency Response
Tab C - Public Affairs/Legislative Action Plan

cc: Secretary of the Treasury
Director, Office of Management and Budget

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CENTRAL AMERICA
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

A Presidential Commission should be constituted as soon as possible to develop a long-range program of security, economic and humanitarian assistance for Central America. Accordingly:

- The President and the Secretary of State should meet with Senators Jackson and Mathias and Congressmen Kemp and Barnes promptly to discuss a mandate for a bipartisan Presidential Commission on Central America.

- The Commission's mandate is to be carefully and precisely defined. The duties of the Commission will be to undertake a study of the situation in Central America (drawing again upon all official sources) so that the Commission members will understand the strategic importance of the area and the threats to US security and national interests.

- The Commission will make recommendations to the President on initiatives that could be undertaken to improve the long-term security of the region, the social and economic betterment of the people of Central America, and how best to defeat the Soviet and Cuban effort to destabilize the area.

- It should be fully understood by everyone that the President, in creating such an organization, is in no way abdicating his responsibilities in foreign policy or in defending the interests of the United States. In particular:

  -- The Secretary of State should make clear that the Administration's pending reprogramming and supplemental requests must be met promptly. He should also forward promptly a proposal for increases as appropriate in FY-84 resources devoted to the area.

  -- It will be made clear in launching the Commission that we expect support for pending requests and for the removal of current restrictions on our actions.

- The Commission's treatment of covert action should be limited to one or two members with experience in such matters. (S)

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Tab A

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- The Director of White House Personnel should coordinate suggestions on the membership of the Commission with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the US Representative to the United Nations, and the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission of names to the President. He should also work in close coordination with the White House Office of Legislative Affairs in carrying out these tasks. (C)

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CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, [redacted]
AND CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

The Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, will develop a program of appropriate military actions, exercises, and contingency measures designed to curtail and eventually halt Cuban/Soviet Bloc assistance and presence in Nicaragua. These U.S. measures should be aimed at creating a credible, escalatory deterrent in accord with the following plan: (TS/S)

[redacted]

- Funding requirements for these operations should be identified and provided to Director, OMB as soon as possible. All available funding authorities should be considered. (C)

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~~SENSITIVE~~

The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, will provide a detailed implementation strategy for the eight point action plan noted above. This strategy should be based upon the rationale that the long range benefits of the Presidential Commission (Tab A) cannot be realized unless adequate measures are taken in the near and mid-term. In accordance with Tab C, the Department of Defense should identify the public affairs guidance and Congressional action/consultation required to accomplish each of the action points identified above. (C)

This plan should be submitted by COB Wednesday, July 13, 1983.

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N 49353

CENTRAL AMERICA
PUBLIC AFFAIRS/LEGISLATIVE ACTION PLAN

The Department of State, in coordination with other appropriate departments and agencies, will immediately develop a public affairs/legislative action plan designed to improve support for our Central American policy. Particular emphasis will be placed on the process of implementing near and mid-term actions (Tab B) and support for the Presidential Commission (Tab A). (C)

- The objective of this plan will be to educate and heighten the perceptions of the American people regarding the situation in Central American and the dangers posed by the Marxist/Leninist government of Nicaragua in their export of revolution to democratically oriented states. This campaign should also stress the danger of Soviet, Soviet Bloc, and Cuban interference in the region; the threat it poses for states in the area and its effect on U.S. security and national interests. Emphasis must be placed on the international dimension of the threat since the impact on U.S. interests will obviously affect the interests of friends and allies as well. (S)

- The plan should provide for periodic visits (at least twice monthly) by senior officers to each of the twelve major media centers. Meetings should be planned with editorial boards, public fora, appearances on talk shows, etc., in order to reach the largest number of American citizens. (C)

- A detailed legislative action plan should be prepared to carry our message to Capitol Hill, to appropriate funds already requested and those to be requested under this plan. Responsibility for the outcome of events should be clearly delineated. (C)

- We should seek to relieve current legislative constraints regarding "certification" and the Boland Amendment. Full support will be sought to continue funding for Nicaraguan resistance activities. (TS/S)

- To protect options for the Commission, we must prevent the situation from deteriorating further. This rationale should be used in all public affairs/legislative action planning. (S)

This coordinated plan should be delivered by COB, July 13, 1983. (U)

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab C

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OGC-84-51747
23 August 1984

—C 0415

(3)

Chron. Ex. 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

FROM: [redacted]
Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: H.R. 5399 -- Section 107, Prohibition on Covert Assistance for Military Operations in Nicaragua

1. The Director has asked for a legal interpretation of the restriction contained in Section 107 of H.R. 5399, which was recently passed by the House of Representatives. More specifically, OGC has been asked to analyze the effect of this provision on expenditures for staff salaries [redacted] In my view, while we plainly can pay all of these fixed costs on the basis of other appropriations, we just as clearly cannot utilize these resources in any activities which would have the effect of supporting paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by anyone.

2. In addition, we have been asked to comment upon the use of third countries to continue the Nicaragua project. I believe the Agency can request third countries to carry on the program at their own expense so long as it is made clear that no U.S. funds would be used either now or in the future to repay such a commitment. The extent to which Agency personnel can be involved in soliciting third country support would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

3. Although the language of Section 107 differs only slightly from that of Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 84 (hereinafter Section 108), the legal effect of those differences is substantial. Section 107 reads as follows:

PROHIBITION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE FOR
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA

Sec. 107. During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or

EXHIBIT
C-Ga-4

ALL PORTIONS ~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

CL BY
DECL
DERIVED FROM FOR 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9-2

OADR

3780

Partially Declassified/Released on 8-21-87
under provisions of E.O. 12356
By R. Pilger, National Security Council

C110/452

Executive Registry 5986

which would have the effect of supporting directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.1/ C 0416

On its face and by its very title, the House version operates as a total prohibition on the use of any funds by U.S. intelligence elements during FY 85 for direct or indirect support of military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by anyone. This language effectively blocks all direct U.S. activities in Nicaragua and precludes U.S. financial support for the Contras during FY 65 by any means. In dissecting Section 107, we are faced with the following restrictions:

A) RESTRICTION ON TIME -- This prohibition would operate throughout FY85 and any subsequent supplemental appropriations would likewise be subject to its restrictions. Should this language become the final version of next year's Intelligence Authorization Act, as of 30 September 1984, an amendment of the Section would be required in order to legalize spending for the Nicaragua program.

B) RESTRICTION ON FUNDS -- The wording contained in Section 107 that "no funds available" may be obligated or expended for the restricted purpose translates into a total prohibition on all activities supporting paramilitary operations in Nicaragua that require funding by the U.S. The funds available are not limited by year of appropriation. Thus, reprogramming of prior year funds and releases from the Reserve for Contingencies would be prohibited. Moreover, the prohibition is not limited by its language to appropriated funds. The broadness of the wording of this section appears to prohibit the use of funds

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1/ By comparison, Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1984 reads as follows:

LIMITATION ON COVERT ASSISTANCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA

Sec. 108. During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of the funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.

Executive Registry 5787

C1120/257

UNCLASSIFIED

made "available" to the Agency by other nations, groups or individuals. Therefore, the Agency could not conduct [redacted] covert action while another nation, group or [redacted]individual foots the bill.

C 0417

C) RESTRICTIONS ON OBLIGATIONS OR EXPENDITURES -- This restriction on both obligations and expenditures of funds available in FY85 not only precludes Agency spending now for the restricted purpose, but forbids the making of commitments to spend available funds at some future time. This same language is contained in FY84's spending cap and the question was raised in that situation whether funds obligated in FY83, but expended in FY84, would be subject to the $24 million limitation. It is my understanding that the question was informally resolved because the Committees reportedly did not intend the limitation to effect funds already obligated. In any event, funds that have been obligated arguably are not "available" to the Agency in a technical sense. To avoid future questions by the Committees, however, it might be appropriate to urge Congress to modify any final restrictive language in a manner that clarifies this point. Perhaps adding to the phrase "no funds available" the words "for obligation" would narrow the restriction.2/

2/ There has been at least one instance where the language of a proposed amendment required the deobligation of funds and their return to the Treasury. Senator Proxmire offered the following amendment to the Department of State Authorization Act for FY84-85, S. 1342:

PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE IN KAMPUCHEA

Sec. 701. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be obligated or expended for the purpose, or with the effect, of promoting, sustaining or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its members to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Kampuchea or elsewhere in Indochina.

(b)(1) All funds appropriated before the date of enactment of this section which were obligated but not expended for activities having the purpose or effect described in subsection (a) shall be deobligated.

(2) All funds deobligated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.

Executive Registry 5988

CIM/657

UNCLASSIFIED

D) RESTRICTION ON WHO MAY SPEND -- The provision expressly [redacted] the CIA, DoD and "any other agency or entity of the U.S. involved in intelligence activities" [redacted] whose funds are subject to the restriction. This language appears to prohibit use of funds made available to the Department of State, to the extent that expenditure of those funds would have the effect of supporting paramilitary operations. Section 107 does not, however, prohibit the Department from obligating or expending funds for diplomatic or other purposes in Nicaragua. Although the restriction does not apply to entities not involved in intelligence, such as the Department of Agriculture, for example, any appropriated funds available to those agencies could not legally be expended for unauthorized purposes under traditional appropriations law. Obviously such other agencies are not authorized by law to conduct paramilitary operations.

C 0418

E) RESTRICTION ON PURPOSE OR EFFECT -- The language of Section 107 requires the Agency not only to refrain from committing or spending funds for the express purpose of supporting paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, but also demands that the CIA anticipate the "effect" of its expenditures. Thus, funds given to the Contras that were being expended, for example, to provide humanitarian support, interdict the flow of arms in the region or assist with public relations efforts, would be prohibited only if such assistance were determined to have the "effect" of supporting paramilitary activities in Nicaragua. While the language of Section 107 itself can be construed to permit humanitarian aid by U.S. intelligence elements, the legislative history indicates that the bill's proponents would oppose <u>any</u> assistance to the Contras.

F) RESTRICTION ON DIRECT OR INDIRECT SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- The restriction on direct or indirect support for military/paramilitary operations prohibits the funding of any Agency activities which have a reasonable nexus with the Nicaraguan covert action program. While the interpretation of "direct" support may cause us few problems, how to define what will have the <u>effect of indirectly supporting</u> such activities in Nicaragua cannot be determined with certainty. Rather than drawing a thin line, this language paints a gray zone subject to interpretation. The provision of medical supplies to the Contras, for example, arguably has the "effect" of "indirectly" supporting their paramilitary activities.

Executive Registry 5989

C10/857

C 0419

This point takes on particular significance when we compare this year's $24 million cap with the "no funds" prohibition of Section 107. As we were approaching the cap, CIA informed the Committees that the Agency had not exceeded the statutory $24 million limitation. We responded to congressional inquiries regarding certain expenditures by treating the matter as an accounting issue and distinguishing direct or indirect support from direct and indirect costs. We noted that the legislative history gave no indication that all "indirect costs" conceivably related to the program must be charged against the cap and that we had charged costs in accordance with long-standing Agency accounting procedures. The SSCI found no problems with this explanation, but the majority members of HPSCI stated their belief that all direct and indirect costs of the program should have been charged against the cap.3/

The essential difference between the cap and the prohibition is that, in the former, the Agency had authorization for an ongoing program and could expend funds and account for them in some way until $24 million was reached; in Section 107 no expenditures can be charged against the Nicaraguan covert action program.

The only useful discussion of the meaning of the terminology "directly or indirectly" is found in the House Report on H.R. 2760, which attempted to impose an absolute ban on support for military/paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The language of that bill is

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3/ Only one reference was made during the floor debate to the accounting practices utilized by the intelligence community in accounting for FY84 funds. Congressman Miller remarked:

> I would also suggest that the funding is illegal, because never have I seen such magnificant bookkeeping that can allow this $21 million to go the number of months that it has. They are always going to run out just before we take up the bill, but when the bill does not come out the way the intelligence community likes, then they are able to fund it for several months because somehow the economies are worked out. This is the most efficiently run war in history if they can make $21 million go this far. But we know that is not what is going on. There is diversion of other military sources and there is the raising of money in the private sector to support these mercenaries.

Executive Registry 5990

C11174/57

UNCLASSIFIED

C 0420

similar to the wording of Section 107 and may be helpful in [illegible] what the House had in mind.4/ The section-by-section analysis of the relevant provision speaks of "indirect support" in the context of support of entities outside Nicaragua which operate within Nicaragua. The specific example given to show the type of indirect support that would be prohibited was training conducted exclusively outside Nicaragua if given in preparation for military or paramilitary activity inside Nicaragua.

The report expresely noted that the section would not prohibit the collection, production or analysis of intelligence. Nor would it prohibit the provision of that intelligence to foreign governments, as long as the provision of such intelligence did not support military/paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by foreign nations or other entities.

G) RESTRICTION ON PLACE -- Section 107 prohibits the financial support of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua. Funding for any activity which would take place outside Nicaragua but would have the effect of supporting paramilitary operations inside Nicaragua would thus be forbidden.

H) RESTRICTION ON WHO DOES THE OPERATIONS -- The restriction against funding applies to paramilitary operations "by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." This wording effectively prohibits the Agency's funding of such activities via intermediaries.

Legislative History

4. The legislative history is helpful only for discerning the spirit behind Section 107. There is no analysis of the wording in 20 pages of floor debate. 130 CONG. REC. H8264-84

4/ OPERATIONS IN NICARAGUA

SEC. 801. (a) None of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 1983 or 1984 for the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department, agency, or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual. H.R. 2760, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

Executive Registry 5991

C1112/657

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(Daily ed. Aug. 2, 1984). Both those in favor of and those against the restriction agreed, however, that Section 107 bans the provision of any funds for military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua and that the intent is to terminate U.S. assistance to the Contras.

C 0421

5. Congressman Boland stated in his opening remarks that the single issue is "disagreement on the effectiveness and appropriateness of a particular covert action to overthrow the government of another nation." Id. at 8266. He later added that "our policy does not strengthen democracy in Nicaragua" and that "(t)his secret war should end -- today." Id. at 8276. Congressman Hyde noted that Section 107 "forbids any assistance to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua ..... No food, no medicine, no ammunition, not even moral support." Id. at 8269. The spirit of Section 107 is abundantly clear -- the House expects Section 107 to end U.S. assistance to the Contras.

6. While the drafters more than likely attempted to imitate the Clark Amendment's prohibition on assistance of any kind for paramilitary operations in Angola,5/ it can be argued that the Section 107 restriction is somewhat different. Unlike the Clark Amendment, this section limits all funds rather than all assistance and it could be thought, therefore, to permit certain activities precluded under the Clark Amendment. Section 107 can be read to allow assistance that either does not require funding by intelligence elements or that does not directly or indirectly support paramilitary operations.

Staff Salaries.

7. With regard to the staff salaries [redacted] Section 107 would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds available to the

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5/ The Clark Amendment reads, in pertinent part:

Limitation on certain assistance to and activities in Angola

Sec. 401(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until the Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section.

Executive Registry 5992

C1101/657

Agency [redacted] salaries [redacted] extent that those expenditures would have the effect of supporting paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The question of allocation of these costs, which was an important point under the spending cap, is not an issue under the wording of Section 107. Since no funds can be obligated or expended in FY85, no covert action program by the U.S. which supports paramilitary operations in Nicaragua is possible.

C 0422

Provision of Aid by Third Countries

8. With regard to the provision of aid by third countries, Section 107 prohibits funding, not discussion. This issue also presents a gray zone subject to interpretation. Certainly asking other countries to provide aid on their own is not prohibited so long as there is no quid pro quo. If, however, the third country expected repayment from the U.S., such assistance would be forbidden. If such a country provided aid with the understanding that the U.S. would provide an equal amount for one of their programs, the Agency would be in violation of both the letter and the spirit of Section 107 and would be open to charges of deliberate circumvention of the law.

9. The more difficult question is the extent to which Agency personnel can be used to solicit third country assistance. In my view, when FY85 begins, Section 107 prohibits the payment of the salaries and expenses of personnel for solicitation of third country assistance because such efforts would have the effect of indirectly supporting paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. Once again, on the spectrum of possible Agency activities to solicit third country assistance, some efforts would clearly be prohibited and others are arguably authorized. Payment of the salary and expenses of an employee whose full-time was dedicated to soliciting such assistance would contravene the restriction. On the other hand, requests for assistance by [redacted] in the course of his normal duties presents a closer case.6/

10. Another hypothetical situation poses troubling legal questions: the use of Agency personnel as couriers for funds provided by third countries to the Contras. While I believe such activity would be prohibited by Section 107 if the courier's sole function was to pass those funds, if that item was a de minimis part of the courier's functions, it could be argued that no funds were expended for the restricted purpose.

6/ If the President tasks the representative of a nonintelligence agency to solicit such assistance in diplomatic or other channels, the letter of Section 107 would not appear to be violated, but such action might be viewed by supporters of the restriction as a violation of the spirit of that prohibition.

Executive Registry 5993

C11/2/65-7

UNCLASSIFIED

11. In any event, under the requirement to keep Congress fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, the Agency [redacted] required to advise the Committees of any plans to solicit third country assistance for the Contras.

C 0423

Conclusion

12. The congressional intent behind Section 107 is to stop covert U.S. assistance to the Contras. The House crafted the language of that section tightly in order to restrict in every way possible any obligations or expenditures by U.S. intelligence elements which would result in continued assistance to military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua. Should that language remain in the final authorization act, in my view, any close cases would be viewed by the proponents of Section 107 as efforts to circumvent the statutory prohibition.

[redacted]

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Executive Registry 5994

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C 0424

UNCLASSIFIED

C11201657

Executive Registry 5995

Chapter 23 FN 30.

DECLASSIFIED

15 May 1985

5/15/85

Chron Bk 4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Operation

1. Abe Azzam telephoned this date to advise that he had contacted the DEA source [redacted]. The message [redacted] was as follows: Family and old friends could not determine whether the "proof" was valid. However, interest had been piqued and there was a request for answers to one or more of five additional questions which would be passed to the DEA source by his handler. (The questions suggested by [redacted] CIA OFFICER [redacted] had been cabled to the DEA Azzam commented that the source initially seemed somewhat reluctant to return and ask for more proof, but said he would do so.

[redacted]

4707

[redacted]

cc: DDO (eyes only)
AC/NE (eyes only)
NE/[redacted] (eyes only)

1/29/87

DECLASSIFIED [redacted]
DCI EXEC REG
Authority NND 947008 Date 4-87
ALL SECRET

CIIN 3899

6 June 87

5/14/85
10

UNCLASSIFIED

C 09283

14 May 85

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

[redacted] 14 May 85, DEA agents Abe AZZAM and [redacted] met [redacted] discuss the latest trip of the DEA agent [redacted] to [redacted] from which had he returned with alleged contraband [redacted] with the group holding Buckley.

[redacted]

THIRD AGENCY DEA

4708

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

REVIEWED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 June 87
MSCHEC

CIN 3900


THIRD AGENCY - DEA
UNCLASSIFIED
order not to have too much delay, it was
would contact
and pass the message that
was insufficient,
6. On 15 May, Azzam reported that
THIRD AGENCY - DEA
UNCLASSIFIED
CIN 3900

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	D. Fortier	7/22	
2	H. Teicher	7/22	
3			
4			
5			
6			

xx	ACTION		FILE
	APPROVAL		INFORMATION
	COMMENT		PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE		RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY		RETURN
	DISPATCH		SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Chapter 9 FOI-7/18/85
(7583) UNCLASSIFIED

Chron Ex. 5 N 7582

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO 402010 A/C

COPY NO 1 OF 2

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EYES ONLY

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

1/25/88

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

4570

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

N 7583

18 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran

1. I strongly endorse the thrust of the draft NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward Iran, particularly its emphasis on the need to take concrete and timely steps to enhance U.S. leverage in order to ensure that the USSR is not the primary beneficiary of change and turmoil in this critical country. While I am broadly in agreement with its assessment of the current political situation, the NSDD needs to reflect more fully on the complex of Soviet motives and recent actions towards Iran and their implications for U.S. policy initiatives. Moreover, I believe that the NSDD should be more precise about the extent and nature of domestic disaffection with the regime and about the potential for encouraging a more pro-Western stance within the regular armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard. Finally, I offer some specific suggestions on the draft itself that refine and add to the proposed U.S. policy actions.

2. The draft NSDD portrays the current Iranian regime as moving to improve its relations with the Soviet Union because of Iran's mounting difficulties. While true, it ignores the following recent developments indicating that Moscow has rebuffed the Iranians:

-- [redacted]

-- The Soviets recently withdrew between 1,000 and 1,500 Soviet economic advisers from Iran.

4570

TS 853513
Copy 1 of 10

UNCLASSIFIED

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR

-- Soviet-Iranian trade has declined significantly over the past year.

-- The Soviets have resumed a hard-line stance in their propaganda on Iran.

There are several possible explanations for these Soviet actions. Moscow may be questioning Tehran's sincerity in changing its anti-Soviet posture during its recent approaches to Moscow. The Soviets also may believe that the current Iranian regime has nowhere else to turn and that they may be able to wring real concessions from Iran by tightening the pressure. Moscow also my be trying to force Iran to end the war with Iraq.

3. This downturn in Soviet-Iranian relations strengthens the case made in the NSDD for our Allies filling the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Soviet economic advisers and the downturn in Soviet-Iranian trade. [redacted] are well positioned to help on the projects abandoned by the Soviets. Quick action could block a future return of the Soviets to these projects and remove a major source of Soviet influence in Iran.

4. On the question of the declining popularity of the regime, I would underline that the recent decline has largely occurred among that portion of the populace that is largely uncommitted and passive. The regime still retains steadfast adherents among the lower and peasant classes that are very active politically. At the same time, the NSDD could better reflect that we have seen evidence of a growing cleavage between those loyal to the regime and those opposed to it. U.S. actions-- [redacted] can exploit this cleavage and activate the uncommitted.

5. In formulating U.S. policy, we need to keep in mind that Iranian policy actions do not spring from a single source. The NSDD therefore might usefully highlight on page 3 that we might well witness a move toward moderation and accommodation on the part of the pragmatists while at the same time the radicals will be seeking to undermine those policies and seek the initiative through engaging in terrorist acts designed to radicalize the atmosphere and upstage the pragmatists.

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N 7585

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran

[redacted]

7. [redacted] Given our serious concerns about this evolution of a post-Khomeini regime and the likely important role of the Revolutionary Guard in a future Iran, I believe the draft NSDD should include an explicit statement in point 4, page 5 that we seek to develop contacts with leaders in the [redacted]

8. The following are comments or recommendations on specific points in the NSDD:

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TS 853513

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran N 7586

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-- The U.S also should find opportunities for public statements that stress that we have no antipathy towards Islam and furthermore that we view Islam as a positive moral force in the region in an age when materialism and atheism are on the rise. We should also make clear our lack of hostility to an Islamic Republic in Iran as long as international norms of terrorism and subversion are not violated.

-- I agree strongly with points 3 and 5 on page 6 of the draft NSDD that we should seek to open lines of communications to the existing Iranian leadership and should avoid actions that could alienate Iranians potentially receptive to improved relations with the U.S.. At the same time, if the US adopts point 6 and responds to Iranian-supported terrorism with

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SUBJECT: Draft NSDD re U.S. Policy Toward Iran N 7587

[redacted] economic reprisals.

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

All portions are classified TOP SECRET.

TS 853513

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)

UNCLASSIFIED

11/8/85
Executive Registry
85-4360/1

8 November 1985
8 NOV 85

Chron. Ex. 6

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Here is the letter about leaks I promised you in our telephone conversation early in the week.

[redacted]

This is only one of many unauthorized disclosures arising from a lack of discipline in the Executive as well as the Congressional oversight committees. This is a cancer which mortally threatens your Presidential authority to conduct foreign policy, our national security process, and our intelligence capabilities. It increasingly erodes the morale and the security ethic of all those who respect and comply with our security programs.

As you know, I have long been deeply concerned about this because I cannot adequately meet my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods unless those in government who receive and handle our intelligence are required to live up to their responsibilities.

On the Friday [redacted] I told the Senate Intelligence Committee, in a hearing on counterintelligence, that media leaks which broadcast sensitive information to the world do more damage than hostile services to our reputation for reliability and to our relationships with other nations. I put it this way:

> "....Virtually every category of source we have has been damaged by unauthorized disclosures over the last year or so. Talking to the press about intelligence information received in the deepest confidence has jeopardized the lives of agents. Public discussion of what we knew and when we knew it and the [redacted] .As we stand today, we have been spending large sums to enhance intelligence capabilities and permitting loose talk to seriously damage their value...."

On 14 November 1984, I wrote to you about the urgent need to establish discipline in the handling of classified information. In that memorandum, I cited eleven cases of media revelations of classified information which had damaged our ability to conduct an effective foreign intelligence program. At a subsequent NSPG meeting you directed that the SIG(I), the NSC subcommittee on intelligence which I chair, present recommendations for dealing with this plague. On 29 November 1984, I sent to Bud McFarlane a comprehensive set of proposals, developed by the SIG(I), a subcommittee chaired by Judge Webster, to bring the unauthorized disclosure problem under control. There are 18 separate action items to be considered.

2027

CIN #121

UNCLASSIFIED

Partially Declassified/Released on 9 Jul 1987
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by S. Reger, National Security Council

~~SECRET~~

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Much [illegible] has been lost in dealing with this problem. Today, I must tell you that [redacted]

While we have [illegible]orized with this problem, the governments of friendly foreign nati[illegible]s have told us that our inability to keep secrets has created great anx[illegible]ty about cooperating with us. [redacted]

I have been taking steps to limit information provided the oversight committees:

- restricting briefings to their staffs, of whom the Senate Committee has about 60;

- confining sensitive information to the chairmen and vice chairmen;

- no briefings for the purpose of media disclosures; and

- no sanitization of intelligence for Congressional publications without the explicit approval of me or my deputy.

Now, with your authorization to use the polygraph for eligibility to compartments and for counterintelligence investigations, I am planning to establish a special compartment for covert action information to be available only to members and perhaps one staff member for the minority and majority sides. To make this effective it is essential that your new directive permit use of the polygraph in investigating unauthorized disclosures as well as counterintelligence.

We should also work to require Congressional staffers to meet the same security standards and requirements as intelligence personnel, including polygraph screening on counterintelligence issues and keeping of records on press contacts.

To carry this off with the Congress, it is necessary to put our own house in order. More leaks emanate from the Executive side than from the Congress. [redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED

Substantially the same rules must apply broadly. There is great disparity between the Executive departments and agencies. All employees of CIA [redacted] are polygraphed and are subject to repolygraph. Press contacts are strictly controlled in those agencies and are recorded and documented. Unauthorized media contacts and disclosures are covered by polygraph re-examinations. The prospect of being asked about unauthorized disclosures in a polygraph re-examination is the strongest deterrent to leaking we have found to date. In recent years, CIA's repolygraph program has surfaced unauthorized disclosures by about [redacted] people. Most of them were denied or separated from Agency employment or, in the case of industrial personnel, had their security approvals removed.

The polygraph is effective. More than [redacted] percent of CIA security disapproval decisions are based on polygraph-developed information. Its success is a function of admissions made by individuals during or after polygraph testing.

Most of the classified intelligence leaks published by the media are of information collected by CIA [redacted] The strong personnel security programs and strict security discipline in these agencies make it unlikely that many of the leaks emanated from them. Over the last two years, [redacted] cases of the publication of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence were reported to my Security Committee by Intelligence Community agencies. Almost certainly there were other cases that were not reported. The Intelligence Community agencies conducted [redacted] investigations of those leaks, with more than one agency sometimes investigating the same leak. [redacted] cases were referred to the Department of Justice. Only one of these, the Morison case, was prosecuted. Usually no action is the result of there being so many recipients of the information that their job is like searching for a needle in a haystack.

I have already taken steps to reduce the dissemination of intelligence and your new directive will enable me to take further steps. We need to consider the further sifting of the haystack, and put leakers at risk by use of the polygraph or a grand jury, or both. We need also a high voltage specialized investigative team and Ed Meese is prepared to establish one.

The record of action on leaks is disturbing. Over the last two years, [redacted] This illustrates a grave need for all elements of the government to be equally diligent in identifying and acting on leaks.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

I am concerned about: the lack of action on the first two of these items; the failure for two months to bring the FBI in on the third; and, in the fourth case, closing the matter with [redacted] instead of, at a minimum, removal of the officer [redacted]

Respectfully yours,

7s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

UNCLASSIFIED
~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chron. Ex. 7

C 6178

22 NOVEMBE

and [redacted]zy summoned to [redacted]

eceived instructions

ontacted Copp. "Everything appears under control. Will now bett[redacted] 0945 hours." Gave contact instructions and formed [redacted]s standing by.

[redacted]. Only requirement was to assist in verifying phone num[redacted]bers of PM and FM. "A very senior official will call them.

Copp called. Advised that previous FM had approved an El-Al charter flight before going [redacted] But had not signed paper. Now busy morning of 22 November with [redacted] Foreign Ministry was refusing to issue flight clearances until after FM signed paper. Plane"s d window 20 minutes away. Copp asked [redacted]

[redacted] pointed outnegotiat[redacted] with Foreign Ministry best handled by Charge. Copp said h[redacted]ld recommend same to Washington. I noted same in cable t[redacted]adquarters but was advised not to involve Charge.

[redacted] Ca[redacted] Copp and updated him on foregoing. He said Was[redacted]on agreed to bringing in Charge. Copp said plane missed [redacted] window but was standing by.

Copp called. [redacted] said plane airborne and reaches go no go point circa 1725. [redacted] MFA after study opposed clearance and would recommend same to FM [redacted] talked yesterday wit[redacted] who said Emba did not concur. [redacted] at time was correct but additional information now available.

[redacted] Copp called. told him of above. He called White House w[redacted]th request for auth to involve[redacted] Dewey called and sai[redacted]bring in [redacted] as proposed. I did so.

[redacted] called [redacted] and validated [redacted]equ[redacted] to get FM out of cabinet meeting.

[redacted] called FM several times during [redacted]0 minutes. [redacted] standing by waiting for FM to [redacted]spond. Copp informed. He said plane decided to a[redacted] Asked Copp what next. He is standing by for instructions.

Foreign Ministry still had made no decision. Copp said NSC is now consi[redacted] [redacted] the mission. [redacted]

C11N 2373 UNCLASSIFIED [redacted] 6 April 1987

357

Partially Declassified/Released on 17 Aug 87 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED C 6175

[redacted] has requested the phone numbers of the FM and PM.

[redacted] request queried headquarters to find out if Sec State [redacted] re of mission and if he approves [redacted] involvement. Message comes back saying Sec State and Amb Oakley only two State officials aware of mission, they concur and all traffic should be kept in our channels. Copp states MacFarlane trying to phone FM.

[redacted] is Charge. He noted FM meeting just concluded [redacted] sion reached [redacted] says next step is for [redacted] to send formal diplomatic note to FM. Note should characteristics of aircraft, routes to and fro[redacted] cargo. Upon receipt FM will consider request. [redacted] promised note by 1100 hours 23 Nov. [redacted] Informed Copp. He said he will allow time for my report to reach Washington then phone to discuss options.

Received msg directi[redacted] to contac[redacted] and to not MacFarlane just talked [redacted] FM who agreed to aircraft clearance.

23 NOVEMBER 85

[redacted] contacted [redacted] MFA [redacted] and conveyed above MacFarlane messa[redacted] only person available that time at MFA. [redacted] not aware of telephone conversation MacFarlane/FM. Opined dip note still needed.

Charge went to For Ministry to mee[redacted] presented note. Copp phoned to advise of new plan tentative involving three flights by two planes to [redacted] 23-27 Nov. Copp said he having trouble arranging for planes for [redacted] to Iran link. [redacted]

Copp asked if I knew what was going on-- had I been briefed. Said Charge and I in dark but could make some guesses. Arranged for immediate meeting at parking lo[redacted] Lasted ten minutes. Copp said [redacted] Hostages deal

Still no response from Foreign Ministry [redacted]

[redacted] told Charge decision reached but before conveying same Foreign Ministry would require [redacted] dip note. It had to contain two statements: a) operation [redacted] been undertaken for humanitarian reasons, and b) the operation is [redacted] free American hostages [redacted] said if note delivered forthwith, decision would follow immediately. Obvious Implication is decision would be positive. All found no problem with first point but hung up on second. Copp deferred to Washington. Copp

REVIEWED RELEASE
Date 4/2/11/87
C11N2375

UNCLASSIFIED C 6133

[redacted] MacFarlane and been trying for past two hours to [redacted] not successful.

[redacted] Opp advises we can anticipate negative response to [redacted] request through our channels. Charge sent cable recommending [redacted] alternate part b wording which he believes [redacted] at this point would accept. Obviously patience running out in Washington [redacted] end at this point for answer received that [redacted] negative [redacted] sion stands and Charge should simply [redacted] saying "We regret your Government [redacted] to fulfill the USG request for this humanitarian mission." Charge delivered same to FM who was greatly troubled. Conversation re self defeating way this entire activity handled.

Message received from headquarters: "It obvious from above we a[redacted] closing down [redacted] aspect of this operation."

[redacted] Shut things down [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

CIIN 2375

16 April 1982

5/5/86

(8)

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

5/5/86

Chron. Gx. 8

N-17765

[redacted]

(20)

[redacted]

5/6/87

178

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

(469)

5/5/86

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

N 17766

179



Partially Declassified/Released on 5/6/87
under provisions of E.O. 12356
By D. Reger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED

470

UNCLASSIFIED
Chron. 6 & 9
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6/27/86

(10)

From: NSOLN --CPUA
To: NSKS --CPUA

Date and time 06/27/86 12:52:41

--- Reply to note of 06/27/86 11:12
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Question from CBS

N 4951

I have just had a chance to watch the W 57th piece. As far as I am concerned, it is the single most distorted piece of "reproting" I have ever seen. Hull does not allege that he knows me, does not confess to receiving money from me or anyone else at the NSC. The only charges made about the NSC are made by people who are in jail, on their way to jail or just out of jail. If this is supposed to be credible, then I'll eat my shirt. I have never met ANY of the accusersor had anything to do with any of them. Obviously, I know and have met several times with Eden Pastora. He does not allege any wrongdoing. I know Robert Owen - he was, up until the time it went out of business - a consultant to the State Dept. NHAO. He was not "paid off" $50k, as alleged by an anonomous accuser, he was paid a salary and expenses for services he provided in delivering humanitarian aid for the USG on a State Dept. contract. Finally, their main "witness," Mr.Terrell was not called to appear before Sen. Kerry's inquisition - apparently because people have learned that Mr. Terrell was not, as be claimed, a former Special Forces Officer, nor a CIA agent, nor a "contra combat leader."In short, neither the witnesses nor the slanderous piece that CBS produced have any credibility whatsoever.

Chron. Ex. 10

[redacted] 6 July 1987
Under provisions of E.O. 12356
by G. [illegible], National Security Council

1682

UNCLASSIFIED

N1846
11/

8/25/87 (11)

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

[redacted]

N 125:5

(86)

PROFS --CPUA

-ply to note of 07/25/86 11:33
FROM: OLIVER NORTH
ject: CAVE MEETING WITH IRANIAN
- is meeting w/[redacted] to determine level of
ent and current political sentiments toward the present regime. He was
pared to pass a message [redacted] but I
k it back when you advised that [redacted] was to be the
pient. [redacted] At the
sent, the only active courier is [redacted] and the only recipient in the
Cave will report his findings when he returns from Frankfurt and we can
determine whether we wish to use any of these new contacts as
riocutors. Also related: Mir and [redacted] are both out of their respective
ces. Charlie agrees that it is entirely possible that they are meeting in
ge.

CAVE MEETING WITH IRANIAN
FROM: RSPAR --CPUA TO: RSJAP --CPUA . 07/25/86 15:30:19
RSJAP --CPUA

JMP 5/19/90 (19)

Partially Declassified/Released on 8/31/87
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by R. Wright, National Security Council

(1943)

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

Chron. Ex. II

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7/28/86

- Chron. Ex. 12

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 July 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

I 0176

SUBJECT: American Hostages

After discussing the release of Father Lawrence Jenco with Charlie Allen and Dewey Clarridge, I believe it is important that you have our assessment of this development and prospects for release of additional hostages.

First, it is indisputable that the Iranian connection actually worked this time, after a series of failures. You will recall that the [redacted] B Ghorbanifar connection also resulted in the release of Reverend Weir in [redacted] September 1985. [redacted] After the impasse in Tehran over in late May, [redacted] continued to initiate direct contact with one of my officers, George Cave, even though the Iranians had been told that we were no longer interested in pursuing the matter. The fact that [redacted] persisted in contacting us indicates his desire to arrange a "deal" with Washington, either through Ghorbanifar or, if necessary, with Cave. He also clearly wanted to keep a channel open. Amiram Nir, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Israel on Counter-Terrorism, has also played a critical role in a determined effort to force Iran to begin the release of American hostages. He has been supported by Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin in this endeavor. In order to make the terms of the arrangements more palatable, Israel, on its own, offered additional arms "to sweeten the deal."

[redacted] To reinforce this commitment, he transferred $4 million to a West European bank to pay his European intermediary for the HAWK spare parts removed from our mission aircraft in May. On Wednesday, 23 July, when no hostage had been released, Ghorbanifar was instructed to inform [redacted] that "the deal was off."

1368

Partially Declassified/Released on 29 [illegible] 1987
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by S. Reger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON

SE-05349

CIN #507 / R 01

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted] NC/OC

I 0177

In return for the release, [redacted] probably expects to receive most of the HAWK spare parts not yet delivered, along with additional military equipment that Israel unilaterally has added to the arrangement. Once this equipment is delivered, [redacted] stated that Iran would take action to obtain the release of one more hostage and would pay the remainder of the money owed to the Iranian intermediary for the HAWK spare parts.

[redacted] moreover, indicated a willingness to meet with U.S. officials again on these matters, either in Tehran or "somewhere else" -- presumably Western Europe.

This is how we see the current situation:

-- The Ghorbanifar-[redacted] connection has worked for the second time -- and another American has been released.

-- Ghorbanifar is an uncontrollable factor, but appears to respond generally to Nir's direction.

-- Nir has every reason to work for further releases of our hostages. Peres and Rabin have put their reputation on the Ghorbanifar-[redacted] connection and support Nir fully in his endeavors. There would be a considerable loss of face for Nir and his superiors if the link were broken. This connection appears to be the only hope they have for recovering their own missing soldiers.

-- [redacted] has now acted and likely expects the United States to respond quickly in turn by delivering most of the remaining HAWK spare parts. He probably believes the United States is also supplying the additional military equipment that has been promised.

-- Whether we are prepared to negotiate or meet their demands or expections at this point, we should find out what they are.

-- If the deliveries do not occur, [redacted] will lose badly with his superiors in Tehran and matters could turn ugly, especially since the Lebanese Hizballah captors probably are not pleased with the Jenco release.

-- If there is no USG contact as a result of Jenco's release, it is entirely possible that Iran and/or Hizballah could resort to the murder of one or more of the remaining hostages.

2

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted] NC/OC

#507

SC-05349-86
Copy 1 of 1

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

1 0178

In summary, based on the intelligence at my disposal, I believe that we should continue to maintain the Ghorbanifar [redacted] contact and consider what we may be prepared to do to meet [redacted] minimum requirements that would lead to release of the rest of the hostages. Although I am not pleased by segmented releases of the American hostages, I am convinced that this may be the only way to proceed, given the delicate factional balance in Iran. I also see resolution of the hostage issue as potentially leading to contacts with moderate factions in Iran that we may be able to deal with in the longer term.

Bill

William J. Casey

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

SC-05348-
Copy 1 of 1

Department of State 8/1/86 OUTGOI

S 4176

PAGE 02 OF 03 STATE 241128 UNCLASSIFIED C01/08 202054 NODS7

ORIGIN NODS-00

(13)

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /008 R

#579

DRAFTED BY: [redacted]

APPROVED BY: [redacted]

S/S: KMQUINN

S/S-O: REDOWNEY

Chron. Ex. 13

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

S/S ONLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY [redacted] IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 241128

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY [redacted]

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] PROJECT

REF [redacted] 974

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE APPRECIATE YOUR EXCELLENT WORK IN MAKING TENTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A MEETING IN LONDON WITH [redacted] AND HOPEFULLY [redacted] WE HAVE NOT YET DETERMINED WHO OUR EMISSARY WILL BE; HOWEVER YOU MAY INFORM [redacted] THAT WE WILL HAVE A USG EMISSARY IN LONDON NEXT WEEK TO MEET WITH HIM. WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE MEETING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. BUT ANY OF THE PERIODS SUGGESTED PARA. 4 REFTEL ARE ACCEPTABLE. PLEASE SEE IF YOU CAN PIN DOWN A TIME FOR A MEETING. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU THE NAME

Partially declassified on MAY 8, 1997
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B. Rieger, National Security Council

OF OUR EMISSARY BY MONDAY, AUGUST 4.

3. PLEASE ALSO REASSURE [redacted] THAT WE ARE IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH HIM ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE UTMOST DISCRETION. SHULTZ

(14)

UNCLASSIFIED Chron. Ex. 14

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

CH 7
#52

August 12, 1986

Honorable Ronald D. Coleman
416 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ron:

As you are aware, there have been numerous stories published in the press during the last year alleging that members of the National Security Council violated the Boland amendment pronibiting certain assistance to the contra fighting the government of Nicaragua. As a result of these allegations, you introduced a resolution of inquiry to compel the National Security Council to provide certain information so the Congress could make a determination as to whether or not the Boland amendment was violated during the time it was in effect.

Because of the highly classified nature of the work of the National Security Council, the resolution of inquiry was referred to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Members of the Committee, including myself, went to the White House to examine the issues raised by the resolution with Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council staff and one of the principal subjects of the resolution; the President's National Security Adviser; and other members of the NSC staff, including White House counsel. In addition, the Committee also examined other classified evidence concerning the resolution.

Based on our discussions and review of the evidence provided, it is my belief that the published press allegations cannot be proven.

The resolution of inquiry was the proper vehicle by which to bring these matters to the attention of the Congress and to this Committee, and we appreciate your efforts to remove doubts about United States activities.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman

UNCLASSIFIED

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4408

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

cc: NSPVR --CPUA

UNGA speech text -- important fix

NSG FROM: NSOLB --CPUA TO: NSJAP --CPUA 09/22/86 10:35:55

TO: NSJAP --CPUA

*** Reply to Note of 09/22/86 08:38

NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH

Subject: Iran

Rafsanjani Velayati is one of the few non-clerics at the top of the GOI. He is a technocrat, reportedly a conservative and relatively close to Rafsanjani. He reportedly is a member of the "War Council" which determines the distribution of resources and funds within the Iranian government. According to [redacted] Velayati participated in the decision regarding our earlier diplomatic approaches to the GOI [redacted] and evaluated these initiatives as sincere. [redacted] reports, however, that Velayati was not in the final sessions Casey had which authorized [redacted] trip to the U.S. In these sessions Rafsanjani, Mohsen Rafiq-Dust and Mohammad Hosein Jalalai along with Musavi-Khoeniei made the decision for his to

come to the U.S. and to be assured that he was indeed talking to the top of the GOI. In the Casey/Shultz discussions: Casey informs that he told Shultz, alone, that the CIA was assisting in bringing [redacted] into and out of the U.S. for talks and that he (Casey) would get back to Shultz at some point in the future on what had transpired. According to Bill, Shultz simply said "OK." Hope this is

(15)

4/22/87

1683

4/22/87

JMP 3A/112 (20)

Declassified/Released on 6 JUL 87 under provisions of E.O. 12356 by B. Reger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET [redacted]

Omm. Ex. 15

not another example of "muddled" talk, misunderstood. The last time he told Goldwater we were going to "lay some mines in Nicaragua," Goldwater thought he said we were going to "pay some fines for some lawyers." NEW SUBJ: [redacted]

[redacted] W/E, North

Iran

MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/22/86 12:00:49
To: NSJMP --CPUA

>>> Reply to Note of 09/10/86 13:15
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Iran
Geo Cave will brief Casey this afternoon on the results of the discussions w/ [redacted] Casey has asked what we are doing abt bringing Sec State up to speed on results. I told him this was your call. Casey is urging a mtg on Weds. among you, Casey, Cave and Me to discuss situation prior to discussion w/ Shultz. Can we schedule same?

Iran

MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/22/86 09:22:57
To: NSJMP --CPUA

>>> Reply to Note of 09/10/86 13:15
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Iran
Talks with [redacted] commenced on Friday night and proceeded almost non-stop until Sunday at 1100 when he departed for Istanbul aboard charter. George and Dick [redacted] advise that things went extremely well. He is assured that the GOI is dealing directly with the USG and that the mutual interests of both parties transcend the [redacted] of the hostages - but that this problem must be solved first.

PROFS 0570

[redacted]

190

FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP [redacted] 12:00:49
NSJMP --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 09/10/86 13:15
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Iran
Geo Cave will brief Casey this afternoon on the results of the discussions w/ [redacted]. Casey has asked what we are doing and bringing Sec State up to speed on results. I told him this was your call. Casey is urging a mtg on Weds. among you, Casey, Cave and me to discuss situation prior to discussion w/ Shultz. Can we schedule same?
Iran

MSG FROM: NSOLN --CPUA TO: NSJMP --CPUA 09/22/86 09:22:57
TO: NSJMP --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 09/10/86 13:15
NOTE FROM: OLIVER NORTH
Subject: Iran
Talks with [redacted] commenced on Friday night and proceeded almost non-stop until Sunday at 1100 when he departed for Istanbul aboard charter. George and Dick agree that things went extremely well. He is assured that the GOI is dealing directly with the USG and that the mutual interests of both parties transcend the "obstacle" of the hostages - but that this problem must be solved first. Much credit in this goes to Dick, who established the initial contact in Brussels. [redacted] wants to set up a "joint committee" in Turkey or Portugal for resolving the issues which separate us - an idea which would then lead to putting a discrete communications team in Tehran. At one point he asked if Secord could return with him to advise on how to set this up. He asked specifically for a sign from the USG that we are indeed moving in the right direction and we agreed to a carefully constructed phrase in a VOA broadcast which would mention the nations which denied access to the hijacked PA 73 a/c - and include Iran in the list. He will be back to us later in the week after he has met with the leadership in Tehran. In discussing what we could do for them he raised the issues of 2M homeless in Iran, the collapse of the economy and the destruction of their oil industry. He complained bitterly about the French effort this spring which he said was designed only to get their

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE: SEP86 [redacted] WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

JMP ? - 1113 (22)

191

hostages out and to help Chirac get elected. We noted that Rafsanjani could not be reelected, that his motivation was to bring about an honorable end to the killing in the Iran/Iraq war, and to reestablish a positive relationship with the Iranian government that would lead to Christians, Jews and Moslems living in peace with one another. On a number of occassions he was told that we believed deeply in the teachings of our Holy Book, a copy of which was on the table, and reference was made to a number of pertinent passages (e.g. Gen. 15:7-21; Gal. 3:7; etc.). At one point he noted to George that he being a man of God had removed the only argument they had - that Allah was supposed to be on their side. He has promised prompt action on the hostages, is looking for assurances that we will not walk away once they use their influence to get them free and noted that the USG should stop other attempts to make contact w/ the GOI to prevent confusion within the factions at home. He expressed several concerns about the Ashgharizadeh channel and admitted that they believed someone close to [redacted] was working for the KGB. He expressed great concern that the Soviets could exploit confirmation of the contact by making the contact public and doing great mischief in Iran and the U.S. and by rapidly escalating their assistance to Iraq or even intervening in Iran. We did all we could to feed this anxiety. Nir has been calling regularly to exhort us to move on the next shipment. Because [redacted] has asked us to wait to see what the result of his discussion in Tehran is, we have decided to stall by telling Nir and Gorba that we must have a meeting w/ [redacted] before we can proceed. We have told Nir that you and RR are very concerned about the two new hostages and that we cannot proceed w/ further deliveries until such a meeting takes place. [redacted] has asked that for the time being we leave the Israelis out of this because of the problems at home. Contrary to what Nir said here, [redacted] did know that Nir was an Israeli. We will put together a summary of the talks by my return Wednesday. You can brief HK that we seem to be headed in a vy positive direction on this matter and have hopes that the hostage resolution will lead to a significant role in ending the Iran/Iraq war. V/R North

Iran

[redacted]

1 P 3A 114

192

Chron. Ex. 16

(26a)

Partially Declassified/Released on 6 May 1987
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by Roger, National Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

10/9/01

Coy Exhibit #2 10/6/86
4/1/87 mgo

Chron. Ex. 17

UNCLASSIFIED

From: NSRLE --CPUA
To: NSCPC --CPUA

Date and time 10/06/86 12:47:31

N 9300

NOTE FROM: Robert L. Earl
Subject: TEST
The only change I have on this so far is that it was in support of FDN forces in the SOUTH not in the north of Nicaragua. I'll correct that w/ JMP when/if he responds, or if we get something else significant to pass on to him.
*** Forwarding note from NSRLE --CPUA 10/06/86 11:49 ***
To: NSJMP --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 08/24/86 13:01
NOTE FROM: Robert L. Earl
Subject: TEST
Yesterday one of the Democracy Inc aircraft apparently went down on a resupply mission to FDN forces in the north. It is overdue from its mission, and no radio contact was received. It is currently unknown where or why the aircraft went down, but [redacted] assets are discreetly organizing a SAR effort over international waters & friendly territory portions of the route. Three Americans and one Nicaraguan national aboard. I will keep you advised of details as I get them.

3709

Partially Declassified/Released on 8-19-87
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by B Reger, National Security Council

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